Hernan Navarro v. C. Dotson et al.

CLERE’S OFFICE □□□□ DIST. COl AT HARRISONBURG, VA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED POR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA June 17, 2026 ROANOKE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLER BY: S/J.Vasquez Hernan Navarro, ) DEPUTY CLERK ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00789 ) C. Dotson ef a/, ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Hernan Navarro, an incarcerated individual proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining about alleged differential treatment of him based on his status as a Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) inmate under a contract between VDOC and the United States Virgin Islands (““USVI’), pursuant to which VDOC agreed to house inmates from the USVI at its facilities. Navarro complains that inmates from the USVI, such as him, are restricted to be designated to Security Level 4 or higher facilities under VDOC Operating Policy ““OP’’) 830.1. He contends that his rights have been violated because he cannot be transferred to a Security Level 3 institution no matter how well he behaves.

This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Navarto’s complaint. (Dkt. 16.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant the motion and dismiss this action.

I. Background The court has taken all facts alleged in Navarro’s complaint, not the legal conclusions, as true at this stage. Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020).

In 2011, Navarro, a United States citizen, was transferred from a prison in the USVI to Wallens Ridge State Prison. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 12.) VDOC had entered into a contract to house inmates from the USVI under the Interstate Corrections Compact. (Dkt. 1-2 at 7–22.) In 2015, in this Court, Navarro sued former VDOC Director Harold Clarke and others about the conditions of his confinement. (Id. ¶ 14; Dkt. 19 ¶ 11 (citing Civil Action No. 7:15-cv- 000635).) The lawsuit was resolved through mediation. (Dkt. 1-2 at 23–24.) The agreed order resulting from that mediation required VDOC to “afford to inmates housed pursuant to the Correctional Services Contract between the VDOC and [USVI] Department of Justice the process applied in VDOC classification policies and procedures, as may be amended by the VDOC, applicable to other inmates housed by the VDOC, including an annual review.” (Id. at 24.) Also under the agreed order, Navarro was transferred to Keen Mountain Correctional Center, where he was housed “for about eight years,” but he was “never given an annual review.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15–16.)1 He was “told by the Counselor, Unit Manager, and Warden that they [could] not put [Navarro] in for a transfer to a level three VDOC facility because of O.P. 830.1 at page five.” (Id. ¶ 15.)

VDOC OP 830.1 Part V governs “Contract Inmate Annual Review Requirements.” (Dkt. 1-2 at 32.) Part V(A) requires counselors to “conduct annual reviews for contract inmates[,] i.e., Virgin Islands and Hawaii[,] within 30 days after the Annual Review Date, the

In or about June 2017, according to the complaint, VDOC OP 830.1, Institutional Classification Management, was amended to add this specific provision,2 which Navarro says is “an unconstitutional policy which discriminates against Virgin Islands inmates.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.) According to Navarro, under this policy, a “Virgin Island inmate[] can only ask at his annual review to [go to a facility higher] up in Security Level and not down . . . and no matter how many years he is charge free he can only go up in Security level.” (Id. ¶ 27.)

In June or July 2025, Navarro was transferred to a Security Level 5 facility, Wallens Ridge State Prison, because of a pending disciplinary violation for a 103b charge, which was subsequently dismissed.3 (Dkt. 1 ¶ 19.) Defendant Chadwick Dotson, who was VDOC’s director at the time of Navarro’s transfer to Wallens Ridge State Prison, emailed Navarro (and presumably all other inmates) to announce the commencement of Virginia model correctional

Navarro’s complaint does not identify actions or inactions of any particular Defendant to this action other than Defendant Dotson, and he does not specify the capacity in which he sues Defendants. The complaint does not allege that Navarro should be classified as a Level inmate.4 Rather, his suit is essentially a challenge to the “system” or the governing regulations on the theory that he could, at some future point, become eligible for transfer to a Security Level 3 facility but may be foreclosed from that possibility, because of the limitation that VDOC will house the USVI inmates only at Security Level 4 or higher facilities. He

II. Standard of Review “[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”

Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state[] a plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A claim is plausible if the complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and if there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007)). In making this evaluation, the court accepts all well-pled facts as true, but it need not assume the truth of any “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” as these are not well-pled facts. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Pleadings filed by pro se litigants must be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). “Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

A pro se complaint must still “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. Analysis 1. Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities As noted above, Navarro did not specify in which capacity he sued Defendants, so the court has assumed he asserts his claims against each Defendant in both their official and individual capacities. Navarro’s official capacity claims for monetary damages fail because a suit against a state official in their official capacity is “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “Thus, since a state cannot be a defendant, plaintiffs may not recover damages against state officials sued in their official capacities for claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hunter v. Virginia State Bar, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (E.D. Va. 2011). Additionally, whereas § 1983 “permits suit against ‘every person’ who deprives an individual of his or her rights under color of state law, neither States nor state officials acting in their official capacities constitute ‘persons’ within the meaning of the statute when sued for monetary relief.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2020).

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that allows individuals to seek prospective equitable relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 2020). To fall within this exception, a plaintiff must allege “an ongoing violation of federal law” and seek relief that is “properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (cleaned up). But, “the exception is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief, [and it] does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past . . ..” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). Further, “conjecture regarding discrete future events . . . is insufficient” to establish “a continuing governmental practice or an ongoing violation.” DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 1999).

