Littleton v. Whatcom County
Littleton v. Whatcom County
Opinion of the Court
Monte R. Littleton appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his case on summary judgment. Littleton brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether he must obtain a solid waste handling permit to operate a worm farm. Worm farms use chicken manure in one phase of their operations. The trial court found that chicken manure is a solid waste, requiring Littleton to
FACTS
Monte Littleton wanted to open a worm farm in Whatcom County. To do so, Littleton had to make worm food by composting wheat straw, chicken manure, water, lime, soy meal, and gypsum. Wheat straw makes up approximately 90 percent of this mixture. The mixture is composted and generates 600-1,000 yards of material each week. After three weeks, the composted material is transferred to a mushroom farm where it is used to grow mushrooms. Ten weeks later, the compost is returned to the worm farm, mixed with wood fiber and sand, and aged for four weeks. The resulting mixture results in “ideal worm food.”
Before he started his worm farm, Littleton sought Whatcom County’s approval. After the county’s land use division manager informed Littleton that his proposed farm did not violate any zoning laws, Littleton spent approximately $650,000 on land and construction. Approximately one year later, Whatcom County Health and Human Services informed Littleton that he would need a solid waste handling permit because chicken manure is a solid waste under state regulations. Littleton then brought this action for declaratory judgment.
Littleton moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion, finding “as a matter of law that chicken manure was a putrescible solid waste controlled under RCW 70.95 and that the plaintiff was required to apply to Whatcom County for a solid waste handling permit.” Although the County did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, both parties agreed that there was no genuine issue of fact. The court ordered summary judgment for the County and dismissed the case.
I. Chapter 70.95 RCW and Department of Ecology (DOE) Regulations
Under chapter 70.95 RCW, Washington’s solid waste management statute, one may not maintain, establish, or modify a solid waste handling facility without a permit.
A solid waste dumping violation constitutes a misdemeanor if the litter is greater than one cubic foot but less than one cubic yard, and it constitutes a gross misdemeanor if the amount is one cubic yard or more.
The DOE has regulatory authority under chapter 70.95 RCW. In its regulations, the DOE defines “agricultural waste” as farm waste resulting from agricultural product production “including but not limited to manures, and carcasses of dead animals weighing each or collectively in excess of fifteen pounds.”
Relying on the DOE’s definition, Whatcom County and the trial court interpreted chicken manure as being solid waste, thus requiring Littleton to obtain a permit. Littleton argues that, despite the DOE regulations, agricultural manures used for agricultural purposes are not solid waste under chapter 70.95 RCW.
II. Interpreting Chapter 70.95 RCW
The interpretation of a statute and its implementing regulations is a question of law that we review de novo.
Littleton argues that the word “waste” in the “solid waste” definition implies that the material is useless and intended for disposal. Therefore, agricultural manures used in agricultural operations are not “waste” because they are still intended for use. The dictionary defines “waste” as a “damaged, defective, or superfluous material. . . material not usable for the ordinary or main purpose of manufacture . . . SCRAP . . . worthless material removed in mining or digging operations . .. refuse from places of human or animal habitation ... GARBAGE, RUBBISH ... EXCREMENT . . . SEWAGE.”
all putrescible and nonputrescible solid and semisolid wastes including garbage, rubbish, ashes, industrial wastes, demolition and construction wastes, abandoned vehicles or parts thereof, discarded home and industrial appliances, manure, vegetable or animal solid and semisolid wastes, and other discarded materials/[19 ]
But in 1970, the legislature changed the definition by striking “home and industrial appliances, manure, vegetable or animal solid and semisolid wastes, and other discarded materials” and adding “commodities” in its place.
Accordingly, we interpret the statutory definition of “solid waste” to exclude agricultural manures used for agricultural purposes. This interpretation complies with our duty to avoid any “absurd or strained consequences” while interpreting a statute.
But the County argues that chapter 70.95 RCW’s reference to “waste-derived soil amendments” eliminates this unintended consequence. A “waste-derived soil amendment” is any substance derived from solid waste that is intended to improve the soil’s physical characteristics.
The County adds that WAC 173-304-015(5) also eliminates unintended consequences. This rule states that “[t]hese regulations shall not apply” to certain solid wastes, including “[a]gricultural wastes, limited to manures and crop residues, returned to the soils at agronomic rates . . . .”
The County next argues that chapter 70.95 RCW clearly anticipates that DOE will regulate manure because a statement in the legislative findings refers to “new and ever-mounting problems involving disposal of garbage, refuse, and solid waste materials resulting from . . . agricultural .. . activities.”
Next, the County asserts that the statutory definition of “composted material” is proof that the legislature intended to regulate agricultural manure. The statute defines “composted material” as “organic solid waste that has been subjected to controlled aerobic degradation at a solid waste facility.”
Finally, the County argues that although manure is not specifically mentioned in the statutory definition of solid waste, it nevertheless qualifies because solid waste is “all putrescible and nonputrescible solid and semisolid
111. Validity of DOE Regulations
Our holding that chicken manure is not a solid waste contradicts DOE’s regulations on the subject. Littleton argues that these regulations are invalid because they exceed DOE’s statutory authority.
