Johnson v. Commonwealth
Johnson v. Commonwealth
Opinion of the Court
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the hustings court of the city of Richmond, rendered on the 23d day of November, 1877, convicting the plaintiff in error, George Johnson, of burglary, and sentencing him therefor to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of five years, the period by the jurors in their ver
The petition for a writ of error assigns various errors in the said judgment, the first of which is, in the action of' the court in discharging the first jury, there being “ no manifest necessity ” for such discharge. I see no error in the action of the court in that respect, but there is no necessity for deciding the question in tins case, and it is not intended to be decided; it being sufiicint to-say in regard to this assignment of error that no objection.
The other errors assigned in the petition are foundeed on the five bills of exceptions which were made parts of the record, and which I will now proceed to consider, but as they all depend on the fifth bill, which is made a part of each of the other four, and in which all the evidence introduced on the trial is set out, I will consider the question arising on that bill in the first place. My opinion upon that may render it necessary to take little or no notice of the other bills.
The fifth bill of exceptions is to the action of the court in overruling the motion of the accused to set aside the verdict, because the same is contrary to law and the evidence; and on the motion of the accused the court certified the evidence taken in the case, which is as follows:
Fifth Bill of Exceptions.
“Be it remembered that on the trial of this case, after the evidence for the Commonwealth had been heard, and argument by counsel, the jury retired to make up their verdict, and after some time returned into court and returned their verdict, which is in the figures and words following, to-wit: ‘We, the jui-y, find the prisoner guilty, and ascertain the term of his confinement in the penitentiary at five years.’ And thereupon the prisoner, by his counsel, moved the court to set aside said verdict, because the same is contrary to law and the evidence. But the court overruled the said .motion, and the prisoner excepted to the ruling and judgment of the court, and moved the court to certify the evidence taken in his case, and sign and seal and make this, his bill of exception, a part of the record, which is accordingly done.”
And the court certifies the evidence as follows: Julian B. Crenshaw, a witness for the Commonwealth, was-
When I awoke I heard the door creak and four or five steps; could not tell and would not say in which direction they were going; my belief at the time was they were going in a room. I heard some other little noise, but cannot say what it was; the sound created the impression on my mind that some one had touched a door, or was at a door; the steps were distinct. I lost about fifty dollai’s; It might have been forty-nine dollars or fifty-one dollars; I bad not had it out of my pocket for a day or so, but felt it in my pocket that night before I went to bed; put my hand in my pocket, and know it was there when I went to bed. I am very positive I did not lose it in my room; I put my pants on a chair, but am sure it did not drop out; my pants were in three feet of the gas, and I dressed there to go to the office. I passed by Ho. 11, going to the steps at the end of the hall on my way to the office, Ho. 11 being nearer the steps than my room. Hos. 10, 11, 12, and 9 are all nearer the steps than my room. When you get to the end of the hall you turn to the right in a kind of elbow of the passage, then pass on a few steps to the stairway to the story above; the steps from the story above land in this elbow at the end of the passage. A person coming down those steps land right at Ho. 9; the steps going down stairs go from that elbow; there is no exit from the passage at the other end of it. Carter and Johnson both manifested some curiosity as to whether I saw the party who entered my room; Johnson asked me if I saw the party. I replied I did not. One said they had known each other sixteen years ago in New Orleans, but had not met since until a day or two ago in Washington
On cross-examination he testified as follows:
I found my coat, pants and vest on the chair as nearly as possible as I left them when I went to bed; I had felt the money in my pocket that night when I went to bed, but had not had it out of my pocket for several days; I had in my pocket a twenty dollar bill, two tens, a five and one or two twos and ones; there are two servants that attend my room, one a male servant, the other a female servant named Matilda, I don’t know her other name; they have a pass-key to my room; I have seen them with a bunch of kej*s going round the room doors; the thief might have disturbed my clothes in getting the money from my pocket, but if he did he had placed them back as he found them; the steps I heard did not appear to die away, but just to stop; I did not see any one when I looked out into the hall from my room. There was no twenty dollar bill found either upon the prisoners or about their baggage that I know of, but there was not a thorough search made, they only searched through their pockets and pocket-books; they did not search the room they were in so thoroughly but that the money might have been in the room and still not have been found; there were some things found on them, after they were carried to the station house, that we did not find on them in the preliminary search. Before I saw "Weatherford, I had no impression it was in Kb. 11 any more than any other room on that floor. I knew it was not in the room immediately adjoining mine by the steps I heard. My idea, when I first heard the door creak and
