Zenaida Montoya, V Bank Of America, Etal
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE ZENAIDA MONTOYA, No. 74162-4-
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>-T3fT! BANK OF AMERICA HOME LOANS, -o £$b f/k/a COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, 25 *v
~- ci.!^ INC., RECONTRUSTCO., N.A., and UNPUBLISHED OPINION ERIN LEE PHILLIPS and JOHN DOE o
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PHILLIPS, husband and wife, FILED: March 7, 2016
Respondents.
Verellen, A.C.J. — Zenaida Montoya appeals from the summary judgment dismissing her Consumer Protection Act1 (CPA) claim and the CR 41(b)(1) order dismissing her fraud-based claims. Montoya may not raise new CPA theories for the first time on appeal. She has not provided an adequate record on appeal to review the CR 41(b)(1) dismissal.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2007, Montoya borrowed money from Countrywide Home Loans secured by a deed of trust upon her residence.2 She defaulted. In 2010, Bank of America sent Montoya a notice of trustee's sale, but the sale never occurred.
1 Ch. 19.86 RCW.
Over a year later, on June 2, 2014, Bank of America moved to dismiss Montoya's remaining claims for failure to prosecute under CR 41(b)(1). On June 3, 2014, Montoya filed a notice of trial setting, seeking a trial date for a two-day, nonjury trial. On June 5, 2014, Montoya's attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw effective June 17, 2014.
On June 13, 2014, the trial court continued the motion to dismiss for six weeks. Apparently Montoya did not note the case for trial or obtain a trial date. Six weeks later, the trial court dismissed Montoya's fraud-based claims for failure to prosecute.
Montoya appeals.
ANALYSIS Waiver
Montoya appeals the summary judgment order dismissing her CPA claim. At summary judgment, she argued a per se CPA violation based on an alleged violation of the MBPA. But neither Countrywide nor Bank of America are subject to the MBPA.4 For the first time on appeal, Montoya argues three new theories of CPA violations:
3Ch. 19.146.
Her arguments on appeal fail for two reasons. First, failure to raise a theory or argument below precludes a party from raising it on appeal.5 We need not consider on appeal a theory that the trial court "had no effective opportunity" to consider and to rule upon at trial.6 Montoya may not raise new CPA theories for the first time on appeal.7
Second, even if we considered her new CPA theories, they lack merit. The "mere fact MERS is listed on the deed of trust as a beneficiary is not itself an actionable injury."8 The record lacks any evidence that ReconTrust failed to maintain an office in Washington. Montoya fails to cite a single HAMP provision that Bank of America allegedly violated.9
Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Montoya's CPA claim.
(1992) (appellate courts do not review arguments unsupported by legal authority).
CR 41 (b)(1) Dismissal
Montoya contends the trial court erred in dismissing her fraud-based claims for failure to prosecute, but the record is inadequate to permit review.
CR 41 (b)(1) governs involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution. Dismissal is mandatory when the plaintiff "neglects to note the action for trial or hearing within 1 year after any issue of law or fact has been joined."10 If the case is noted for trial before the dismissal hearing, the case will not be dismissed.11
Bank of America moved to dismiss Montoya's remaining claims for failure to prosecute under CR 41 (b)(1). Montoya's counsel immediately filed a notice of trial setting scheduled for June 13, 2014, the same date as the motion to dismiss hearing. We have a limited record of what occurred on June 13. The minute entry states, "Court finds this matter should go to trial. Motion to dismiss is denied. Matter will be heard again in 6 weeks, if no pleadings by new counsel[,] the court will grant motion to dismiss."12 On July 25, 2014, the trial court dismissed Montoya's fraud-based claims for failure to prosecute. The dismissal order states that "the case was not noted for trial before the [m]otion hearing."13
We do not have an adequate record to resolve precisely what occurred at the June 13 hearing. At that time, Montoya was still represented by counsel and a notice of trial setting was before the trial court. Montoya bears "the burden of providing an
CONCLUSION
Montoya may not raise new CPA theories for the first time on appeal. The record is inadequate to permit review of the CR 41(b)(1) dismissal order.
Therefore, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
Iv^cUev/ } J 14 Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 52 Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988).
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.