Town of Huntington v. Town of Charlotte
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Krull v. Town of Huntington (Vermont Superior Court 2017)
- Brennen v. Mogul Corp. (Vt. 1988)
- Lamoureux v. Chromalloy Farm Systems, Inc. (Vt. 1988)
- In re Lake Sadawga Dam (Vt. 1960)
- Nickrans v. Wilk (Ill. 1896)
- In re Estate of Eichhoff (Cal. 1894)
- Cowdrey v. Town of Caneadea (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern New York 1883)
- Werz v. Werz (Mo. Ct. App. 1881)
- McCahill v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (N.J. 1875)
- Galpin v. Page (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of California 1870)
- Morse v. Presby (Superior Court of New Hampshire 1852)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Two questions are raised in this case, and both affect the validity of the decree of divorce of Sheldon, by the supreme court, in 1816.
In the first place, it is urged that the decree is inoperative and void, because it does not appear from the records of the court, nor from the clerk’s docket, that Sheldon had such residence in this state, as would give the court jurisdiction of the case.
This was a matter of fact, that was made to depend upon the proof to be exhibited on the trial, for the purpose of settling the question of jurisdiction; and applies to the person, and not to the subject matter of the dispute. And that being a court of enlarged jurisdiction, we are not only at liberty, but are called upon to presume, that they did not proceed to grant the decree, till the proof established their jurisdiction.
It is further insisted, that the decree only took effect from the time it was recorded.
To adopt such a rule of construction would weaken the force and effect of judgments, and throw numberless embarrassments around judicial proceedings. A judgment must, of necessity, take effect from the time it is rendered, and not from the time it is recorded ; for, otherwise, its efficacy would be made to depend upon the action of a functionary, who had nothing to do with its rendition, and who, by law, invested with no power or authority, but the mere ministerial duty of enrolling it. And this duty
This decree, for all the purposes intended, was good when it was passed, and the record, when made up, had relation back to the passing of the decree.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.