Akers v. Akers
Akers v. Akers
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question of practical importance remaining in this case is whether the appellant, Madison J. Akers, should
At a sale of the negroes had in this cause, on the twenty-first of December, 1857, Nathaniel S. Akers purchased two of them, and in payment gave his bond for $1,200, payable six months after that date. And to a part of that sum, to-wit, the sum of $370, it is not denied that Madison J. Akers was entitled at that time.
On the fourteenth February, 1859, the appellant, by verbal contract, bought of Nathaniel a tract of land containing twenty-six acres, which had fallen to him in the division of his father’s estate, for which the said Madison agreed to pay $800—one-half thereof in cash, and the balance on twelve months’ time; and it seems to have been agreed between them that any outstanding matters of account might be brought into the final settlement, whenever it was had. By reason, however, of disputes that arose between them as to the various items of credit claimed by the appellant, no settlement was ever reached, and in September, 1882, Nathaniel filed his bill in the circuit court of Franklin county to have his vendor’s lien for the unpaid portion of the purchase-money enforced. In his bill he alleged that there remained due at that date the sum of $635.27, as appeared from a statement which he filed with his bill. He also filed with his bill a duly executed deed for said land, to be delivered to the appellant upon the payment of the aforesaid balance; and he called upon the appellant to answer his bill. The appel
The cause came on to be heard on the thirty-first October, 1883, when the court, without passing on the report, recommitted the matter to Commissioner Carper, with instructions to take the same account, and, in making up his report, to consider the depositions already filed, or any other legal testimony which might be adduced by any of the parties.
On the nineteenth April, 1884, Commissioner Carper returned his report, in which he states that no additional testimony was offered by either party, and, therefore, he had only considered the testimony taken by Commissioner Saunders, and he finds the balance due by the appellant as of that date to be $611.54.
To this report the appellant filed exceptions, but the
To this decree the appellant obtained from the judge of the corporation court of Roanoke an injunction, on a bill alleging that he had informed his counsel and Commissioner Saunders that he was entitled to a credit of $370, with interest for a number of years, on account of his interest in the money which N. S. Akers bound himself to pay for the slaves, and which interest he had allowed said N. S. Akers to retain as a part of the purchase price of the land, as he insisted the proceedings in the suit in the county court for the division of his father’s estate would show; and alleging, further, that he had only discovered that this credit had never been allowed him since the adjournment of the April term, 1884, of the circuit court of Franklin county.
To.this bill Nathaniel S. Akers filed an answer, in which, after admitting the sale of the land in February, 1859, to Madison J Akers, and the purchase of the slaves by himself for $1,200, and that he had bought the interest of said Madison in the said bond for $1,200, which interest he says amounts to $370, he denies positively that he had endeavored to pay the said interest of Madison J. Akers in the negro money by giving him a credit therefor on his land purchase, or that the same was ever done; and, on the contrary, he charges that he had purchased the interest of the said Madison in the negro money, and paid him for it in full prior to the sale of the said land to him, and' that said Madison received this negro money on January 1, 1859, as is shown by the credit therefor on the bond which he files with his answer; which credit, he says, was placed upon the bond by A. J. Akers, who is dead, but who
At the hearing, on the eighth December, 1884, the injunction was dissolved, when the appellant filed another bill and procured from the judge of the corporation court of Danville another injunction restraining the plaintiffs in the original suit and commissioner of sale appointed in that suit from making sale of the said land or otherwise proceeding to execute the decree of May 16, 1884, entered in that cause. In this last-mentioned bill, which the appellant in his petition calls a bill in the nature of an application for a rehearing of the original suit, the appellant alleges as one of the grounds for a rehearing this last mentioned decree that he is possessed of newly-discovered evidence. On the fourth July, 1885, this second injunction was dissolved, thus leaving the aforesaid decree of May 16, 1884, again in force, whereupon the appellant appealed from the order of dissolution.
Now, from the foregoing recital of the pleadings and proceedings in the cause, it will be readily seen that never
Now, without stopping to comment upon the improbability of the suggestion that in making up a carefully prepared statement, under the eye of experienced counsel, to exhibit the true state of the account between himself and his brother, both he and his counsel would have overlooked so large a credit as $370—nearly one-half of the entire purchase-money—while carefully remembering and preferring such trifling items as $3.64, $4.23, and $4.50, we think it perfectly apparent that the claim, however honestly asserted it may have been, has no real foundation. For in the first place he became, as the record shows, entitled to the $370 at and before the period at which he purchased the land; if, therefore, that amount had still been due at the time of that purchase, the purchase-money to be paid would have been only $430, and the terms of the pur
Deckee affiemed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Akers v. Akers and als.
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Practice in Chancery&emdash;Rehearing&emdash;After-discovered evidence.&emdash;Where the after-discovered evidence, whenever a decree is sought to be reheard, is merely cumulative and not variant from the evidence already in the record, it is the settled doctrine that no rehearing will be allowed.