Ramirez v. City Wings, Inc.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

DIVISION OF ST. CROIX )

ANA RAMIREZ and MARGARET LOUISE )

THOMAS, ) )

Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 2020-0024 )

CITY WINGS, INC. d/b/a Seaflight, ) )

Defendant. ) __________________________________________)

Attorneys:

Pamela L. Colon, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For Plaintiff Ana Ramirez

Trudy Fenster, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For Plaintiff Margaret Louise Thomas

Charles E. Lockwood, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lewis, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 13) filed by Defendant City Wings, Inc. d/b/a Seaflight (“Defendant” or “City Wings”); Plaintiff Ana Ramirez and Plaintiff Margaret Louise Thomas’ (collectively “Plaintiffs”) “Opposition to Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 21); and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 27). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter seeking damages allegedly resulting from an engine failure and emergency landing of a flight operated by Defendant on which Plaintiffs were passengers. (Dkt. No. 1). The Complaint alleges negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5-8.

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Dkt. No. 13 at 1). Defendant states that although the Complaint alleges that Defendant is incorporated in the State of Georgia, it is incorporated in Puerto Rico and has its principal place of business in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13 at 1-2, 5-6). Thus, Defendant argues that no diversity of citizenship exists. Id. at 2. Additionally, Defendant argues that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over the action as the Complaint only brings claims under territorial law. Id. at 6.

Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Complaint establishes federal question as well as diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiffs argue that if the Court determines that Plaintiffs have not established either federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the Court should permit them to conduct jurisdictional discovery or to amend their Complaint. Id. at 10.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction only over cases that present a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when diversity of citizenship exists and the value of the claim exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

An attack under Rule 12(b)(1) to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction can be either a facial or factual attack. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). A facial attack— as it is denominated—challenges the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint on their face. Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). In contrast, a factual attack disputes “the factual allegations underlying the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction,” and involves the presentation of competing facts. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack requires that a court “only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. On the other hand, a court may consider evidence beyond the complaint in reviewing a factual attack. Id. In so doing, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case” and “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). III. DISCUSSION

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” The statute is generally understood as requiring complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants, meaning that, “unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alteration in original); see also Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Jurisdiction under § 1332(a) requires ‘complete diversity,’ meaning that ‘no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.’” (quoting Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003))). “The key inquiry in establishing diversity is . . . the ‘citizenship’ of each party to the action.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. Inc., 592 F.3d at 419.

“A natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where she is domiciled.” Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2008). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are both “residents” of the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). Defendant has not disputed that Plaintiffs are citizens of the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13 at 4). However, residence and domicile are not synonymous terms. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). “[T]he domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting McCann v. George W. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pierro v. Kugel, 386 Fed. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To acquire a domicile, a person must be physically present in a state and intend to remain in that state.” (citing Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972)) (emphasis in original)). A complaint that alleges only the residency, but not citizenship or domicile, of a party is “jurisdictionally inadequate in [a] diversity of citizenship case.” McNair v. Synapse Group, Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012); see also GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Alleging residency alone is insufficient to plead diversity of citizenship.”); Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300 (“[M]ere residency in a state is insufficient for purposes of diversity.”). Because the Complaint only alleges Plaintiffs’ residency, it is facially deficient in pleading diversity jurisdiction. See McNair, 672 F.3d at 219 n.4.

Even assuming that Plaintiffs can amend the Complaint to allege that they are citizens, not simply residents, of the Virgin Islands, Defendant has submitted evidence challenging the jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint related to Defendant. The Complaint alleges that Defendant is incorporated in the State of Georgia and does business in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1).1 Defendant disputes this allegation and has submitted a declaration from Donald Lewis, President of City Wings, which asserts that Defendant is incorporated in Puerto Rico—not Georgia—and operates solely in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13-1 at ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7). Plaintiffs have failed to overcome Defendant’s challenge to diversity jurisdiction.

First, the Court finds that Defendant has made a factual attack on the ability of the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity as it has submitted a declaration disputing the citizenship allegations in the Complaint. See Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that in a factual attack, for example, “while diversity of citizenship might have been adequately pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant can submit proof that, in fact, diversity is lacking”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[Defendant’s] motion was supported by a sworn statement of facts. It therefore must be construed as a factual, rather than a facial attack on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).”). Thus, in considering Defendant’s attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider evidence outside the Complaint and need not take the allegations in the Complaint as true. See GBForefront, L.P., 888 F.3d at 35 (“To resolve a factual challenge, the ‘[c]ourt may look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts[.]’” (quoting Const. Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 357)).

“Once a factual challenge has been raised, the plaintiff then has the burden of proof to establish diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” GBForefront, L.P., 888 F.3d at 35 (citing McCann, 458 F.3d at 288-89). “[I]n reviewing a factual attack, ‘the court must permit the plaintiff to respond with rebuttal evidence in support of jurisdiction, and the court then decides the jurisdictional issue by weighing the evidence. If there is a dispute of a material fact, the court must conduct a plenary hearing on the contested issues prior to determining jurisdiction.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 105 (quoting McCann, 458 F.3d at 290).

