Calcaterra v. Manfra
Calcaterra v. Manfra
Opinion of the Court
Under the Uniform Parentage Act,
FACTS
Regina Marie Calcaterra was born in New York on November 9, 1966. Her birth certificate identifies her mother as Camille Diane Calcaterra. No father is identified on the birth certificate. However, Regina Calcaterra be
There was a time during her teenage years when Regina Calcaterra sought information about, and from, Manfra, but she did not commence an action to determine paternity until she was 34 years old. This was shortly after her mother died. Calcaterra does not allege that Manfra is her “presumed father,”
Calcaterra sought deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing to establish paternity. Manfra objected and opposed testing. Over this objection, a court commissioner granted Calcaterra’s motion and ordered DNA testing. Manfra sought revision of the commissioner’s order to the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court vacated the order, denied the motion for paternity testing, and dismissed the case.
The trial court acknowledged that on appeal this court might rule in a one-sentence opinion that the statute states that a child alleging sufficient facts, at any age, at any time, and anywhere, can force a DNA test on an individual to attempt to establish parentage. But the trial court determined that the term “child” is more complicated than mere biology and must be considered in reference to the context of, and reasoning for, the statute. The trial court held that under the facts presented there were no compelling reasons
DISCUSSION
Calcaterra’s action was filed under a prior version of the Uniform Parentage Act as adopted in Washington. Former RCW 26.26.060(l)(a) provided as follows:
A child, a child’s natural mother, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father, a child’s guardian, a child’s personal representative, the state of Washington, or any interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship.
(Emphasis added.) The statute did not contain a definition of the word “child.”
There is no limitation period applicable to chapter 26.26 RCW when the objective is to establish parentage.
The inclusion of the phrase “at any time” shows the intent of the legislature. In adopting the Uniform Parentage Act, the legislature balanced the interests of the child against those of a putative parent. While Manfra’s right to privacy is an interest affected by an order compelling DNA or blood tests,
The privacy invasion of a DNA test is minor. Even if it is determined that Manfra is the father of Calcaterra, there are admittedly no child support issues, and he can disinherit Calcaterra if he so chooses. Manfra’s psychological well-being does not outweigh the interests of a child.
The decision of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
Baker and Appelwick, JJ., concur.
Review denied at 149 Wn.2d 1015 (2003).
The Uniform Parentage Act was amended and updated by the legislature, effective June 13, 2002. For purposes of this opinion, we will be referring to the former act, chapter 26.26 RCW.
The declarations of Regina Calcaterra, her sister, and John Manfra’s sister-in-law indicate that Camille Calcaterra was in love with John Manfra and had a child (Regina) by him. Camille had a difficult time coping with Manfra’s departure which resulted in abuse and abandonment of her children. Regina and her sister acknowledge their information is based on information from their mother who died in 1999. Regina Calcaterra’s affidavit also sets forth her version of the previous discussions between John Manfra and herself.
See former RCW 26.26.040, presumption of paternity. Calcaterra does not allege that Manfra fits any of the statutory presumptions listed in the statute and in fact indicates in her petition that the presumption does not apply.
Although finding that the five-year look back time limit exception of former RCW 26.26.134 pertains to support orders, the trial court noted that the limitation for the establishing or enforcement of back support reinforces its decision that Calcaterra’s petition is too late.
The more recent version of the Uniform Parentage Act includes a definition of “child.” This version was adopted by the legislature and became effective June 13, 2002. “Child” is defined as “an individual of any age whose parentage may be determined under this chapter.” RCW 26.26.060(5).
Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976); Gonzales v. Cowen, 76 Wn. App. 277, 281, 884 P.2d 19 (1994).
Gonzales, 76 Wn. App. at 281 (citing Sheila A. Malloy, Comment, Washington’s Parentage Act: A Step Forward for Children’s Rights, 12 Gonz. L. Rev. 455, 456 (1977)).
Gonzales, 76 Wn. App. at 282 (citing Hayward v. Hansen, 97 Wn.2d 614, 617, 647 P.2d 1030 (1982)).
State ex rel. McMichael v. Fox, 132 Wn.2d 346, 352-53, 359, 937 P.2d 1075 (1997) (citing State v. Santos, 104 Wn.2d 142, 146-50, 702 P.2d 1179 (1985)).
State ex rel. O’Brien v. Cooperrider, 76 Wn. App. 699, 702, 887 P.2d 408 (1994).
Gonzales, 76 Wn. App. at 283; former RCW 26.26.060(l)(a) (1983).
Gonzales v. Cowen, 76 Wn. App. 277, 282 & n.2, 884 P.2d 19 (1994).
State v. Howe, 44 Wn. App. 559, 565, 723 P.2d 452 (1986) (citing State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 737-38, 612 P.2d 795 (1980)).
Howe, 44 Wn. App. at 565 (citing Meacham, 93 Wn.2d at 738).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In the Matter of the Parentage of Regina Marie Calcaterra. Regina Marie Calcaterra v. John Manfra
- Cited By
- 3 cases
- Status
- Published