People of the Virgin Islands v. Ja'Haile Clendinen

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN ***

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )CASE NO ST 2023 CR 00066 ) )14 V I C §§ 921 922(a)(3) 331(1) 11(a) )14 V I C §§ 2251(a)(2)(B) 11(a) ) 14 V I C §§ 297(a)(2) 11(a) Plaintiff ) 14 V I C §§ 2251(a)(2)(B) 11(a) )14VIC §§1508(a) 11(a) vs ) 14V I C §§ 625(a) 11(a) )14VIC §§ 2253(e)(1) 331(1) 11(a) ) 14v1c §§ 2253(e)(1) 11(a) JA HAILE CLENDINEN ) 14 V [C §§ 2253(1) 11(a) ) 14 V I C §§ 2253(a) 11(a) ) 14 V I C §§ 2256(a)(3) 11(a) (3 Counts) )19 VIC §604(a)(1)(b)(5) 14V I C §11(a) Defendant ) 19V I C §604(a)(1) 14V I C §11(a) )19VIC§630(a)14V1C§11(a) Cite as 2024 VI Super 33U MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1|] THIS MATTER is before the Court on 1 Motion To Dismiss Count 25 Of The Information Defendant Ja’Haile Clendinen filed April 25 2023 2 Motion To Dismiss Count 26 Of The Information Defendant Ja’Haile Clendinen filed April 18 2023' 3 The People 5 Opposition To Defendant’s Motions To Dismiss Count 25 and 26, filed May 5 2023 and 4 Defendant’s Reply To People’s Opposition To Motion To Dismiss Counts 25 and 26 Defendant J a Haile Clendinen, filed June 23, 2023 1|2 The Court will deny Defendant s Motions as the Court does not find either statute in Count or Count 26 to be so vague that it is void I INTRODUCTION 113 Defendant Ja Haile Clendinen (“Clendinen”) moves this Court to dismiss Count 25 and Count 26 of the Information against him pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure People of the VIrgUl Iclands v Ja ’Halle Clendinen 2024 VI Super 33D Case No ST 2023 CR 00066 Memorandum Opinion and Order Page 2 of 7

i2(b)(3)(B)(v) for failure to state an offense Clendinen argues that the Counts are unduly vague Count 25 charges a violation of V I CODE ANN tit 14 § 2253(0 Unauthorized Possession Of A Firearm Within One Thousand Feet Of A School Count 26 charges a violation of 14 V I C § 2253(a) Unauthorized Possession Of A Firearm 1M Clendinen argues that Count 25 fails to put him on notice of the sentencing range and maximum period of incarceration he faces as the statute provides several different penalties “without any guidance as to how to punish a defendant convicted under the statute ”' Clendinen argues that there is no maximum sentence for § 2253(a) and that § 22530) incorporates “six different possible maximum punishments” those of §§ 2253(a) (b) and those of §§ 2256(a) (b) 2 Clendinen argues that Courts can only make procedural, not substantive rules, and thus cannot explicitly or implicitly crafi the sentencing ranges, and argues that the ranges provided in the statute are a “ridiculously confusing setup ”3 Clendinen also argues that the rule of lenity supports a finding in his favor as the statutes are “ambiguous ’ and lastly that his attorney needs to know what the minimum or maximum potential for his loss of freedom is so that he can fulfill his legal and moral responsibilities to his client 4 Clendinen makes similar arguments regarding Count 26- chiefly that it fails to provide a maximum incarceration range 5 1|5 The People argue that § 2253(a) can be interpreted m part materza6 to “set a maximum of twenty (20) years or the maximum allowable when aggravating factors are present ”7 The People then argue that because § 2253(1) doubles the penalty, Clendinen faces forty (40) years as the maximum The People point to Wallace v People8 for the guidance that statutes should be interpreted m part materza 9 The People point to McIntosh v People'0 for the assertion that when a general and specific act address the same subject matter, they should “be harmonized if possible ” The People therefore reject Clendinen’s contention that the statute should be invalidated for not holding a maximum sentence 116 Clendinen replies that the non aggravated punishment for violation of § 2253(a) states that it is ‘ not less than 10 years” and that “[n]othing in this language suggests a 20 year maximum period of incarceration ”'2 Clendinen asserts that the cases cited by the People are either inapposite 01' support his position '3 Clendinen avers that the People have waived any opposition to his other ' Def 5 Count 25 Mot 4 Der Count 25 Mot 2 3 Def 5 Count 25 Mot 6 Def 5 Count 25 Mot 8 9 Def 3 Count 26 M01 3 In part mater 10 BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed 2024) (1 ad] On the same subject relating to the same matter It is a canon of constmction that statutes that are m pan mate; in may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject ) People 5 Opp n l 371 VI 703 (VI 2019) Id at 763 '0 57 V I 669 (V I 2012) " [d at 685 ‘2 Def 3 Reply 2 ‘3 Def 3 Reply 3 People ofthe Virgin Islands v Ja’Hatle Clendinen 2024 VI Super 33U Case No ST 2023 CR 00066 Memorandum Opinion and Order Page 3 of 7