Here, even assuming that Navarro’s request for injunctive relief is prospective and that at least one of the Defendants could be properly charged with enforcement, his claims still must be dismissed because Navarro has admitted he does not currently score to be housed at Level 3 as explained above. Navarro thus has failed to present facts indicating any alleged ongoing violation of law such that the Ex parte Young exception could apply. See Cotto v. Campbell, 126 F.4th 761, 771 (1st Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 504 (Jan. 12, 2026) (noting that the “[t]he pivotal question [under Ex parte Young] is whether the relief ‘serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law’ because a court cannot issue injunctive relief, no matter how ‘prospective’ it may appear, without such a violation”) (emphasis added). Navarro attempts to leverage the situations of other inmates who he claims are USVI inmates scoring at Level 3. (See, e.g., Dkt. 19 ¶ 4.) But Navarro cannot assert the claims of other inmates.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972) (“Appellee has standing to seek redress for injuries done to him, but may not seek redress for injuries done to others.”).

Therefore, any official capacity claims that could be asserted by Navarro fail to establish a plausible claim of entitlement to relief.

2. Claims Against Defendants in Their Individual Capacities As stated above, Navarro’s challenge is most accurately described as a challenge to the system and/or applicable regulations. Such a claim is not properly asserted against Defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a vehicle for holding individual “persons” liable for their violations of constitutional or federal law. Liability under § 1983 is often described as personal, meaning that a defendant can only be held liable for his or her actions or inactions. See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss challenge with “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed me accusations and legal conclusions.” Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of inmate’s suit that lumped defendants together) (cleaned up). A complaint under § 1983 must “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him . . . as distinguished from collective allegations.” Robbins v. Okla. Ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original); see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that a § 1983 complaint must allege factual detail about each defendant’s personal involvement). If a plaintiff has not alleged any personal connection between a defendant and a denial of constitutional rights, the claim against that defendant must fail. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Here, Navarro has not alleged any personal connection between a defendant and a denial of due process or equal protection. Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim against any defendant. Navarro cannot simply challenge the “system” under Section 1983 individual capacity claims.

The Fourth Circuit recently reiterated this in Rice v. Adams, 172 F.4th 428 (4th Cir. 2026), explaining that, in the § 1983 context, the motion to dismiss standard demands that a plaintiff “plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 432 (emphasis in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). It continues: “The allegations must be particular enough to allow one to infer what each defendant did and knew. Lumping defendants together won’t do. . . . We require [] ‘specific factual allegations for each defendant,’ because only such allegations provide ‘fair notice to that defendant of the plaintiff’s claim and underlying factual support.” Id. Because of the lack of specific personal allegations, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case in which an inmate had died from opioid withdrawal because the complaint did “not allow [the courts] to connect any named officer to any act or omission” that supported the claim. Id. at 433. It characterized this flaw as “fatal.” Id. Likewise, Navarro here does not allege any specific actions or inactions of any Defendants. Six of the seven named Defendants are not mentioned at all except for the conclusory allegation that they are each “legally responsible for [] operations” and the welfare of inmates. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 4-10.) No actions or inactions of these Defendants are stated, so the claims against them must fail.

Navarro’s complaint does refer to Defendant Dotson, the former Director of VDOC, but Navarro does not identify any particular acts or inactions of Dotson that would indicate any plausible claim of entitlement to relief. As with the other named Defendants, Navarro seeks to hold Dotson responsible solely because he was in charge. This is not permitted under § 1983, for the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability is “inapplicable” to § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Government officials “may be liable in their individual capacities only for their personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms.” Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022). The mere assertion that Dotson was responsible for the operation of the VDOC and the facilities in its jurisdiction is insufficient to support a claim of supervisory liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 227 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Appellant argues that Appellee had an overarching duty to keep the patients at CSH safe.

While this may be true, it does not relieve Appellant of the burden of showing a pervasive risk of harm that Appellee knew about, actually or constructively—a burden that Appellant has not met.”) (internal citations omitted).

Navarro mentions Dotson sent out an email related to the announcement of new model facilities with better conditions. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 20.) According to Navarro, this email made him feel sad because USVI inmates could never be housed at a model facility. (Id. ¶ 21.) But the simple act of sending of an email announcing new facilities does not support a claim that Dotson violated Navarro’s due process or equal protection rights. Navarro also mentions that the VDOC Director was responsible for amending the regulations in 2017 that limit USVI inmates to certain level facilities. (Id. ¶ 27.) He contends the VDOC Director made this change to retaliate against Navarro for his 2015 litigation. (Id.) But Dotson was not the VDOC Director in 2017,5 so this conclusory, unsubstantiated, and time-barred allegation does not state any plausible claim of entitlement to relief. Finally, Navarro’s complaint states

In sum, Navarro’s complaint does not indicate a plausible claim of entitlement to relief against any of the individuals named as Defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Without a viable federal claim pending, the court declines to exercise any supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), such as Navarro’s contention that Virginia Code § 53.1-32.1 was violated, that VDOC breached the contract between it and the USVI, or that VDOC violated its own regulations.7

Finally, Navarro filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint to add reference to a proposed bill pending before the Governor. (Dkt. 22.) For the reasons explained by Defendants in their opposition at Dkt. 25 at 3-4, the court finds that this amendment would be futile and would not alter the court’s analysis herein. Accordingly, the court DENIES this motion.

IV. Conclusion and Order For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 16), and DENIES Navarro’s motion seeking to amend his complaint (Dkt. 22). The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

The Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to Navarro.

ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2026.

HON. JASMINE H. YOON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE