I do not think the court of chancery committed any error in disregarding the supplemental bill. The object of that bill was to rescind the contract made between Israel and Long, and to recover back the purchase money from Israel, on account of an al.leged defect of title in Coffman. But Long had no claim upon Israel for any defect of title to the land in the proceedings mentioned. He contracted to take the *565title of Coffman; and in case of eviction, Coffman, not .M M Israel, will be liable to him upon the covenant of warranty. Until eviction, however, which may never happen, this court cannot anticipatethe operation of Coffman's covenant, by rendering him responsible in dama ges, to the same extent as he will be at law, should the title prove to be a defective one. This is not like the case where resort has been allowed to the preventive justice of the court, to arrest the compulsory payment of purchase money, when the purchaser can shew that his title has been questioned by a suit prosecuted or threatened, or is clearly defective. That proceeding is allowed against the person liable for the title, and whose claim for purchase money is sought to be injoined. But here, one person claims the balance of the purchase money, and another is liable on his covenant of warranty for the title; which brings the case within the direct and controlling authority of the principle stated in Koger et al. v. Kane's adm'r &c. 5 Leigh 606.

Nor do I think that the contract, as set out in the answer of Israel, is liable to the imputation of usury. There was no agreement for the loan or advance of money to Long, and no forbearance of a debt due; but it is a contract on the part of Israel to sell Long a tract of land for 900 dollars, if he succeeded in purchasing it from Coffman. On the part of Long, it is an executory contract to pay the 900 dollars, depending, for performance, upon circumstances which might prevent its ever becoming a debt. His real object was to buy land, provided he could get it for a stipulated sum, and on suitable terms of payment; and there was no negotiation for the loan of money, or the forbearance of any debt. This is apparent, not only from his own account of the transaction, but from the stipulations of the bond taken from Israel when the contract was consummated. By that bond, Israel incurred a responsibility which it might have taken more, than the 900 dollars to dis*566charge; for he bound himself in the penalty of 2000 dollars, to procure a good deed with general warranty t0 made to Long by Coffman. Whatever therefore was the nature of the original executory agreement, it ^ ' was relieved from all taint of usury when it came to be executed. But the decree is clearly erroneous in several particulars.

1. If the court was right in dismissing the bill and decreeing costs, it ought not to have decreed against the appellants jointly, nor against the executor de bonis propriis.

2. The deed from Coffman to Long was not such “ a good general warranty deed” as Israel was bound to procure, for the tract of land described in the bond and intended to be sold. That deed was manifestly defective, conveying only a small portion of the land, and embracing other land not within the contemplation of the parties. These errors ought to have been corrected, by decreeing Coffman to execute a deed with general warranty for the land contained in the survey made by Cyrus Hayivood on the 19th of April 1823; for although Long might probably, with the aid of parol evidence, have established the true boundaries of the land he contracted to buy, he had a right to insist upon a correct and sufficient deed.

3. The decree ought, I think, under the circumstances that had taken place, to have directed a reconveyance of the legal title outstanding in Tindall, upon the payment of the balance of the purchase money by Long to Israel.

The bill, therefore, ought not to have been dismissed, but a decree should have been entered conforming to this opinion, giving costs to the plaintiffs to be paid by Israel; and for not having done so, this court ought now to reverse the decree with costs, and remand the case for further proceedings.

As to the merits of this case, I have nothing to say, but to express my entire concurrence in the opinion delivered by judge Parker.

But as reference has been made to the case of Koger et al. v. Kane’s adm'r &c. 5 Leigh 606. I deem it my duty to avail myself of the occasion, to correct a mistake into which mr. Leigh was led, in the report of that case. It is there stated, that the other judges concurred in the opinion delivered by the president. The fact was somewhat different. The court which decided that case consisted of only three judges; the president, judge Carr, and myself. There was no difference of opinion between the president and judge Carr. But I differed from them both, as to one point. I did not think that Kane, who had purchased from Koger, had agreed to “ take the title of Preston ff and therefore I was of opinion that he still retained his right to injoin the purchase money due from him to Koger. On all other points I agreed with the rest of the judges. My opinion was reduced to writing and delivered in court, and I intended to hand it to the reporter. This, however, 1 omitted to do; and mr. Leigh, finding but one opinion in the record which was given to him, naturally inferred, and therefore stated, that the other judges had concurred. My opinion in that case will now be handed to mr. Leigh, with a request that it may be published as a note to this case.*

The decree in this case is, I think, plainly erroneous, in decreeing costs de bonis propriis against the executor, and in failing to require a new and sufficient deed to be executed by Coffman. The deed from Coffman to Long is void for uncertainty, as also is that from Hull to Coffman, for there is no other description of the land sold than a setting forth of the *568boundaries, which not only do not cover the land sold, but do not meet. A tract of land may be well described without setting out the bounds: or it may be ...... • 1 , , . , J well described by setting out the bounds, without any tb¡ng more . but in this latter case, the boundaries set out ought to shew forth the land, so .that it can be identified. The error in this case was anteriour to Coffman's deed; but it may not perhaps be necessary to correct the deed to him, as well as that from him. It will suffice if Coffman makes a deed according to Hall's survey, as laid down on the plat.

I am also of opinion that the sale should have been set aside, on the authority of Gay v. Hancock &c. 1 Rand. 72. for no sale could have been fairly made where the title was so radically defective. But I see no foundation for the charge of usury, nor any error in refusing to make an allowance for the supposed interference with Robinson of 27f acres. As to the supple- ■ mental bill, it was obviously not necessary to settle the question whether Israel was entitled to his money. Had the deed been regular, the supposed superiour title of the commonwealth would have been nothing to him, for he did not make himself in any way responsible for the title. He is only bound to procure Coffman's deed with general warranty. When he does this, he is entitled to his money. Then, as to Coffman. If Long had purchased from Coffman, he might well say, “As the contract is still executory, I will not go on with it; equity will not compel me to take a bad titleand in this way, the facts set forth in the supplemental bill would be important. But Long did not purchase of Coffman. He dealt with Israel, and Israel purchased of Coffman, and has paid his money for the land. The contract, then, cannot be rescinded by Long, and his only redress is upon his general warranty. This redress he cannot assert in a court of equity, nor in anticipation of an eviction which has not occurred, and may *569never occur. He cannot assert it in equity, because A that court is not the proper tribunal to give damages for breach of a warranty; nor can he assert it in anti- „ . cipation of an eviction, on the ground that the title is defective, for that would be to convert a covenant of warranty into a covenant for good title, whereas they are essentially and intrinsically distinct. The vendor of land, who has some doubts about his title, but has had a long possession which a short time may mature into a perfect title, may be very willing to give a warranty, but very unwilling to covenant for good title, since that covenant subjects him to an immediate action if there be a single defect in the chain of title. It is on these principles that in England relief has been denied in equity by way of injunction, where the vendee has obtained his deed and possession. They are, I doubt not, the true principles of a court of equity. We have indeed gone farther in Virginia, in relieving by injunction ; but wc have never gone so far as to interfere except where the application was to restrain the recovery of the purchase money. That is not the case here. As to Coffman, this bill (except so far as it seeks a correction of the description in the deed) is purely an action upon the covenant of warranty, brought before eviction, and when probably no eviction may ever occur. Upon the whole, therefore, the supplemental bill was properly disregarded.

For the errors already mentioned, the decree is to be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.