I am of opinion, that this case can be regarded as before us upon the appeal from the dismission of the bill of review alone. It was contended, that Laidlefs bill was not a bill of review, but should be regarded as a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, and a petition for a rehearing. I know of only two modes by which a party can bring before the same court a decree of its own, to be corrected for error not clerical but judicial. These are a petition for a rehearing, and a bill of review. As to the ceremonies attending them, and the causes for which they 'will be received, they occupy nearly the same ground. The first is the proper step when the decree is not final; the latter, when it is enrolled, and the parties out of court. *353I think the bill before us is a bill of review, because the party has given it both the form and the substance of such a bill. He calls it a bill of review, and prays that the decree may be reviewed, both for newly discovered facts, and error apparent on its face. It is equally clear, that the decree sought to be reviewed is interlocutory and not final. It decrees the payment of money, and that if not paid, the marshal shall sell the land, and report his proceedings to the court. The case is like Bowyer v. Lewis, 1 Hen. & Munf. 553. where the bill of review was dismissed, because the decree was not final; and more exactly like the case of Ellzey v. Lane, 2 Id. 589. where on a mortgage a bill to foreclose had been filed, and a decree was made for a sale and report; and the court held that the decree was interlocutory, and that no bill of review in such case would lie. Without going into any other question, I should be for affirming the decree, as I am clearly of opinion that the appeal did not bring up the original decree as such, but merely as the decree sought to be reviewed. Whether now, upon a petition of appeal from the original decree, this court would allow it, will be best decided when the case shall come before us in that shape.

A bill of review, strictly speaking, is a proceeding to correct a. final decree, in the same court, for error apparent on the face of the decree, or on account of new evidence discovered since the final decree. The decree being final, the bill of review is not regarded as a part of the cause in which the decree was rendered, but as a new suit having for its object the correction of the decree in the former suit. But where a decree is only interlocutory, but liable to the same objections, the party injured must seek his redress, not by a bill of review, as such, but by petition, or supple*354mental bill in the nature of a bill of review. Such pe." j. tition or supplemental bill is regarded as a part of the very cause, the decree in which is sought to be corrected, and any order or decree of the court, on the petition or bill, is only interlocutory, and cannot be appealed from in England, however erroneous or unjust it may be, until the decree which is sought to be corrected by the petition or bill, shall itself become final. But when that decree becomes final, the appeal taken from it brings up every part of the cause, and will lead to the correction of every error, in whatever stage of the cause it may have been committed. And such was the law of Virginia, until the statute was passed allowing appeals from interlocutory decrees. That statute, however, has produced a material change in the course of our courts on this subject.

As I have already said, the same causes which will require a bill of review, after the decree is final, may require a petition or supplemental bill, while the decree is only interlocutor}'. Let us suppose, then, that such cause exists against an interlocutory decree, as would justify a petition or supplemental bill for its correction, and that the party seeking relief sets forth the cause in the form of a bill of review, asking a review and correction of the decree; is his application to be rejected altogether, merely because he has given it the form and name of a bill of review, instead of a petition, or supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review ? I think, certainly not. The court should regard its substance, and treat it, accordingly, as a petition or supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. There is, in fact, in many instánces, no difference in form or substance between a bill of review, and a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. The time at which they are presented, gives to them their character. The same bill which, if presented after a final decree, would be a good bill of review, would, if presented in the *355same words, before final decree, be good as a supple- . ° . 1 r mental bill in the nature of a bill of review, whatever name the party may inadvertently give to it. If such a bill, presented before final decree, be rejected, or being received, be dismissed, the order of rejection, and the decree of dismissal, are interlocutory, and under our statute may be appealed from, in the same manner as any other interlocutory orders or decrees. It is undeniable, that the party might have appealed from the original interlocutory decree: why shall lie not do so from a subsequent interlocutory order or decree equally erroneous and injurious ? I can see no reasonable objection to such a course. And when an appeal is allowed in a cause, it brings up every part of the cause. These principles are, I think, perfectly applicable to the case befoi'e us. Laidlifs bill, called by him a bill of review, was, in fact, a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, and the order or decree of the court upon it was an interlocutory order or decree, subject to the right of appeal, as any other interlocutory order or decree whatever; and the appeal from it brings up every part of the cause. As to the cases of Bowyer v. Lewis and Ellzey v. Lane, it is sufficient to say that they were decided before the statute allowed appeals from interlocutory decrees, and therefore do not apply. The cause must be heard upon its merits.

I concur with my brother Cabell, in the view he has taken of this preliminary question. The appellant’s counsel must be heard upon his objections to the original decree, considered in connexion with the new evidence and proceedings on Laidletfs bill. It is true that in the bill itself he calls it a bill of review, yet as the decree which he seeks to have reviewed is interlocutory only, and not final, it cannot be looked on as a bill of review, properly so called. But it may and must be regarded as a supplemental bill in nature of a *356bill of review. Such a bill, though it does no't ask that . the former decree may be reviewed and reversed, yet prays that the cause may be heard with respect to the new matter made the subject of the supplemental bill, at the same time that it is reheard upon the original bill, and that the plaintiff may have such relief as the nature of the case made by the supplemental bill requires. Mitf. Pleadi 4th edi. p. 91. Courts of equity regard substance rather than form, and may, I think, so mould the pleadings and proceedings as to attain the real justice of the case. The bill before us, although it improperly prays that the former decree may be reviewed and reversed, makes a new case, and prays for an opportunity to introduce new testimony, and to be relieved in the premises according to equity.

The cause was then argued upon its merits, and several questions were discussed—I. Whether, as Laidley’s covenant with Wilson of March 1814, bound him to give a mortgage for the debts therein mentioned, only in case Hanway and Brooke’s suit against him should be decided in his favour, or their bill against him should be dismissed,—that bill had been so dismissed as the covenant intended it should be, before he should give the mortgage ? whether the casus foederis had occurred or not ? II. Whether the receipt which Laidley had obtained from Thoebe Merrifield in full of the judgment of Merrfield’s administrators against him, was, under the circumstances of the case, a good acquittance of the judgment? If not of the whole judgment, whether the payment of 70 dollars which he actually made to her ought to be credited to him or not ? III. Whether the chancellor did not err in allowing interest on the judgment of Merrfield’s administrators, that judgment not itself giving running interest, or, at least, in allowing interest on the damages or interest and costs, included in the judgment, as well as on the debt ? On the last point, *357the cases of Beall v. Silver, 2 Rand. 401. and Mercer’s adm’r v. Beale, 4 Leigh 189. were cited.

According to the letter of the covenant between Laidley and Wilson of March 1814, by which the former bound himself to give the mortgage, in case the suit of Hanway and Brooke against him should be dismissed, the casus foederis had occurred; for the suit was dismissed. But it was not dismissed on a hearing; it was dismissed by order of one plaintiff, and by consent of the counsel for the other: and the question is, whether such dismission of that suit was a dismission within the spirit and meaning of the covenant f Hanway deposed, that he never had been, and never expected to be, instructed by Reid SfFord to renew the suit, and he did not intend to renew it; and in fact it has never been renewed during the long time which has since elapsed. Thus, by the dismission of the suit, Laidley has had the full benefit of Wilson’s services, which was the consideration upon which he covenanted to give the mortgage. Therefore, I think, we may well conclude, that according to the substantial purpose and meaning of the covenant, as well as the letter, the casus foederis did occur, and that Laidley was bound to give the mortgage; especially wdien it is considered that the mortgage he contracted to give was a mortgage to secure payment of his own -just debts; and that if the actual dismission of the suit was not enough to bind him to give the mortgage, it put it out of Wilson’s power to obtain any other dismission.

As to the receipt which Laidley procured from P'haibe Merrifield in full of the judgment of Merrifi,eld’s administrators against him, it was hardly denied in the argument, that it was fraudulent; but it was contended, that it was a fraud practised by Laidley on her, not a fraudulent combination of him and her to defraud Samuel Merrifield, the acting and responsible administra*358tor; and that, as she had authority to receive and give ' , an acquittance for the whole debt, the partial payment to her of 70 dollars was good, and .Laidley ought at least to have a credit for that payment. Upon a careful examination of the proofs, I am convinced, that the transaction was a fraudulent collusion between Laidley and Phoebe Merrifield, whereby she obtained from him 70 dollars for her own use, and he got an acquittance of the whole judgment: he bribed her to betray the interests of her intestate’s estate, and to unite with, him in defrauding Samuel Merrifield, whom they both knew to be the acting and responsible administrator. [Here, the judge stated and examined the evidence on the point]. With this opinion of the state of facts, I cannot agree that Laidley shall have credit for the payment of 70 dollars ; for to allow him the credit, would be to •aid the parties to the fraud, to effect their purpose pro tanto.

