*571¶1 D.S. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to expunge and to seal his juvenile indecent liberties adjudication under RCW 13.50.050. Holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in State v T.K.1 controls and mandates application of the pre-1997 amendment version of RCW 13.50.050, we reverse and remand to the trial court to seal and to expunge D.S.’s juvenile record.

FACTS

¶2 On June 3, 1986, juvenile D.S. pleaded guilty to one count of first degree statutory rape. The trial court reduced the offense to indecent liberties and, on July 30, 1986, sentenced D.S. to serve one year of community supervision. D.S. served his sentence and, since that time, he has not been charged with another crime.

f 3 On July 26, 2004, D.S. moved to expunge and to seal his juvenile criminal record under RCW 13.50.050. Reasoning that the 2001 amended version of RCW 13.50.050 precluded sealing and expunging of D.S.’s juvenile record because he did not bring his motion until after the effective date of the amendment, the trial court denied the motion.

¶4 D.S. appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶5 The issues before us are (1) whether the legislature’s 2001 amendments to RCW 13.50.050 operated to bar sealing and expungement of D.S.’s 1986 juvenile sex offense when he did not file his motion until 2004 or (2) whether the preamendment version of RCW 13.50.050 still applied. D.S. argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in T.K. controls *572and that his right to expungement and sealing vested when he went crime-free for two years after his release from confinement, despite the legislature’s attempt to curtail the effect of T.K. in its 2001 amendment of RCW 13.50.050. We agree with D.S.

I. Evolution of RCW 13.50.050

¶6 RCW 13.50.050 governs the sealing of juvenile criminal records. Before 1997, former RCW 13.50.050(11) (1996) required the court to grant an offender’s motion to seal his juvenile record if he met two conditions: (1) two years had elapsed from the later of his discharge from supervision or the court’s issuance of an order relating to the offense; and (2) no further criminal or diversion proceedings remained pending against the offender.2 It is undisputed that D.S. met both criteria in 1989.

¶7 In July 1997, the legislature amended RCW 13-.50.050, adding a prohibition against sealing any juvenile record containing a felony sex offense.3 This amendment *573was effective July 1,1997.4 It is undisputed that D.S.’s 1986 indecent liberties adjudication was a Class B felony sex offense. Thus, if the triggering event for applying the 1997 amendment was filing a motion, then the 1997 amendment would have prohibited the sealing of D.S.’s juvenile record when he filed his motion in 2004.

¶8 In 1999, however, the Washington Supreme Court held that the triggering event was not the filing of a motion to seal the record but, rather, the offender’s satisfaction of the statutory criteria — the passage of time with no new offenses.5 In T.K., the court considered whether a trial court erred in denying a juvenile sex offender’s motion to seal his record based on the 1997 amendments to RCW 13.50.050.6 The court ruled that the 1997 amendments were ambiguous about (1) whether they applied retroactively and (2) what event triggered the application of RCW 13.50.050.7

¶9 Applying principles of statutory construction, the court held that (1) the 1997 amendments applied prospectively and (2) “completion of the statutory conditions, not the filing of a motion to seal,” triggered application of RCW 13.50.050 entitling an offender to the sealing of his juvenile record.8 Therefore, the court concluded, where an offender seeking to have his juvenile criminal records sealed had satisfied the statutory conditions of RCW 13.50.050 before *574July 1997, the former version of the statute governed, no matter when the offender filed the motion.9

¶10 In 2001, responding to the court’s T.K. decision, the legislature again amended RCW 13.50.050, providing that the 1997 amendments applied to any offender, such as D.S., who had a prior sex offense and who had filed a motion to seal his juvenile record after July 1, 1997.10

II. Effective Date of 2001 Amendment

¶11 The State argues that because the legislature’s 2001 amendment to RCW 13.40.050 “did not exist” at the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in *575T.K.,the court’s decision is not controlling.11 We disagree.12 As the court noted in T.K.:

Contrary to the State’s argument, amending a statute does not necessarily mean that the prior statute ceases to exist. An amendment generally means that the new statute will apply as of the effective date of the amendment. There are many cases, however, in which a preamendment version of a statute will continue to govern in cases arising prior to the amendment, particularly where vested rights or contractual obligations are affected.[13]

¶12 The T.K. decision is consistent with the general rule that we apply statutory amendments prospectively.14 Nonetheless, we will apply an amendment retroactively if “ '(1) the legislature so intended; (2) it is “curative”; or (3) it is remedial, provided, however, such retroactive application does not run afoul of any constitutional prohibition.’ ”15 With respect to criteria one and two, it is undisputed that here the legislature intended its 2001 amendment to RCW 13.50.050 to apply retroactively to “cure” the 1997 amendment’s ambiguity that had precipitated the Supreme Court’s decision in T.K.16

*576¶ 13 But such curative retroactivity here, if valid, would thwart the third McGee Guest Home criterion because it would run afoul of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.17 It is a “fundamental rule of statutory construction that once a statute has been construed by the highest court of the state, that construction operates as if it were originally written into it.”18 Here, the Supreme Court read the pre-1997 version of RCW 13.50.050 as creating an offender’s automatic entitlement to sealing of his juvenile record once he remained crime-free for two years in the community.19

¶14 Thus, although the legislature may act generally to clarify its statutes, even retroactively, such clarification cannot have a retroactive effect where the statutory amendment directly contravenes a prior Supreme Court decision interpreting an ambiguous provision in the original statute.20 Thus here, although promulgating the 2001 amendment expressly to contravene T.K., the legislature could not thereby alter the court’s prior construction of RCW 13.50.050(11) by declaring it retroactive. As the court noted:

[T]he statute both before and after the 1997 amendments says the court “shall” grant a motion to seal, imposing a mandatory *577obligation to seal if a juvenile meets the statutory conditions. Accordingly, once the conditions of the statute are met, the defendant has a right to relief and a court has the non-discretionary obligation to seal records regardless of when the motion is made.[21]

¶15 Although, as the State asserts, our Supreme Court has not yet addressed the retroactivity of the legislature’s 2001 amendment, the court in T.K. nevertheless explained how it would rule even if the 1997 amendment had been unambiguous and clearly retroactive:

Even if the 1997 amendments at issue here are remedial, a statute will not be applied retroactively if it affects a substantive or vested right. The Court of Appeals in State v. T.K, ...held that the defendants’ statutory right to have records sealed had accrued prior to the amendment and no later-enacted statute could divest them of the right.[22]

*578¶16 In our view, this language from T.K. also precluded the 2001 amendment’s retroactive application to D.S., whose right to sealing and expungement of his juvenile record had accrued in 1989, long before even the 1997 amendment. Despite the legislature’s express intent, it could not amend former RCW 13.50.050 such that it could retroactively defeat T.K.’s application to D.S. Under T.K, D.S. earned his right to have his juvenile record sealed when he committed no additional crimes for two years, thus complying with former RCW 13.50.050’s requirements in 1989. If the 1997 amendment could not operate to divest T.K. of his right to expungement, then similarly, the 2001 amendment could not operate to divest D.S. of the same right.23 That D.S. did not file a motion to expunge or to seal his record until 2004, three years after the 2001 amendment, does not eradicate this vested right.

¶17 Holding that the trial court erred in applying the 2001 amended version of RCW 13.50.050 to defeat D.S.’s motion, we reverse and remand to the trial court to expunge D.S.’s prior juvenile adjudication from his record and to seal that record. Having reversed on this nonconstitutional ground, we do not reach D.S.’s additional constitutional grounds for reversal.24

¶18 Reversed.

Morgan, A.C.J., and Armstrong, J., concur.