Plaintiff argues that diversity jurisdiction clearly exists because “Defendant, by its own admission, is a citizen of Puerto Rico due to its incorporation in that Commonwealth.” (Dkt. No. at 9). However, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of both the state where it is incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also Johnson, 724 F.3d at 347. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the fact that Defendant may be a citizen of Puerto Rico due to its incorporation there, does not mean that it is only a citizen of Puerto Rico. Defendant may also be a citizen of the Virgin Islands if its principal place of business is located there.

The Supreme Court has defined “principal place of business” as “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities” which courts have referred to as the “nerve center.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010); see also Johnson, 724 F.3d at 347. Defendant asserts, through the Declaration of its President, Donald Lewis, that it “conducts all business activities and maintains all business assets in the U.S. Virgin Islands” and “[t]he Company’s high-level officers direct, control, and coordinate the Company’s activities only in the U.S. Virgin Islands.” (Dkt. No. 13-1 at ¶¶ 7, 9). Additionally, Defendant’s “core day-to-day executive and administrative functions are primarily carried out of the Company’s headquarters, located at 8248 Plantation Manor #61, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.” Id. at ¶ 10. Thus, Defendant’s evidence seemingly demonstrates that its principal place of business is indeed in the Virgin Islands. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92-93.

Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence disputing Defendant’s Declaration as to its principal place of business, or indeed any legitimate argument that addresses the issue of Defendant’s principal place of business.2 Thus, there is no dispute of material fact as to warrant a

“District courts have the authority to allow discovery in order to determine whether subject- matter jurisdiction exists.” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 108. In alleging the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, “a plaintiff need not allege an airtight case before obtaining discovery.” Id. However, “only those plaintiffs who have provided some basis to believe jurisdiction exists are entitled to discovery on that issue.” Id.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have provided no basis to believe that diversity jurisdiction exists, and thus discovery is not warranted. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 108 n.38 (“[O]ur decisions in the personal-jurisdiction context also support the notion that jurisdictional discovery is not available merely because the plaintiff requests it. In Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, for example, we required sufficient allegations of personal jurisdiction in order to prevent ‘a fishing expedition . . . under the guise of jurisdictional discovery.’” (quoting Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2010))). Plaintiffs have not made any allegations in their Complaint regarding Defendant’s principal place of business; they have essentially skirted the issue in their Opposition when confronted by the facts in Mr. Lewis’ Declaration;3 and they have given the Court no other

Nor will the Court grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint. Plaintiffs previously filed a “Motion to Amend the Complaint” (Dkt. No. 14), wherein they sought to change Defendant’s state of incorporation from Georgia to Puerto Rico. Magistrate Judge George W. Cannon, Jr. denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend as futile given Defendant’s undisputed contention that its principal place of business is in the Virgin Islands and thus, even with such an amendment, the Court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. (Dkt. No. 19). This Court agrees and affirms the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. Although Plaintiffs again request the opportunity to amend their Complaint in their Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 21 at 10), Plaintiffs give no insight into the nature of the proposed amendment or any indication that an amendment would be any less futile than the one previously submitted.

In sum, the Court finds that because Defendant has demonstrated—without any meaningful response from Plaintiffs—that it is a citizen of the Virgin Islands and the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs are citizens of the Virgin Islands, the parties are not diverse. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter on the basis of diversity.

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Where the parties are not diverse, this Court’s jurisdiction must be based on the existence of a federal question. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required.”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal federal question jurisdiction argument which they maintain “renders the issue of diversity irrelevant to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 9-10). courts have jurisdiction over actions that “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (“A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.”). When faced with determining whether the Court has original “arising under” jurisdiction, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule applies under which “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.

Federal question jurisdiction may arise in two ways. First, “a case arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gardiner v. St. Croix Dist. Governing Bd. of Dirs., 859 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (D.V.I. 2012). In those cases, federal courts unquestionably have federal subject matter jurisdiction. Gardiner, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)). Second, in a narrower category of cases, “a case may [also] arise under federal law ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Gardiner, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). This case falls into neither category.

As to whether federal law creates the cause of action asserted, the Court first notes that the Complaint makes no reference to any claims based on federal law. While the Complaint references the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it alleges only claims arising out of territorial law— namely negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 5-8). Therefore, on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiffs are only alleging territorial—not federal—causes of action and there is no basis for concluding that federal law creates any cause of action asserted.

