The City of Port Orchard (the City) charged Delmar Tilton with failure to sign an acknowledgment of *179receipt of a notice of infraction. The Superior Court dismissed the charge, and the City appealed. We affirm.

On May 18,1991, a Port Orchard police officer stopped Til-ton for speeding. The officer filled out a notice of infraction that contained the following statement: "Without admitting having committed each of the above infractions/offenses, I promise to respond as directed on this notice”. The officer demanded that Tilton sign on a line printed beneath this statement, but Tilton refused.

The officer then charged Tilton with "failure to sign notice of infraction” and obstructing a public servant. A municipal court jury acquitted of obstructing but convicted of failure to sign.1

Tilton appealed the failure-to-sign conviction to Superior Court, which ordered a trial de novo.2 Before such trial was held, however, Tilton filed a motion to dismiss based on State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). In essence, he asserted that the City, as a matter of law, could not produce evidence sufficient to prove the charge.3 The Superior Court ruled

that the language which defendant refused to endorse is not language whereby he acknowledges receipt of a notice of infraction. Hence, the motion must be granted and the cause dismissed.

Clerk’s Papers, at 11-12.

RCW 46.61.021(3) provides:

Any person requested to identify himself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself, give his current address, and sign an acknowledgement of receipt of the notice of infraction.

RCW 46.61.022 provides in part:

*180Any person who wilfully fails to . . . comply with RCW 46.61.021(3), is guilty of a misdemeanor.

These statutes apply in Port Orchard by virtue of Port Orchard Municipal Code § 10.04.010.

Tilton argues that he cannot be guilty of violating these statutes because he was not asked to acknowledge, and he did not refuse to acknowledge, receipt of a copy of the traffic infraction. His premise is that promising to appear in court is different from acknowledging receipt of a copy of a document, and that he was only asked to make a promise to appear in court.

We agree. A person does not acknowledge receipt of a copy of a document merely because he or she promises to appear in court. Nor does a person decline to acknowledge receipt of a copy of a document merely because he or she declines to promise to appear in court. Thus, Tilton did not refuse to acknowledge receipt of a copy of the notice of infraction merely because he declined to promise to appear in court, and the City’s evidence is insufficient to prove the facts needed to convict under RCW 46.61.021(3).

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that if we held otherwise, we would allow Tilton to be convicted for refusing to make a promise that he had a right not to make. As the City conceded at oral argument, a motorist stopped for a traffic infraction has no legal duty to promise to appear in court; if he or she refuses to make such a promise, he or she can be taken to jail, but he or she does not commit a crime merely by virtue of the refusal. Former RCW 46.63.060 (Laws of 1984, ch. 224, § 2); RCW 46.64.015; former RCW 46.64.020(2) (Laws of 1988, ch. 38, § 1(2)).4 Thus, Tilton had a right not to prom*181ise to appear in court, and it would be irrational to convict him of a crime because he exercised that right.

Nothing said herein means that an officer cannot ask a motorist to "copy receive” a traffic citation, or that the motorist who refuses such a request cannot be convicted under RCW 46.61.021(3). We hold only that a motorist who declines to make a promise to appear in court does not, by that act alone, refuse to acknowledge receipt of a copy of a traffic citation.

Affirmed.

Bridgewater, J., and Utter, J. Pro Tern., concur.