arguments by not addressing them '4 Lastly, Clendinen believes that the People have not offered a reasonable construction of either statute '5 ll LEGAL STANDARD A Sections 2253(a) (b) 2253(1) and 2256(3) (b) 1|7 Title 14, sections 2253(a) and 2253“) of the Virgin Islands Code state, respectively (a) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports 0r carries either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section 451(t) of this code, loaded or unloaded, may be arrested without a warrant, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall be fined not less than $l0,000 nor more than $IS,000 or both the fine and imprisonment, except that if such person shall have been convicted of a felony in any state, territory or federal court of the United States, or if such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, possessed, borne, transported or cam’ed by or under the proximate control of such person during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence, as defined in subsection (d) hereof, then such person shall be fined $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifieen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) years The foregoing applicable penalties provided for violation of this section shall be in addition to the penalty provided for the commission 0f, or attempt to commit, the felony or crime of violence (b) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports or carries either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any machine gun, assault rifle or sawed off shotgun, as defined in subsection (d)(2) and (3) of this section, loaded or unloaded, may be arrested without a warrant, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty years and shall be fined $25,000, except that if such person shall have been convicted of a felony in any state territory or federal court of the United States, or if such machine gun, assault rifle or sawed off shotgun or an imitation thereof was held, possessed, home, transported by or under the proximate control of such person during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence, as herein defined, then such person shall be fined $50,000 and imprisoned not less than twenty (20) years nor more than twenty five (25) years The foregoing applicable penalties provided for violation of this section shall be in addition to the penalty provided for the commission of or attempt to commit, the crime of violence

'4 Def 5 Reply 3 '5 Def 5 Reply 4 People ofthe Virgil! Islands v Ja ’Hatle Clendmen 2024 VI Super 33U Case No ST 2023 CR 00066 Memorandum Opinion and Order Page 4 of 7