Despite a lack of any federal cause of action in the Complaint, Plaintiffs argue that federal law nonetheless governs this dispute because the Complaint involves an aviation incident governed by Federal Aviation Administration regulations, and federal law preempts the general field of aviation safety. (Dkt. No. 21 at 5-9). In their Opposition, Plaintiffs rely on several statutes and regulations they argue govern the incident, including 49 U.S.C. § 41101, 49 U.S.C. § 44713, 49 C.F.R. § 830.2, and 49 C.F.R. § 830.5. (Dkt. No. 21 at 7-8). Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard is misguided.

It is true that the doctrine of “complete preemption ‘operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.’” N.J. Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. (In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.), 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)). “The complete preemption doctrine holds that ‘Congress may so completely preempt a particular area, that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.’” Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)). Therefore, a suit that “purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress . . . [and] therefore, ‘arise[s] under the ... laws ... of the United States.’” Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 67 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (“Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”).

However, this is not a case of complete preemption, as confirmed by Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999) on which Plaintiffs rely. In Abdullah, the Third Circuit held that there is “implied federal preemption of the entire field of aviation safety,” id. at 365, in that “federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire field from state and territorial regulation,” id. at 367.4 Unlike complete preemption, however, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Third Circuit in Abdullah was applying the doctrine of “field preemption.” 181 F.3d at 367. Field preemption is a different doctrine entirely from complete preemption. As stated by the Third Circuit: Complete preemption is not the same as field preemption, and the two concepts should not be confused. Complete preemption “operates to confer original federal subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.” . . . It applies when the preemptive force of a federal statute is so “extraordinary” that it “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” . . . [Field preemption is] a species of “ordinary preemption” that operates as a federal defense to a state law claim, and has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction.

Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 421 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).5

In Abdullah, the Third Circuit specifically found that, under the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”), “state and territorial law remedies are [not] preempted, only the standards of care for the safe operation of aircraft” and that “there is no federal remedy for personal injury or death caused Notably, in Abdullah, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the District Court’s jurisdiction rested on diversity. 181 F.3d at 366.

Defendants’ complete preemption theories must fail.”); Belmont v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 401 F. Supp. 3d 348, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Defendant has not shown that the FAA provides for a private right of action for personal injury claims. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of demonstrating that the FAA has completely preempted Plaintiff’s state law tort claims.”); In re Air Crash at Lexington, 486 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (“[T]he FAA does not completely preempt state law causes of action for wrongful death or survivor benefits in aviation cases.”); Skydive Factory, Inc. v. Me. Aviation Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Me. 2003) (“[T]he Federal Aviation Act has no private cause of action, . . . and there is no suggestion in the Act or the legislative history that Congress intended to eliminate ordinary damage recoveries for breach of contract and torts.”).7 Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ preemption argument as a basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Finally, having determined that the Court does not have “arising under” jurisdiction based on a federal cause of action, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs’ Complaint raises a substantial federal question as articulated by the Supreme Court in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). See Goldman v. Citigroup

Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint raises a substantial federal question because the facts alleged in the Complaint constitute violations of the federal regulations governing aircraft safety. (Dkt. No. 21 at 8-9). However, even if compliance with federal law speaks to an element of a state or territorial claim, this does not create federal jurisdiction based on a substantial federal question.

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc., 547 U.S. at 701 (“[Under Grable,] it takes more than a federal element ‘to open the “arising under” door.’” (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313)); Hirschbach v. NVE Bank, 496 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (D.N.J. 2007) (“A state law cause of action does not give rise to a substantial and disputed question of federal law simply because it is predicated on conduct regulated by federal law.”). Thus, although standards may be governed by federal law, courts have held that personal injury suits related to aviation safety do not generally confer subject matter jurisdiction based on the framework articulated in Grable. See Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 2007) (“No court of appeals has held either before or after Grable that the national regulation of many aspects of air travel means that a tort claim in the wake of a crash ‘arises under’ federal law. Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . strongly implies that the ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is unavailable; we now hold that this is the right conclusion.”); Yellen v. Teledne Cont’l Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding no federal jurisdiction under Grable because “[al]though these claims arise against the backdrop of a federal aviation regulatory scheme, they sound in run-of-the-mill state tort law. Plaintiffs’ claims do not betray a serious federal interest that merits a federal forum in this litigation”); McCarty v. Precision Airmotive Corp., Case No. 8:06-cv-1391-T-26TBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65770, at *5 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (“The fact that FAA rules and regulations may be relevant to defining the duty of care in a negligence case or the standard in a products liability case, however, does not elevate a typical state-law tort claim to one requiring resolution in a federal forum.”). Simply stated, Plaintiffs’ territorial tort claims do not fall into that “‘slim category of state law claims . . . which ‘sensibly belong in a federal court.’” Kalick, 372 Fed. App’x at 320.

In the view of the foregoing, the Court finds that it lacks federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Complaint.8

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. The Court will therefore grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. However,

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: August 20, 2021 _______/s/_______

WILMA A. LEWIS

District Judge