Glasser v. City of Seattle, Office of Hearing Examiner
Glasser v. City of Seattle, Office of Hearing Examiner
Opinion of the Court
¶1 — This case concerns the adequacy of State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)
I
¶2 Since the 1900s, the City has operated the Landsburg Project on the Cedar River in King County to provide a
¶3 In the 1930s, a run of sockeye salmon was successfully introduced into the Cedar River watershed. After building to robust levels in the 1960s, the run experienced significant declines. The Washington State Legislature responded in 1989 by enacting Senate Bill 5156
¶4 In 1991, the State constructed an “interim” hatchery capable of producing up to 17 million fry annually. However, in 1993 the Cedar River Sockeye Policy Committee decided to postpone construction of the spawning channel and continue operating the interim hatchery as an emergency measure to reverse the precipitous decline of the sockeye fishery. The interim hatchery has been operated by the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife ever since.
¶5 Eventually the City entered into a lengthy planning process with state and federal agencies regarding management of the Cedar River watershed. The end result was the Cedar River Watershed Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), a 50-year comprehensive plan that addresses watershed management, instream flows, fish passage at Landsburg,
¶6 In 2000, the parties signed the Cedar River HCP in conjunction with an implementation agreement, the Lands-burg mitigation agreement, and the instream flow agreement. These agreements provided for construction of a fish ladder to allow all salmon species except sockeye to spawn above the dam because of concerns that the large number of returning sockeye would pose a risk to the City’s drinking water supply. Sockeye mitigation would instead be accomplished by construction of a new, expanded hatchery with a production capacity of up to 34 million fry per year, which was assumed to be the number of fry needed to achieve the equivalent of 262,000 spawners required by Senate Bill 5156 for mitigation purposes. The parties also agreed to implement an adaptive management plan designed to “address critical questions as they arise and make changes in management based on the results of monitoring.”
¶7 In 2003, the programmatic HCP EIS was followed by a supplemental EIS (SEIS) to evaluate specific project alternatives for constructing the expanded sockeye hatchery. Consistent with the goals and objectives referenced in the HCP and Landsburg mitigation agreement, the SEIS alternatives focused on various design and siting considerations for the expanded sockeye hatchery.
¶8 In May 2003, Glasser challenged the adequacy of the SEIS before the Hearing Examiner. The Hearing Examiner granted the City’s motion to limit the appeal to issues
¶9 The City prepared a revised hatchery SEIS that focused on the specific deficiencies noted in the Hearing Examiner’s decision, and Glasser appealed. In September 2005, the Hearing Examiner reiterated that the scope of the appeal did not include a challenge to the revised hatchery EIS based on its failure to reanalyze programmatic alternatives in the HCP EIS, and in December 2005 the Hearing Examiner ruled that the revised hatchery SEIS was “adequate by all applicable standards.” Glasser obtained a writ of review in superior court, which ruled in July 2006 that Glasser failed to prove that the Hearing Examiner’s decisions were erroneous. Glasser now appeals that decision.
¶10 In addition, Glasser recently filed suit in federal court directly challenging the 1999 programmatic HCP EIS.
¶11 Glasser argues that the Hearing Examiner erred in refusing to accept any evidence or argument concerning the continuing validity of analysis and assumptions in the 1999 programmatic HCP EIS that underlay the subsequent hatchery EIS. Glasser argues that the programmatic alternatives for sockeye mitigation were developed based on an erroneous analysis of the City’s legal mitigation obligations under Senate Bill 5156 and erroneous assumptions about the number of fry needed to meet those requirements. These alleged errors led to the rejection of nonhatchery alternatives in the HCP EIS and to the adoption of the expanded hatchery alternative. Therefore, the programmatic HCP EIS is not competent to support the project-level hatchery EIS. Glasser insists that she is not asking the City to redo the original HCP EIS or to consider new programmatic alternatives; rather, she wants this court to remand the revised hatchery EIS to the City for reevaluation of the alleged errors in the HCP EIS.
¶12 The Hearing Examiner never actually evaluated the adequacy of the EIS on this issue. Rather, she dismissed this portion of Glasser’s arguments as a matter of law based on her interpretation of SEPA’s phased review regulations and parallel provisions in the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC). Accordingly, the issue concerns the interpretation of statutes and regulations, which is a question of law reviewed de novo.
¶13 The principal purpose of SEPA is to provide decision makers and the public with information about potential adverse impacts of a proposed action.
¶14 Recognizing that SEPA documents can become outdated over time, the regulations provide standards and processes for ensuring the continuing validity of the analysis. “When preparing a project EIS ... the lead agency shall review the nonproject EIS to ensure that the analysis is valid when applied to the current proposal, knowledge, and technology. If it is not valid, the analysis shall be reanalyzed in the project EIS.”
115 Glasser argues that the City failed to review the assumptions and analyses in the HCP EIS to ensure their validity as applied to the hatchery proposal. She implies that this review, if performed, would have shown that the alternatives analysis in the 1999 programmatic HCP EIS was not valid, which would call into question the hatchery EIS’s analysis of the expanded hatchery as a foregone conclusion. Glasser further argues that a new SEIS is required because probable significant adverse environmental impacts were not covered by the range of alternatives in the hatchery EIS.
