¶1 John A. Hively appeals the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment, denying reconsideration, and dismissing his negligence claim against the Port of Skamania County (Port) for injuries caused by his fall in one of the Port’s parks, Teo Park. Hively argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Port is entitled to immunity under the recreational use statute, former RCW 4.24.210(1) (2006), 1 because material issues of fact exist as to whether the place where he fell was sufficiently attenu *13 ated from the fee-generating areas of the Port’s properties and whether there was a latent condition. Because we disagree, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissal.

FACTS

¶2 Hively traveled to Teo Park in Stevenson, Washington, a property owned by the Port on the Columbia River waterfront. Teo Park is physically connected to two other port properties, Bob’s Beach and Stevenson Landing, by an asphalt path. There is a restroom along this path, which has a second path that is not at issue here that also provides access to the restroom.

¶3 Hively headed down the asphalt path, which was shaded by trees. After a few steps, Hively tripped and fell onto the path, injuring himself. In his deposition testimony, Hively stated that when he fell he was looking straight ahead and he did not see the pothole due to a shadowed area created by the bright sun. Hively expected that the path would be hazard-free, and before he fell he did not notice any potholes or irregularities on the path.

¶4 The Port does not charge a fee to enter Teo Park, Bob’s Beach, or Stevenson Landing, and they are open to the public. The restroom is also open to the public, except during the winter season when it is closed. Occasionally, the Port rents Teo Park to private parties for a fee, but the path along the waterfront and the restroom remain open to the public while the park is rented. The Port also charges cruise ships a fee to dock at the pier at Stevenson Landing, but again, the pier remains accessible to the public without a fee even when ships are docked there.

¶5 The path along the waterfront on the way to the restroom, where Hively fell, was paved with asphalt in 1997, but over time the surface of the path had become broken and irregular. The Port knew about the condition of the path, but did not consider it to be dangerous because the *14 irregularities were “open and obvious and consistent with other rough or natural trails on Port park property.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 54. Prior to Hively’s fall, the Port had not installed signs warning of the path’s conditions. Hively’s lawsuit was the first time the Port had heard of a person tripping on this particular path.

¶6 Hively sued the Port for negligence. The Port moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to recreational use immunity under former RCW 4.24.210. Hively cross moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Port’s motion for summary judgment, denied Hively’s motion, dismissed Hively’s claim with prejudice, and denied Hively’s motion for reconsideration. Hively appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶7 We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Wash. Fed. v. Harvey, 182 Wn.2d 335, 339, 340 P.3d 846 (2015). Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). When the supporting facts are undisputed, the trial court may determine immunity as a question of law. Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 179 Wn.2d 684, 693, 317 P.3d 987 (2014). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Landstar Inway, Inc. v. Samrow, 181 Wn. App. 109, 120, 325 P.3d 327 (2014).

II. Recreational Use Immunity

¶8 Hively argues that the Port is not entitled to summary judgment because the Port is not immune from suit *15 under the recreational use immunity statute, former RCW 4.24.210. We disagree.

¶9 Under former RCW 4.24.210, landowners who allow the public to use their land for recreational purposes without charging a fee are immune from suit for unintentional injuries that occur on the land. Former RCW 4.24-.210(1) creates an exception to common law invitee premises liability. 2 Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 694. The purpose of recreational use immunity is to encourage landowners and those in lawful possession of land to make it available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability. RCW 4.24.200; Jewels v. City of Bellingham, 183 Wn.2d 388, 394, 353 P.3d 204 (2015).

¶10 To be entitled to immunity under the recreational use statute, the landowner must prove that the land in question is (1) open to members of the public (2) for recreational purposes and (3) for which “ ‘no fee of any kind [is] charged.’ ” Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 695-96 (quoting Cregan v. Fourth Mem’l Church, 175 Wn.2d 279, 284, 285 P.3d 860 (2012)). The landowner bears the burden to prove entitlement to immunity because recreational use is an affirmative defense. Camicia, 179 Wn.2d at 693. Hively concedes that the Port meets the first and second elements, but argues that the Port fails to meet the third element because the Port charges a fee to cruise ships to dock at Stevenson Landing and to parties who wish to exclusively rent Teo Park.

¶ 11 A landowner may charge a fee to use part of its land and maintain immunity for recreational use of the remainder of the land. Plano v. City of Renton, 103 Wn. App. 910, 914, 14 P.3d 871 (2000). To maintain recreational use immunity and charge a fee, “[a] landowner must only show *16 that it charges no fee for using the land or water area where the injury occurred.” Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915. A landowner is not entitled to immunity when the place where the injury occurred is a “necessary and integral part” of the fee-generating area. Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915. It is undisputed that the Port does not charge a fee for public use of either the path where Hively fell or the restroom to which the path led.

¶12 Hively relies on Plano to argue that the path where he fell was a necessary and integral part of the Port’s fee-generating areas (i.e., the pier and Teo Park itself when it is rented exclusively) as a matter of law. In Plano, anyone who used the dock, the fee-generating area in that case, was required to use one of two connecting ramps that led to the dock where Plano’s injury occurred. Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915. The ramps had been built specifically to provide access to the dock, and a paying patron could not pay the required fee without walking up one of the ramps. Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915. Thus, the Plano court held that the undisputed facts established that the ramps were a necessary and integral part of the dock and the city of Renton was not entitled to immunity when a nonpaying user injured herself on one of them. Plano, 103 Wn. App. at 915.

¶13 The facts of this case are not analogous to Plano. A person is not required to pay for or use either the path or the restroom as a part of any paid access for or use of either Teo Park or the pier. Hively concedes that it is unnecessary for a person to reach the restroom by walking on the path where he fell because another path also provides access to the restroom from the pier. No evidence suggests that the path where Hively’s injury occurred was constructed specifically for the purpose of providing access to the Port’s fee-generating areas. While John McSherry, the executive director of the Port, agreed that the restroom is “a key part” of Teo Park and that it is an “important part of all of the recreation activities that occur on the waterfront,” this fact is undisputed, and thus the trial court could determine the *17 issue of immunity as a matter of law. CP at 111, 204. Therefore, following the reasoning of Plano, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the path or the restroom was an integral part of the Port’s fee-generating areas and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Port under former RCW 4.24.210. 3 Necessarily, the trial court also properly denied Hively’s motion for reconsideration. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment dismissal and order denying reconsideration.

¶14 A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Review denied at 186 Wn.2d 1004 (2016).