Alexander v. Greenup
Alexander v. Greenup
Opinion of the Court
The Judges
after stating the case. With respect to the general question in this case, I take it to be clear that although a patent, perfect on its face, is only to be vacated for matter dehors the patent, by a proper and regular proceeding, 141 *yet that a patent may carry on its face intrinsic evidence of its own nullity, and be considered void, when exhibited in the progress of a trial. I will put the case of a patent obtained “for land now holden in fee by A.• or “for escheated land,’’ (at this day under the Commonwealth,) in the ordinary way, as if it were waste and unappropriated land: in either case, it does not want extraneous evidence to shew, that the Commonwealth has been deceived in its grant, or rather has granted that which was not grantable at all in the first case, or, in the second, in that mode, or for that consideration, which the law of the country justifies. The recognition of a principle going to defeat patents perfect as upon the face thereof, on the ground of extraneous and latent defects, by a regular proceeding, does not conflict with another principle, that a patent which is defective per se, is to be held void, in the first instance.
In the case before us, admitting for the present, that the act of 1785 applies, for the purpose of' perfecting entries for es-cheated land made in the time of Eord Fairfax; the question is, whether this patent is not void, as on its face; 1st. On the ground that it does not state that the es-cheat preceded the entry; and, 2dly. That it does not state that the escheat was regularly made by an inquisition. This last question is important; and I shall not now decide it, as there are other and plainer grounds on which I hold the judgment of the District Court to be evidently erroneous. On the one hand, it may be argued that the officers of the Commonwealth should be intended to have granted the patent on the proper documents only; and, on the other, it is a principle of our law, certainly not to be relaxed in favour' of a Lord Proprietor, and greatly for the liberty of the subject, that the King cannot enter upon the lands of a subject upon mere sur.mises, nor without the solemn inquisition of a Jury.
As to the 1st objection, it is only stated that the land escheated from Jonathan Monkhouse, deceased. There is nothing in the patent to shew that this escheat 142 happened *prior to the date of the entry; and the patent would be satisfied, if in fact that escheat had accrued after the entry, and before the date of the patent. I admit that my own opinion is, that, on a liberal scale of construction, the escheat must be taken to have been prior to the entry: but it is a rule, on the other hand, that patents are always to be taken in a sense most favorable for the King, and against the party,
I have thus considered this case as if the act of 1785 related to entries for escheated lands: if it did, and the escheat could, on this patent, be taken to have been anterior to the entry, the title of the appellee would have been complete: but my opinion is, that that act relates only to unappropriated and ungranted lands.
This is evident both from the preamble and body of the act, taken in a general view. The preamble states the mischief contemplated to be remedied, to be, that no mode existed for granting out the unappropriated lands of the Northern Neck. It is argued, however, that the general term “entries,” in the 4th section,
Upon the whole, while I doubt extremely (to say the least) whether this patent is not void, for the reasons assigned, supposing the act of 1785 to extend to entries of this character, (for escheated lands,) I am clearly of opinion, that the act applies only to unappropriated lands for which entries had been made; and being thus confined, I am of opinion that the instruction of the Court below was erroneous; that the patent ought not to have been received as evidence of the appellee’s title; and that therefore the judgment be reversed.
The principal questions in this case are, whether the recital contained in the appellee’s patent, 145 Mated the 8th day of December, 1788, was conclusive evidence, that a title nad accrued to the Commonwealth by virtue of an inquest of escheat taken upon the death of Jonathan Monkhouse, in the patent named; and whether the said patent was likewise conclusive evidence of a title derived to the plaintiff, under the Commonwealth, unless the defendant should shew, in evidence to the Jury, a better title in himself, (or those under whom he claims,) derived from the Commonwealth, since the said escheat in the plaintiff’s patent mentioned happened? Such being the instruction given to the Jury at the trial in the District Court, as stated in the bill of exceptions.
On examining the records of the late proprietor’s office of the Northern Neck, now in the register’s office, I find, that, formerly, there was great solemnity used in obtaining patents for escheated lands; an instance of which I shall notice, in the case of land that escheated to the proprietor, on the death of Frances White, alias Lampton.
On the 3d June, 1729, Dr. Thomas Turner gave information by letter to Thomas Lee, the proprietor’s agent, that one Frances White, alias Lampton, had been seised of about 50 acres of land in the County of Richmond, now King George, and died without heirs, or having disposed of ihe same; and prayed to have the preference of a grant thereof.