¶16 We disagree. The SEPA phased review regulations are designed to streamline environmental review as a proposal progresses from broad planning to narrow, site-specific implementation. The scope of the project EIS is to be limited accordingly.
¶17 Here, the initial programmatic SEPA analysis was conducted in conjunction with the Cedar River HCP. The alternatives in the HCP EIS presented a broad range of policy choices for mitigating anadromous fish impacts, including a no-hatchery/habitat restoration alternative favored by Glasser. However, the agencies did not choose this alternative; instead, they selected the expanded hatchery alternative. Following this programmatic decision, the City then prepared a project-level hatchery EIS that focused its alternatives analysis on a narrower set of considerations relating to the siting and construction of the hatchery. The Hearing Examiner ruled that the City’s revised hatchery EIS did consider whether assumptions and analyses in the 1999 HCP EIS were still accurate, at least with respect to issues within the scope of that document (worst-case analysis). This process properly followed the letter and spirit of the SEPA regulations.
¶18 Glasser also argues that the hatchery EIS is inadequate because the adaptive management plan (AMP) proposed as one of the mitigation measures fails to provide reasonable assurances that adaptive management will actually occur, and that the Hearing Examiner erred in applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review to this issue. We agree that the Hearing Examiner erred in applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to Glasser’s EIS adequacy challenge. EIS adequacy refers to the legal sufficiency of the environmental data contained in the document.
¶19 WAC 197-ll-440(6)(a) provides that an EIS must “discuss reasonable mitigation measures that would significantly mitigate” the significant impacts. The EIS shall “[c]learly indicate those mitigation measures . . . that could be implemented or might be required, as well as those, if any, that agencies or applicants are committed to implement.”
¶20 Glasser’s argument is primarily substantive: that the AMP is unlikely to result in management changes that will actually mitigate for adverse impacts. Glasser claims that SEPA requires “reasonable assurances” that adaptive management will actually occur, citing Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Boardl
¶21 Therefore, the issue is whether the AMP is described in sufficient detail to allow for a reasonable evaluation of the proposal’s impacts. Glasser claims that the AMP should have specified a statistical power analysis and that it lacks defined triggers for action. However, the EIS explained that the parameters will be developed once the specific monitoring studies are designed, and the AMP does identify numeric thresholds triggering review and responses that should be taken. Glasser also argues that the AMP is defective because it lacks a dispute resolution process, but the Hearing Examiner properly concluded that a more extensive process was not legally required under SEPA. The revised AMP meets SEPA requirements for display of impacts.
¶22 Affirmed.
Agid and Cox, JJ., concur.
Review denied at 163 Wn.2d 1033 (2008).
Ch. 43.21C RCW.
16 U.S.C. § 1531.
S.B. 5156, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989).
RCW 77.100.120.
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
Glasser v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 2:06-CV-00561-MJB (W.D. Wash., filed Apr. 20, 2006).
City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wn.2d 289, 295, 126 P.3d 802 (2006).
Save Our Rural Env’t v. Snohomish County, 99 Wn.2d 363, 373, 662 P.2d 816 (1983).
WAC 197-11-776.
WAC 197-11-060(5)(b).
WAC 197-11-060(5)(c).
WAC 197-11-443(2).
WAC 197-11-443(3); SMC 25.05.443(C).
SMC 25.05.600(B).
WAC 197-11-600(3)(b)(ii).
WAC 197-11-443(2), -060(5)(c).
Klickitat County Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d 619, 633, 860 P.2d 390, 866 P.2d 1256 (1993) (citing Richard L. Settle, The Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis § 14(a)(i) (4th ed. 1993)).
Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d at 632; Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wn.2d 20, 34, 785 P.2d 447 (1990).
Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d at 633.
RCW 43.21C.090; Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d at 633.
Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wn.2d 338, 344-45, 552 P.2d 184 (1976); Solid Waste Alternative Proponents v. Okanogan County, 66 Wn. App. 439, 442, 832 P.2d 503 (1992).
Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d at 633 (quoting Cheney, 87 Wn.2d at 344-45).
Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass’n v. King County Council, 87 Wn.2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674 (1976); Kettle Range v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 120 Wn. App. 434, 455-56, 85 P.3d 894 (2003).
Kettle Range, 120 Wn. App. at 456 (quoting Anderson v. Pierce County, 86 Wn. App. 290, 302, 936 P.2d 432 (1997)).
133 Wn. App. 503, 137 P.3d 31 (2006).
113 Wn. App. 34, 52 P.3d 522 (2002).
Preserve Our Islands, 133 Wn. App. at 538-39; Thornton Creek, 113 Wn. App. at 57-58.
WAC 197-11-440(6)(c)(iii).
WAC 197-11-440(6)(c)(iv).
151 Wn.2d 568, 90 P.3d 659 (2004).
38 Wn. App. 904, 691 P.2d 229 (1984).
Miller, 38 Wn. App. at 913.
Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 600.
Save Our Rural Env’t, 99 Wn.2d at 371.
Moss v. City of Bellingham, 109 Wn. App. 6, 14, 31 P.3d 703 (2001) (quoting Anderson, 86 Wn. App. at 300).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.