Mary Kay, Inc., appeals from a trial court decision that the City of Tacoma’s appeal from a hearing examiner tax assessment refund order invoked the superior court’s original jurisdiction and in allowing further pretrial discovery. Because, under these facts, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, we reverse and dismiss.

FACTS

Mary Kay, Inc., an out-of-state corporation, manufactures and distributes wholesale skin care products and cosmetics through a network of local beauty consultants. Some of Mary Kay’s beauty consultants receive wholesale *113products and sell them as retail products in the City of Tacoma. As a result, Tacoma, a municipal corporation organized under state law, assessed Mary Kay $14,070.11 in business and occupation taxes for sales within its city limits.

After paying the assessment, Mary Kay timely appealed to the Tacoma Hearing Examiner, under Tacoma Municipal Code (TMC) 6.68.390, in accordance with TMC 1.23.050-(B)(9).1 The hearing examiner held an adversarial proceeding, concluded that Mary Kay was not subject to the business and occupation tax, and ordered Tacoma to refund Mary Kay’s assessment payment.

Tacoma appealed the hearing examiner decision under TMC 1.23.160,2 TMC 6.68.390,3 and TMC 6.68.395. TMC 6.68.395 provides that the “trial in the Superior Court on appeal shall be de novo and without the necessity of any pleadings other than the notice of appeal.” Tacoma then proceeded with discovery, serving interrogatories and requests for production on Mary Kay.

In response, Mary Kay moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to bar further discovery. In support of its motion, Mary Kay argued (1) that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear Tacoma’s appeal of its own administrative order or, alternatively, (2) that the superior court had appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction.

The trial court ruled that under article IV, section 6 of the Washington Constitution, it had original jurisdiction over *114cases that involve the legality of any tax issues. It then denied Mary Kay’s motion to dismiss or bar discovery.

Mary Kay sought discretionary review of the trial court ruling. A commissioner of our court granted Mary Kay’s motion. We limited our review to whether Tacoma was “entitled to a trial de novo.” Order Granting Mot. for Discretionary Review (in part) at 8 (Wash. Ct. App., Jan. 29, 2002).

ANALYSIS

Mary Kay contends that the trial court erred in ruling that Tacoma’s appeal invoked the court’s original jurisdiction and in allowing further discovery. Jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Local Union I-369, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Sandvik Special Metals Corp., 102 Wn. App 764, 770, 10 P.3d 470 (2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1006 (2001).

In denying Mary Kay’s motion to dismiss or to bar discovery, the trial court specifically found that it “ha[d] original jurisdiction over cases that involve the ‘legality of any tax,’ under Art. IV, § 6, of the Washington State Constitution, [and] that [it] is not dependent on the Tacoma Municipal Code.” Clerk’s Papers at 175.

The trial court correctly cited our constitution, but it failed to determine whether the provision is self-executing and, thus, confers original jurisdiction absent additional statutory authority. Anderson v. Whatcom County, 15 Wash. 47, 51, 45 P. 665 (1896) (to be self-executing, a constitutional provision must sufficiently detail a right to be protected and enjoyed or enforced and, absent such sufficiency, the provision is merely a principle) (citing Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 100 (5th ed. 1883)). Generally, constitutional grants of jurisdiction are not self-executing. W. Am. Co. v. St. Ann Co., 22 Wash. 158, 162, 60 P. 158 (1900) (citing Price v. Smith, 93 Va. 14, 24 S.E. 474 (1896)).

As already noted, article IV, section 6 of the Washington Constitution provides that “[t]he superior court shall *115have original jurisdiction in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine . . . But this constitutional provision does not supply a sufficient means by which the right may be enjoyed, thus, it is not self-executing and the trial court incorrectly relied on it alone. We next turn to whether there was another basis for the trial court to invoke original jurisdiction.

Washington statutory authority mimics our constitutional provision providing: “The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity, and in all cases at law which involve the . . . legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine .. ..” RCW 2.08.010. Although this statute confers original jurisdiction on the superior court, our inquiry does not end here.4

Tacoma claims that it invoked superior court original jurisdiction when it filed a notice of appeal under TMC 6.68.395. Initially, we disagree because we reject, as did the trial court, Tacoma’s argument that its municipal code alone confers original jurisdiction on the superior court. City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 726-27, 585 P.2d 784 (1978) (municipality cannot prescribe to the superior court the practices and procedures the municipality expects the superior court to follow — judicial matters involving practice and procedure of the superior court are inherently judicial and not local concern extending to municipality’s policing power under the Washington Constitution).

Here, there are only two ways that Tacoma could invoke the superior court’s original jurisdiction: first, by filing a complaint, CR 35 and Haywood v. Aranda, 143 Wn.2d 231, 237, 19 P.3d 406 (2001) (superior court jurisdiction is invoked when a complaint is filed); or second, by filing a *116writ.6 Tacoma filed neither a complaint nor a writ and it could not invoke original jurisdiction by filing a notice of appeal.7 Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the hearing examiner’s decision.

The superior court is reversed and the matter is dismissed.8

Quinn-Brintnall, A.C.J., and Morgan, J., concur.