(f) Whoever unless authorized by law, has possesses, bears, transports or carries, either openly or concealed, on or about his person, or under his control in any vehicle, of any description, any firearm as defined in title 23, section 451(f) of this code and any assault weapon as defined in subsection (d), or any weapon that can be converted along with a conversion kit loaded or unloaded within one thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or private elementary, junior, secondary or vocational school or a public or private college, junior college, or university or a playground or a housing facility owned by a public housing authority or within one thousand feet of a public or private youth center school bus stop or private youth center or public swimming pool or public beach, is subject to twice the maximum punishment prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and section 2256(a) and (b) of this chapter '6 {[8 Title 14 sections 2256(a) and (b) of the Virgin Islands Code state (a) Any person who is not (1) a licensed firearms or ammunition dealer, or (2) officer, agent or employee of the Virgin Islands or the United States, on duty and acting within the scope of his duties, or (3) holder of a valid firearms license for the same firearm gauge or caliber ammunition of the firearm indicated on such license; and (4) who possesses, sells, purchases, manufactures, advertises for sale, or uses any firearm ammunition is guilty subject to imprisonment for up to seven years or a fine not more than $10,000 to both fine and imprisoned (b) Any person who, unless authorized by law possesses, sells purchases, manufactures, advertises for sale, or uses armor piercing or exploding ammunition for use in a firearm shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than $15,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years '1 B Void for vagueness doctrine 19 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court provided in Codrmgton v People'8 that ‘ [T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement Therefore, a statute “is unconstitutionally vague if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what ' 14 V l C §§ 2253(a) (b) 2253“) ' 14 v 1 c §§ 2256(a) (b) '5 57 V I 176(V12012) People ofthe Virgin Islands v Ja'l-laile Clendmcn 2024 V1 Super 33U Case No ST 2023 CR 00066 Memorandum Opinion and Order Page 5 017

is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement '0 [[1 ANALYSIS A Neither § 2253(a) nor § 2253(1) are unconstitutionally vague 1110 Clendinen does not argue that either § 2253(a) or § 2253(f) are vague as to what conduct they prohibit Rather, he argues that they authorize discriminatory enforcement because, in his view, they do not provide a maximum sentence and are otherwise confusing as to the sentence range they impose The Court, however, is not of the view that the sentencing range is confusing or otherwise vague Section 2253(a) plainly sets a minimum of ten (10) years, along with a fine range of $10,000 $15,000 That section goes on to state, without a break in the sentence, that if there are aggravating factors (such as whether the possessor of the weapon is a felon or committed a violent crime), this minimum is raised to fifteen (15) years and the fine is raised to $25,000 The section then caps the sentence at twenty (20) years and then there is a period {[11 As is common in sentencing ranges, the minimum end of the range is provided first, and the maximum is provided last This reading is bolstered by the fact that the entirety of the range is provided for in one single run on sentence It is also bolstered by logic It is sensible that aggravating factors would increase the minimum sentence Additionally, it is sensible that committing the crime absent aggravating factors would not result in a sentence higher than a sentence with aggravating factors, such as life in prison ’0 The section of the statute from “except that” to “1 5 years" simply provides a conditional within the sentence that raises the minimum level but does not separate the maximum end of the range from the initial minimum set with ‘ ten years”, such that the range provided for in the whole of the sentence can be understood to be 10 years and a fine (but if there are these additional factors, 15 years and a larger fine) to 20 years i 12 Section 22530) is likewise not vague, as it merely doubles the range already provided for in § 2253(a) if the unauthorized possession of the firearm occurs near certain property namely, property children or other minors are likely to be in or near, such as schools, playgrounds, or youth centers Section 22530) clearly references “subsection (a) of this section, which is the range described above, in § 2253(a) [t is in essence another aggravating factor conditional ‘if the crime is additionally committed in a place where there are likely minors, multiply the sentencing range by two (2) and use that ’ Likewise, if the crime committed is the one outlined in § 2253(b)— Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm that is a machine gun sawed off, or assault rifle (a more specific act than subsection (a))—then subsection (f) doubles the ranges provided therein

l"Id at 187 (quoting first Kolendei i Lawson 461 U S 352 357 (1986) then LeBlancu People 56 V1 536 541 V1 2012 5° As Clenginen points out, a statute absent a maximum sentence has been interpreted by some couns as imposing a maximum sentence of life in prison See e g , Lee v United States, (Vivi! Action No 16 4709 (SDW) 2018 U S Dist LEXIS 159910 at ‘9 10 (E D Pa Sept 19 2018) (collecting cases) It would not be a reasonable reading of the statute to conclude that unauthorized possession of a gun may result in ten (10) years to life, but unauthorized possession of a gun with aggravating factors would only result in fifteen (15) to twenty (20) years 09/27/2024