John L. Weatherford, another witness for the Commonwealth, after being sworn, testified:
I am night clerk at the St. Claire hotel, and was on duty at the time of the occurrence. I have a list of the occupants of the rooms on that floor that night; there are eight rooms on that floor, numbered from 9 to 16. In Ho. 9, were W. L. C. Walker, of Tappahannock, J. E. Gaines, of Charlotte county, and J. A. Coleman, of Halifax; in Ho. 10, were Henry Taylor, of Louisa, M. A. Miller, of Staunton; in Ho. 12, Miss Miller, of Staunton; in Ho. 9, L. Lewis, of Clarke county; in Ho. 13, the Lev. Preston Hash, Hnited States army; in Ho. 15, Hr. George West and wife; in Ho. 14, Mr. J. P. Crenshaw ; and in Ho. 11, C. L. Carter and George Johnson, Atlanta, Ga. I knew all but these two; Crenshaw came to me about twenty to twenty-five minutes after 5 o’clock, A. M.; about 5 o’clock, I went up to the room of another Mr. Crenshaw, No. 17, to wake him; Ho. 17, is on the floor above 11 and 14, and immediately over Ho. 9; the steps from that floor come down at the end of the passage, on the floor below, just opposite the door of Ho. 9, which is next to Ho. 11; a few minutes before 5 o’clock, I came down these stairs, having waked Mr. Crenshaw up stairs before I came down; as I came down I examined the hall; as I reached tire door nearly opposite No. 9, I heard something that caused me to stop; that noise continued until the latch fell; I knew
¥e then sent for Mr. John T. Hall, sergeant of the city police, and he went off and got a warrant and returned with officer John D. Perrin, and at about 6 o’clock, A. M., we all went up to'No. 11, and I knocked at the door. There was no answer to the first knock, and I knocked again; then one of these men, Carter, answered and opened the door. I stepped in and asked Carter who occupied the room ? He said, “ I do.” I also said, who is your friend ? and he said, Mr. Davis. I asked him, did you register the names ? and he said, “ Oh, yes, that is George Johnson.” I then said to him, your friend has come in rather unexpected, you did not expect him until this morning; how did you get up to your room? He answered me, I did expect him last night, and I did not tell the clerk I did not expect him until this morning; he came last night, and I brought him up to the room. George Johnson was then lying in bed. I said to him, Carter, your neighbor across the hall here ha's been a little unfortunate, and lost some money, and we have come in here to get it. (I did not mention the circumstance of having heard his door shut.) There
John T. Hall, police officer, another witness for the Commonwealth, after being sworn, testified:
On the 30th day of October last, about half-past five o’clock A. M., I was sent to for to —• the St. Claire hotel; I went there and was informed by Mr. Weatherford that a robbery had been committed. I went up to the room ■of these two men, and Weatherford knocked two or three times on the door, when Carter opened it, Johnson being still in bed; I told him to get up and dress himself; Weatherford entéred the room first and spoke to Carter; asked him who is your friend in bed, and he said Davis; he then said, oh, Johnson! I searched them while they were dressing by searching each piece of clothes before they put them on; I searched their
This blank is to be filled up at the mailing office and given to the person who presents the letter for registration.
Ho. 337.. -, 1877.
Postoffice D-, received of H. Burton, -
326 E. 14-■, a letter addressed to T. L. Yan Horn,
New Orleans, La.
T. Miley, Jr., P. M.
Endorsed on face: Registered October 10,1877, branch D, New York postoffice.
Return Registered Letter Receipt.
Hote.—This return receipt, after being signed by the party to whom the letter or package which accompanies it is delivered, must be immediately enclosed to the postmaster at the office where it originated.
Should the registered letter not be delivered, this receipt must be-forwarded with it in due course, to the dead-letter office.
Ho. 2220. -, 1877.
6
Mailed at -, by Charles T. Burton, 139 E.
19-, a letter addressed to Charles G. Irish,--
303 Washington street, Buffalo, H. Y.
Received the above described letter.
Charles G. Irish.
Sign here,
Stamp here the office and date of delivery: Buffalo,,
H., September 5,1877, registered.
There was one pass for L. Lewis and another for Lewis Lewis; they are not now in the book; I have gotten such articles as this file, nippers and skeleton keys from burglars.
On cross-examination he said: I did not take out the bureau drawers and set them on the floor; I am pretty certain they were not taken out by any one. I made a more careful search of the room than usual; I wanted to find that money. The town was flooded with thieves and burglars during the late visit of the President; the money I found on Johnson consisted of three fifty dollar bills, three tens and two twos. The first thing I said when I went into the room was to tell Johnson to get up; I have no recollection of telling him I wanted that fifty dollars; the keys might have worked themselves inside the hat where I found them.