On the 7th of April, 1720, Thomas Lee issued his warrant to Edward Barrow, surveyor of Richmond County, empowering him to survey the said land, and return the survey and plat to the office, in the customary time; in which warrant the agent recited that Turner had obtained a certificate, and published and returned the same, according to the rules of the office. At the foot of the warrant there is a direction to Turner that “when you return your survey you must bring Mrs. White’s title.” signed Thomas Lee.
Next in order is a survey, and plat of the land, made by J. Warner, surveyor of
By this it appears that in the time of the proprietorship of the late Hord Fairfax, great ceremonies were deemed necessary, and were used in obtaining patents for es-cheated lands in the Northern Neck, but I have not been able to procure the form of an escheat patent, without that territory. It appears, however, that, in the times of the proprietorship of Hady Culpeper and Hady Fairfax, less ceremony was used in obtaining such patents, than in later times p as they had sometimes been used without a prior inquest of office; but still there was a particular recital of previous ceremonies, having been observed, according to the rules of the office; as appears by the preamble of a patent issued to Edward Turberville; which is as follows: “Marguritte Hady Culpeper, Catharine Hady Fairfax, Proprietors of the Northern Neck of Virginia, To all, &c. Whereas Edward Turbervile, of the County of Richmond, hath set forth to our office, that Randolph Davenport died seised of 115 acres of land in the County of Westmoreland, and left no heirs behind him, nor did dispose thereof by will; whereupon the same escheats to us the said proprietors; and thereupon a certificate according to the rules of the office issued to make the same public, which being returned with an endorsement and under the hand of Thomas Sorrell, Deputy Clerk of the said County, certifying that the same 148 was duly *published, and no person appearing to dispute the title to'the said escheat, and the said Edward Turbervile moving to be preferred to escheat the same, Know ye, therefore, &c. that for divers good causes, &c. we, &c. have granted, made over, &c. unto the said Edward Turbervile, &c. all our right, title, &c. in and to the said 115 acres of land, &c. situate, &c. and bounded, &c. To have and to hold, &c. yielding and paying, &c. Provided, &c. Witness, &c.
In the patent before us there is a bare recital, “that by virtue of an entry made in the office of the late Hord Proprietor of the Northern Neck, bearing date the 6th of April, 1778, and in consideration of the ancient composition of 11. 5s. sterling paid by Christopher Greenup into the treasury of this Commonwealth, there is granted to the said Christopher Greenup, 235 acres and 30 poles of land, by survey, bearing date the 17th day of March, 1788, lying, &c. which said tract or parcel of land was escheated from a certain Jonathan Monkhouse, deceased, and bounded as folioweth, to wit,” &c. and the plaintiff produced no other title paper, or writing, in support of his title.
And all the evidence, that the land in question had escheated from Jonathan Monkhouse, is an assertion in Greenup’s entry, that the said Jonathan Monkhouse dying intestate, and without any known heir, the said land, part of a tract of 625 acres granted to John Hough, escheated to the Hord Proprietor.
In the margin of the entry (as appears by a copy from the register’s office) there is a note: “Advertisement issued, and entry and advertisement fees paid.”
What were the rules in the proprietor’s office, at the time Greenup’s entry was made, we are not informed. But I find that on application at the office for a grant of escheated land, the first step was to advertise the same.
What further steps were necessary (accord
Judge Blackstone, in the 3d volume of his Commentaries, page 259, when speaking of the inquests of office, in England, observes, “that they were devised by law, as authentic means to give the king his right by solemn matter of record, without which he, in general, can neither take, nor part from any thing. For,” says he, “it is part of the liberties of England, and greatly for the safety of the subject, that the king may not enter upon, or seize any man’s possessions, upon bare surmises, without the intervention of a Jury.”
If that be a sound general principle in England, where many of the people’s rights must yield to prerogative, how much more forcibly does it apply in our republican government?
Upon the whole, I concur in the opinion that the judgment be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded, with a direction, that1 ‘upon such trial, the Court below do not permit the patent to be given in evidence.”
Judge Tucker, having- been one of the Judges in the District Court, did not sit in this cause here.— Note in Original Edition.
2 Bl. Com. 347.
2 Rev. Code 69.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.