after stating the provisions of the marriage settlement, and the facts proved by the parol evidence (as above stated) said—I cannot well distinguish this case from that of Ridout v. Lewis. In that case, the wife received only two thirds of the pin-money settled on her, for several years; she complained that she was paid short, and the husband promised that she should have it at last. Lord Hardwiclce held, that when a wife accepts a payment short of what she is entitled to, or lets the husband receive what she has a right to receive to her separate use, her consent will be implied to that method of proceeding, but that her complaint that she had not her full allowance, and his promise, that she should have it at last, destroyed the implication, and the promise that she should have it at last, was an undertaking on his part that she should be paid the arrears. In the case before us, it does not appear that the wife received any part of that which was settled on her to her separate use; but she frequently demanded it, and the husband as often promised it to her; so that her consent to part with it to him without reimbursement, cannot be implied. I do not think this case comes within the rule in Moore's ex'x v. Ferguson. There, the wife did not, during the coverture, exercise any act of ownership over the property, nor interfere with the husband’s receipt of the profits: she did not complain of his receiving them, nor demand them, nor did he promise that she should afterwards have them. *41Her consent was, therefore, implied, that her board and clothing, or her support and maintenance, during the coverture, should be deemed an equivalent for the profits of her separate estate.

I am of opinion, that the decree be reversed with costs, and a new account directed; in which, however, the commissioner should not allow interest on the estimated rents.

I concur with my brother Brockenbrough. It seems that the wife did demand the rents due her, frequently, during the coverture, and the husband always promised that she should have them. There was no waiver of her right, and no acquiescence in the wrong done her, further than that she did not resort to coercive measures. She gave up dower, and every thing else by the marriage contract. The property settled was to return to the husband’s estate at her death. She is expressly entitled to the rents and profits, to her separate use during coverture; and where is the law or the justice which shall deprive her of this pittance, because she chose rather to submit to wrong, than stir up strife with her husband ? especially as there are no creditors to lose by this act of sheer justice.

The other judges concurred. Decree reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings &c.