Dr. E. S. Pendleton, another witness for the Commonwealth, after being sworn, testified:
I am one of the proprietors of the St. Clair hotel. Since the arrest of the prisoners two ladies, one Miss Booten and the other Miss Stansbury, two ladies of excellent standing, have been the only occupants of room Yo. 11 until tire day before yesterday; the nippers were in the hands of the attorney for the Commonwealth before that.
On cross-examination he said: I cannot say no one else has been in the room since the arrest of the prisoners, and don’t know how many people have occupied that room since. The bureau has been in it now about eighteen months; don’t know where the bureau came from; think it came from Watson’s factory; nearly all our furniture came from there.
I am a waiter at the St. Claire hotel, and heard of the robbery next day. I was asleep in my room at the time it occurred, and had not been up on that floor since about ten o’clock that night. I found this instrument (the nippers) in hTo. 11; it was inside of top drawer of bureau. I found it one day this week in taking out the drawers ■of the bureau to dust in behind them; as the ladies always like to have everything clean about the bureau I always take the drawers out to dust them.
J. 13. Angle, a policeman, and witness for the Commonwealth, after being sworn, testified:
I searched the valise at the station-house. The hat (a black slouch hat) lay in the valise on one side of it. The hat was mashed flat, and the keys, wrapped in brown paper, were inside of it. The valise was pretty full. The keys lay inside the hat, and there was no lining inside of the hat. Don’t think the keys could have worked themselves in the hat, but they might have done so. The valise was pretty full, but more could have been gotten into it.
I certify that the foregoing is the substance of the evidence introduced for the Commonwealth in this case, there being no evidence for the defence.
Witness my signature and seal.
A. B. Guigon. [Seal.]
To sustain a charge of a criminal offence there must be proved, first, the corpus delicti; and, secondly, that the accused committed the offence charged against him.
In this case there ■'■vas sufficient proof of the corpus delicti, of the breaking and entering in the night time, by some person, of the dwelling-house of another, with
But was there sufficient proof that the accused committed the offence to warrant his conviction thereof by the jury? To warrant such conviction, the evidence should be such as, if true, to exclude all rational doubt of the guilt of the accused.
I do not think it was such in this case. The evidence introduced, and not the facts proved on the trial, is certified in the bill of exceptions. Ho evidence was introduced in behalf of the accused; and in considering this question we must regard as true all the evidence of the witnesses inti’oduced in behalf of the Commonwealth.
So regarding the evidence, did it warrant the verdict of the jury? Did it legally show that the accused committed the burglary charged against him ? Again I say, I think not. It makes out no more than ground for suspicion against the accused, however strong that suspicion may be. It falls short of proof of his guilt beyond all rational ground of doubt to the contrary. The evidence tending to connect the accused with the offence charged, if there can be said to be any such evidence, is inconclusive, and is consistent with an hypothesis which assumes the innocence of the accused of the offence charged in the indictment. That burglars’ instruments were found in possession of the accused, if such was the fact, was a suspicious circumstance, and tended strongly to show that the accused had come to Richmond on the occasion of the crowd which at that time assembled in the city, with a purpose on his part to avail himself of any opportunity he might have on that occasion to commit such an offence. But surely that evidence was wholly insufficient, in itself, to connect the accused with the particular offence charged against him in the indictment. And there was little other evidence in the case
These circumstances, taken singly of all together, while: they create a suspicion of guilt, are yet inconclusive and wholly insufficient to prove such guilt. They are consistent with the fact of guilt, but are also consistent with the fact of innocence. If they be not at least as consistent with the fact of innocence as with the fact of guilt, they certainly do not amount to such degree of proof as to connect the accused with the offence and to warrant his conviction thereof.
But the other evidence in the case, so far from strengthening the suspicion of guilt, rather tends to weaken if' not disprove it. There were two obvious modes of connecting the accused with the offence, either of which would have been probably sufficient for the purpose if it' had been sustained by evidence. One was, by identifying the accused as the person who entered the room of" J. B. Crenshaw; and the other was, by identifying some of the money found in possession of the accused as the money, or some of it, which had been stolen from Cren
Another material circumstance of the case in connection with the one last stated, is, that when the alleged offence was committed all of the rooms near the one occupied by Crenshaw, and no doubt most of those in other parts of the hotel, were occupied by guests, and there -were two servants, one a male and the other a female, who attended to his room and had a pass key to it, and who slept on the same floor -with the said room on the night on which it was broken and entered. Row, without meaning to say, what certainly does not appear, that the evidence in this case creates the slightest suspicion that any one of these guests and servants, other than the accused, was guilty of the offence charged against him, certainly the circumstance just stated is material to be considered in deciding the question whether the conviction of the accused was warranted by the evidence in the case.
