On December 2, 1966, claimant, Clinton G. *395Austin, an employee of Ralston Purina Co., suffered an injury to his back while lifting sacks of calcium phosphate. He submitted a claim to the Department of Labor and Industries, which was closed on September 29, 1967 with an award for permanent partial disability of 5 per cent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disability. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals affirmed the department action. The board’s ruling was affirmed by a Spokane County jury. From this verdict, claimant appeals.

The only error assigned on appeal is the trial court’s refusal to give the following requested instruction:

If you find that the plaintiff’s industrial injury herein aggravated and made active a latent or dormant preexisting condition, under the law, the resulting disability is to be attributed to the injury and not to the pre-exist-ing physical condition, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the entire condition.

Claimant contends this instruction properly states the law established in Miller v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 682, 94 P.2d 764 (1939), where it is stated:

We have held in an unbroken line of decisions that, if an injury, within the statutory meaning, lights up or makes active a latent or quiescent infirmity or weakened physical condition occasioned by disease, then the resulting disability is to be attributed to the injury, and not to the preexisting physical condition.

It is claimant’s theory the injury of December 2, 1966 made active or “lighted up” a latent or dormant preexisting condition; as a consequence, the Miller rule applies and the instruction should have been given. He contends that when the instruction was refused, the jury was not permitted, under the instructions given, to consider claimant’s theory. As a result, it erroneously arrived at a negative answer to the following interrogatory:

Was the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals correct in determining that on or about September 29, 1967, the condition proximately caused by plaintiff’s industrial injury of December 2, 1966, was fixed and that further medical treatment would not tend to lessen plaintiff’s causally related disability?

*396It is dear no instruction was given on claimant’s theory.

Each party is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury by proper instruction, if there is any evidence to support it. DeKoning v. Williams, 47 Wn.2d 139, 141, 286 P.2d 694 (1955). A claimant must produce sufficient substantial facts, as distinguished from a mere scintilla of evidence to make a case for the trier of fact. Sayler v. Department of Labor & Indus., 69 Wn.2d 893, 896, 421 P.2d 362 (1966); Miller v. Department of Labor & Indus., 1 Wn. App. 473, 478, 462 P.2d 558 (1969). The only question before this court is whether there is sufficient evidence to present to a jury the theory that claimant’s injury made active or “lighted up” a latent preexisting condition. It is our view there is not.

The evidence shows claimant’s condition following the injury was diagnosed as ankylosing spondylitis, sometimes referred to as rheumatoid arthritis of the spine or “Marie Strumpell’s arthritis.” It is clear this condition preexisted the injury; the company doctor traced the condition on X rays for 10 years prior to the injury.

In his brief, claimant contends the condition was latent because he had no back trouble prior to the injury and was able to carry on his work lifting 100-pound bags of calcium phosphate. Since the injury he has not been able to do so. While the claimant did so testify on direct examination, he admitted on cross-examination that for a number of years before the accident he had occasional stiffness in his back and muscles; that he lost 1 or 2 days’ work on an earlier occasion; and a couple of days in bed at home would straighten him out.1 Moreover, the production *397manager of Ralston Purina noted that before the accident claimant’s gait was very stiff; he did not have a normal walk and it was unnatural for claimant to move or stand in a straight position.2

Claimant relies upon Dr. Robert Burroughs who first examined him in March 1968, 16 months after the injury, and stated:

It is my opinion that it is more likely than not that, that particular injury triggered off a sustained exacerbation of his chronic preexisting ankylosing spondylitis.

This testimony does not state the preexisting condition was latent or inactive. Moreover, it was elicited based on a history in which claimant denied any back aches, pains or stiff ness, prior to the injury.3 However, on cross-examina*398tion when Dr. Burroughs4 was asked to assume there were complaints of aches, pains and stiffness in his back and joints prior to the injury, he testified this would indicate the condition was symptomatic prior to the injury. He also testified it is unusual not to have symptoms. Further, he said the condition was a naturally progressing condition and would have progressed naturally without the injury. This testimony negatives the conclusion claimant’s preexisting condition was latent or dormant before the injury.

Claimant also cites the testimony of Dr. William Grieve who examined claimant in August 1967 and testified for the respondent. On direct examination, he said that 'ankylosing arthritis develops without trauma and is naturally progressive independent of intervening events. It was his opinion claimant’s condition was fixed and any further treatment would be for the arthritis and not for the injury. Claimant relies upon that portion of his testimony on cross-examination wherein Dr. Grieve said the arthritic condition existed prior to the injury; the injury aggravated it and caused the condition to become symptomatic but temporary. However, he also said the symptoms from the strain *399were past and in his opinion the claimant’s present symptoms were due to the underlying preexisting condition unrelated to the injury. From our review of the testimony, it is evident Dr. Grieve did not testify the preexisting condition was inactive before the injury nor that the injury “lighted up” a latent condition.

In our view, the evidence was insufficient to justify the giving of a “lighting up” instruction and it was properly refused. Cf. Hutchings v. Department of Labor & Indus., 24 Wn.2d 711, 725, 167 P.2d 444 (1946); Rambeau v. Department of Labor & Indus., 24 Wn.2d 44, 163 P.2d 133 (1945); Sayler v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra.

Judgment affirmed.

Munson, C.J., and Evans, J., concur.