The remaining question is, whether the chancellor erred in allowing interest on the aggregate amount of the debt and costs due by the judgment ? Here was the sum of 264 dollars due by the judgment (call it debt, damages, interest, costs—what you will) which Laidley, on the 8th March 1814, acknowledged he owed, and mortgaged his land to pay. Need I refer to cases to shew that when the court of equity comes to decree payment of this debt, and a foreclosure &c. it will give interest on the whole ? Does it matter what are the elements of which it is composed, and how the different items originated P when under his seal the debtor has acknowledged it all, as one debt, and bound his property to secure it. But suppose we still take it as a judgment composed of principal and costs, and this a bill to enforce it in equity: the cases of Chamberlayne v. Temple and Beall v. Silver shew, that in such cases equity will give interest on the whole aggregate amount, though sounding in damages, and carrying no interest *359at law. Nor does the case of Mercer v. Beale depart, in the slightest degree, from this doctrine: on the contrary it is expressly laid down there, that equity will (as a general rule) give interest on judgments; and further, the chancellor, in that case, decreed interest on the whole of the judgment unpaid at the filing of the bill, from the date of the judgment, and this court affirmed that decree. The point in question there, was of a different kind. The judgment, as it stood at law, bearing no interest, payments were made between 1802 and 1809, reducing it from ¿£2500. to 614 dollars; in 1816 (seven years after the judgment was thus reduced) a bill was filed to enforce the payment of the balance ; and it was contended, in the argument here, that the court of equity should have treated this judgment exactly a.s if it had carried running interest on its face, computing interest on it to the time of the payments, and applying the payments first to the discharge of the interest. The two judges who gave opinions in the case thought, that as there was but one debt (the judgment at law) each payment must of necessity be made to it, and deducted from it at the date when made ; and that the circumstance of filing a bill afterwards, could not authorize a change in the application of these payments, and applying them to a debt which did not exist when they were made, and which it could not then have been known would ever exist. This doctrine, I still think, stands on a stable foundation; but does-not touch at all the general question we are now considering.

Upon the whole I am for affirming both decrees, in omnibus.

I concur with my brother Carr on the first point.

J think it clearly proved that Laidley paid the sum of 70 dollars, and that sum only, to the administratrix Phoebe Merrfield ; and I concur with the chancellor, that *360her receipt to Laidley of the 25th September 1822, for *■ r J ' . . J- ' the whole amount of the judgment, was fraudulent. Therefore he was entirely correct in disregarding that receipt. But the payment of the 70 dollars is proved by other evidence than the receipt; and as the payment of the 70 dollars was made to one having a right to receive it, I cannot perceive that it would be consistent with equity to compel Laidley to pay it over again. In this respect, I think the decree is erroneous.

I am also of opinion that there was error in allowing interest on the aggregate amount of principal, interest and costs ascertained by the judgment of 1811. That judgment did not carry interest on its face ; but I agree that, according to the decision of Beall v. Silver, it is proper that the court of equity should decree interest on the real debt due, to run on till the payment. Equity should give just so much interest as the jury and court of law would have given, if instead of -stopping at the time of the verdict or judgment by default, it had been allowed to run on till payment. The judgment here is for £ 60. debt, and for 44 dollars damages (which, according to my understanding, was the interest on that debt) and for 19 dollars costs. The aggregate sum is 263 dollars. But it is easy to distinguish the principal sum, which ought to carry interest till the day of payment, from the interest and the costs. I think that it ought to carry interest, not from the time fixed on by the chancellor, but from the prior period when the judgment was rendered, namely, March 1811.

I do not deem it necessary to examine the evidence minutely, for the purpose of ascertaining ■ whether Laidley was guilty of the fraud imputed to him, in procuring the receipt mentioned in the proceedings ; for, even if it be true that his conduct in that respect was grossly fraudulent, he ought nevertheless to be credited for the 70 dollars which he actually paid. Mrs. *361Merrifield, to whom it was paid, was co-administratrix of the estate, and had as much right to receive it as her co-administrator. It is no objection to the validity of the payment, that she intended to apply it to her own use. There is nothing in the record to shew that it was improper in her thus to apply it. We know nothing of the state of the accounts between her and the estate of her intestate. She may have been in advance for the estate ; and besides, she was entitled as widow to one third of the estate after the payment of debts : and even if this money was misapplied, she and her sureties will be made responsible for it, on the settlement of her accounts. The fact that Laidley has fraudulently attempted to release himself from a part of the judgment which he had not paid, cannot, in a court of equity, destroy his right to a credit for that which he has actually paid. Therefore I am of opinion that the decree should be reversed so far as it denies a credit to Laidley for the payment of 70 dollars, and in all things else affirmed ; for I perceive no other error.

Decree—That the decree of the superiour court of chancery was erroneous in denying to Laidley credit for the 70 dollars paid by him on the 25th September 1822; therefore, decree as to that reversed, and as to the residue affirmed; and cause remanded for further proceedings.