I will now notice such of the cases referred to in the argument of the case as I deem material to be noticed, from which it will appear that the evidence, supposing it
In Algheri v. The State of Mississippi, 25 Miss. R. 584, referred to by tbe counsel of the plaintiff in error, it was held by the high court of errors and appeals of that state: 1st. That in the application of circumstantial evidence to the determination of a case, the utmost caution and vigilance should be used. 2d. That it is always insufficient, where, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to prove, some other hypothesis may still be true; for it is the actual exclusion of every other hypothesis which invests mere circumstances with the force of truth; and 3d. That where the evidence leaves it indifferent-which, of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be. The second and third of these propositions were literally taken from 1 Stark, on Ev. 572, and correctly expound the law.
I will cite only two other of the cases referred to by tho counsel for the plaintiff' in error, but they are cases of the highest authority, being the unanimous decisions ■of our late general court when it was our court of appeal in criminal cases, and when it was composed of judges of the greatest ability and experience, especially in regard to the criminal law. I mean Grayson’s case, 6 Gratt. 712, and same case, 9 Id. 613. Grayson was twice convicted of murder and sentenced to be hung therefor. Judge Field, who presided at each trial, refused in each case to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. And the general court, in each, case, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial to be had therein. Judge Scott, who delivered the opinion of the court in the former case, concluded it by saying: “ In the case at bar my opinion
The principle of these two cases is directly applicable to this; and according to the principle the judgment in this case ought to be reversed on the ground that the evidence in the case was insufficient to support the verdict.
I do not think there is anything in the cases cited by the attorney-general in conflict with those above referred to. They apply more to the questions .arising on the other bills of exceptions, or some of them, than to that arising on the 5th, now under consideration. They are the cases, 1st, of the Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 Cush. R. 582; 2d. The People v. Larned, 3 Selden R. 445; and 3d. Foster v. The People, 10 Supreme Court Reports, N. Y. 6. In the first of these cases, it was held that on the trial of an indictment for breaking and entering a building and stealing therefrom, a number of burglarious tools and implements found together in the possession of
Besides the two cases of Grayson, cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error from the decisions of the highest court of appeal in criminal cases in this state, there are two cases recently decided by this court which have an important bearing upon this case. In each of them the opinion of the court was delivered by my brother C Cristian, and the court was unanimous. In one of them, Smith’s case, 21 Gratt. 809, the question was as to the
I am therefore of opinion, that the court of hustings erred in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error to set aside the verdict.
In regard to the questions presented by the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th bills of exceptions, very little need be said. The 5th bill of exceptions being made a part of each of the
I am therefore of opinion, that the judgment of the hustings court ought to he reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside, and the cause remanded to the said hustings court for a new trial to he had therein, in conformity with the foregoing opinion.
, Christian, J., concurred in the opinion of Moncure, P.
The other judges concurred in the opinion of Moneare, P., on the fifth exception. There was a diversity of opinion on the questions involved in the other exceptions.
The judgment was as follows:
Eor reasons stated in writing and filed with the record,
But the court is further of opinion, in regard to the fifth bill of exceptions, which is to the action of the said hustings court in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error to set aside the verdict of the jury, “ because the same is contrary to law and the evidence,” that the evidence set out in the said bill of exceptions, which was all the evidence introduced on the trial of the case, was wholly insufficient, even conceding it all to be true, to connect the plaintiff’ in error with the offence charged against him in the indictment and to warrant his conviction thereof by the jury; and that the said hustings court, therefore, erred in overruling the said motion to set aside the said verdict.
In regard to the other bills of exceptions, to-wit: the first, second, third and fourth, the court is not unanimous; a majority of the judges being of opinion that the said hustings court did not err in overruling any of the motions to exclude any of the evidence mentioned in the first and fourth of said bills; but did err in overruling the motions to exclude the evidence mentioned in the second and third of said bills. In regard to the second bill of exceptions, however, the said majority consisted of but three judges, one of whom is of opinion that the said hustings court would not have erred in admitting as evidence the conversation therein mentioned upon condition that the jury believed that the said conversation
Therefore it is considered, ordered and adjudged by the court, that for the errors aforesaid, the said judgment oi the said hustings court be reversed and annulled, the said verdict of the jury be set aside, and a new trial be .awarded to the plaintiff in error for the said offence; and the cause is remanded to the said hustings court for a new trial and further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with the foregoing opinion; which is ordered to be certified to the said hustings court of the city of Richmond.
Judgment reversed.
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- Johnson v. The Commonwealth
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