Here, the regulations define “solid waste” to include agricultural manures.
We reverse.
Coleman and Baker, JJ., concur.
RCW 70.95.170.
RCW 70.95.240(1).
Waste is “putrescible” if it contains organic matter capable of being decomposed by bacteria and fungi. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1850 (1993); WAC 173-304-100(63).
RCW 70.95.030(22).
RCW 70.95.030(23).
RCW 70.95.240(2).
RCW 70.95.010(1).
RCW 70.95.010(3).
WAC 173-304-100(2) (emphasis added).
WAC 173-304-100(73) (emphasis added).
In re Impoundment of Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wn.2d 145, 154, 60 P.3d 53 (2002) (citing Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983)).
State v. Grays Harbor County, 98 Wn.2d 606, 607, 656 P.2d 1084 (1983) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Lehman, 93 Wn.2d 25, 27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980)).
Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local No. 882 v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 92 Wn.2d 415, 420, 598 P.2d 379 (1979) (citing Hartman v. State Game Comm’n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975)), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980).
Edelman v. State ex. rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 116 Wn. App. 876, 882-83, 68 P.3d 296 (2003) (citing Vashon Island Comm, for Self-Gov’t v. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995)), review granted, 150 Wn.2d 1025 (2004).
Grays Harbor County, 98 Wn.2d at 607 (citing Lehman, 93 Wn.2d at 27; Garrison v. State Nursing Bd., 87 Wn.2d 195, 196, 550 P.2d 7 (1976)).
Id. at 607-08 (citing Whitehead v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 92 Wn.2d 265, 268, 595 P.2d 926 (1979); Ropo, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 67 Wn.2d 574, 577, 409 P.2d 148 (1965); Garrison, 87 Wn.2d at 196).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2580 (1993).
Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 134.
Id. at § 3(9) (emphasis added).
Laws of 1970, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 62, § 60(9) (emphasis added).
Auto. Drivers, 92 Wn.2d at 421 (citing Jepson v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 573 P.2d 10 (1977)) (a court cannot read into a statute that which it believes the legislature has omitted); In re Phillips’ Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 201-02, 74 P.2d 1015 (1938) (repealed and superseded statutes are useful in statutory construction, and a court may presume a change in legislative purpose from a material change in a statute’s wording).
State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987) (citing State v. Richardson, 81 Wn.2d 111, 499 P.2d 1264 (1972)).
RCW 70.95.030(21), (26).
RCW 70.95.030(21).
RCW 70.95.240(l)(b).
RCW 70.95.205(1).
Chapter 15.54 RCW defines “commercial fertilizer” as “a substance containing one or more recognized plant nutrients and that is used for its plant nutrient content or that is designated for use or claimed to have value in promoting plant growth, and shall include limes, gypsum, and manipulated animal and vegetable manures. It does not include unmanipulated animal and vegetable manures, organic waste-derived material, and other products exempted by the department by rule.” RCW 15.54.270(4).
“Manipulation” means “processed or treated in any manner, including (hying to a moisture content less than thirty percent.” RCW 15.54.270(19).
WAC 173-304-015(5).
RCW 70.95.010(1) (emphasis added).
RCW 70.95.030(4).
RCW 70.95.030(22).
H&H P’ship v. State, 115 Wn. App. 164, 167, 62 P.3d 510 (2003) (citing RCW 34.05.570(2)(c)) (a regulation is invalid if it exceeds the agency’s statutory authority).
Id. at 168 (citing State v. Ford, 110 Wn.2d 827, 831, 755 P.2d 806 (1988)).
Id. (citing Green River Cmty. Coll. v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 95 Wn.2d 108, 112, 622 P.2d 826 (1980), modified on reh’g, 95 Wn.2d 962, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981); RCW 34.05.570(1)(a)).
Id. (citing Braman v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 104 Wn.2d 55, 60, 700 P.2d 1139 (1985); Superior Asphalt & Concrete v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 84 Wn. App. 401, 405, 929 P.2d 1120 (1996), review denied, 132 Wn.2d 1009 (1997)).
Id. at 170 (citing Bird-Johnson Corp. v. Dana Corp., 119 Wn.2d 423, 428, 833 P.2d 375 (1992)).
Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass’n v. Telecomm. Ratepayers Ass’n for Cost-Based & Equitable Rates, 75 Wn. App. 356, 363, 880 P.2d 50 (1994) (citing In re Registration of Elec. Lightwave, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 530, 536-40, 869 P.2d 1045 (1994); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wn.2d 804, 808, 650 P.2d 193 (1982)).
WAC 173-304-100(2), (73).
RCW 70.95.060(1).
RCW 70.95.215(2).
RCW 70.95.218(4).
RCW 70.95.255.
RCW 70.95.280.
RCW 70.95.310.
RCW 70.95.670.
RCW 70.95.300(2) (allowing applications for solid waste exemptions); RCW 70.95.300(1) (allowing exemption of solid wastes if the material will be beneficially used or reused without health or environmental risks); RCW 70.95.205 (allowing exemption of solid wastes if the material is a waste-derived soil amendment meeting certain standards); RCW 70.95.305 (allowing exemption of certain solid waste handling facilities that satisfy environmental standards).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.