¶ 1 JD Miller challenges his conviction for first degree assault and ensuing persistent offender sentence. We affirm the conviction and sentence, but remand for reconsideration of the legal financial obligations (LFOs).

FACTS

¶2 The charge arose from a confrontation outside the home of Markham Welch in Clarkston. Christopher Bennett and his ex-wife, Stacy Bennett, drove to her home on the evening of May 20,2014, and noticed a white BMW idling in her neighbor Welch’s driveway. The Bennetts suspected Welch of drug dealing and had seen the BMW at the location before. Welch was not home at the time; the building was dark. 1 Christopher Bennett went over to the BMW to confront the driver.

¶3 Demanding to know what the driver, Dustin Pearson, was doing there, Christopher Bennett threatened to call the police. While Bennett went to retrieve his cell phone, Pearson drove away. Mr. Miller then emerged from Welch’s house. He and Bennett exchanged words. Miller then struck Bennett once in the abdomen, stabbing him with a utility knife. Stacy Bennett drove Christopher to the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery.

¶4 Miller was arrested at a residence in Lewiston, Idaho, two days later. Pearson was arrested on May 20 at his girlfriend’s house, where he had been hiding in the base *183 ment crawl space. Pearson eventually testified as a witness for the prosecution. When he testified that he fled the Welch property because he feared that Bennett was returning with a weapon, the prosecutor entered into evidence several items found in the back seat of Pearson’s vehicle that he admitted keeping for protection—a tire iron with a taped handle, two knives, brass knuckles, and a starter pistol. The items were admitted over defense relevance and undue prejudice objections.

¶5 Welch testified for the prosecution that JD Miller’s cousin lived in the house with him. A television from his house was discovered outside the home after the incident. When Welch testified that Mr. Miller had not taken the television, he was impeached with a note he had written to Stacy Bennett indicating that he believed the Bennetts had interrupted a burglary of his house. He testified to the jury that while he initially believed that Miller had burglarized the house, he later learned someone else had done so.

¶6 Mr. Miller testified on his own behalf that he had gone to Welch’s house to see his cousin on her birthday. He walked into the house and discovered that no one was home. He did not remove the television or anything else. After the brief visit, he walked out and saw Pearson drive away from Christopher Bennett. Bennett came at him and Miller pulled his knife and stabbed Bennett once. The injured man backed off and the fight was over.

¶7 The prosecutor argued that Mr. Bennett’s version of the events was more credible and that Mr. Miller should be found guilty of first or second degree assault. The defense argued that Mr. Miller had permission to be on the property and was merely defending himself. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict on the charge of first degree assault.

¶8 The only contested issue at sentencing was whether a prior Idaho conviction for aggravated assault was the equivalent of Washington’s second degree assault. The trial court concluded that the two offenses were legally equiva *184 lent. The court then sentenced Mr. Miller to life in prison as a persistent offender. The court also imposed total legal financial obligations of $2,150; mandatory assessments constituted $800 of that figure.

¶9 Mr. Miller timely appealed to this court. A panel considered the case without argument.

ANALYSIS

¶10 This appeal presents two primary issues. 2 In the published portion, we consider Mr. Miller’s contention that the court erred in determining that the Idaho aggravated assault conviction was the equivalent of a Washington second degree assault. He also contends that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial testimony. Finally, he argues that the court erred in imposing LFOs without making a sufficient inquiry into his ability to pay. We address first the equivalency argument before addressing his other claims.

Equivalency

¶11 The sole issue argued at sentencing concerned the legal equivalency of the prior Idaho conviction for aggravated assault. We agree with the trial court that the Idaho offense was legally comparable to Washington’s second degree assault.

¶12 Washington law requires that a persistent offender be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. RCW 9.94A.570. A “persistent offender” is one who has been convicted on at least three separate *185 occasions, whether in Washington or elsewhere, of felonies that under the laws of Washington would be considered most serious offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a). A “most serious offense” includes class A felonies, assault in the second degree, robbery in the second degree, and other assorted violent crimes. RCW 9.94A.030(33).

¶13 Foreign convictions from another state or federal court may only count as a most serious offense if the sentencing court is able to find the offense is legally or factually comparable to a Washington most serious offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 254, 111 P.3d 837 (2005). An appellate court reviews de novo whether an out-of-state conviction is comparable to a Washington crime. State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 87, 292 P.3d 715 (2012).

¶14 To determine comparability, we “first consider if the elements of the foreign offense are substantially similar to the Washington counterpart. If so, the inquiry ends.” Id. If, however, the elements of the foreign conviction are not substantially similar, or if Washington defines the offense more narrowly than the foreign jurisdiction, it is necessary to look to the factual record of the foreign conviction to establish factual comparability. State v. Latham, 183 Wn. App. 390, 397, 335 P.3d 960 (2014). Offenses are factually comparable “if the defendant’s conduct constituting the foreign offense, as evidenced by the undisputed facts in the foreign record, would constitute the Washington offense.” Latham, 183 Wn. App. at 397-98. The State must prove factual comparability by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 398.

¶15 Idaho defines “assault” as “[a]n intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” Idaho Code § 18-901(b). An “aggravated assault” is an assault with “a deadly weapon or instrument without intent to kill.” Idaho *186 Code § 18-905(a). In Idaho, a knife is a deadly weapon. State v. Cudd, 137 Idaho 625, 627-28, 51 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 653, 659, 818 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1991).

¶16 Washington defines “assault” according to the common law and recognizes three alternative means for committing assault: battery, attempted battery, and creating an apprehension of bodily harm. 13A Seth A. Fine & Douglas J. Ende, Washington Practice: Criminal Law § 305, at 41 (2d ed. 1998). The third definition is at issue here. Under that definition, an actor commits assault by “ ‘putting another in apprehension of harm whether or not the actor actually intends to inflict’ ” the harm. State v. Frazier, 81 Wn.2d 628, 631, 503 P.2d 1073 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1969)). The actor, however, must act with the intent to create that apprehension. State v. Krup, 36 Wn. App. 454, 458-59, 676 P.2d 507 (1984). The conduct must go beyond mere threats; there must be some physical action that, under all the “circumstances of the incident, are sufficient to induce a reasonable apprehension by the victim that physical injury is imminent.” State v. Maurer, 34 Wn. App. 573, 580, 663 P.2d 152 (1983).

¶17 In Washington, assault in the second degree occurs when a person (among other things) “[a]ssaults another with a deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.021(c). “Deadly weapon” means “any . . . weapon, device, instrument, [or] article . . . which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.” RCW 9A.04.110(6).

¶18 A comparison of the major elements of the two statutes:

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¶19 The trial court concluded that the two crimes were equivalent and, therefore, did not address the question of whether Mr. Miller’s conduct would factually have constituted second degree assault in Washington. 3 As the above chart suggests, we agree that the offenses are equivalent.

¶20 Both crimes share the same intent. Idaho’s “threaten violence” standard is equivalent to Washington’s “create apprehension of harm.” Both states use the common law definitions of “assault” that include both assault and battery. As critical here, both states recognized that threatened use of force constitutes an assault. The Idaho statute is somewhat narrower in that the threat need not rise to the level of a threat to kill, while Washington’s includes no limitation. The level of threatened harm in the two states is equivalent.

¶21 Similarly, both definitions require that the victim apprehend the threat and be affected by it. In Idaho, the victim needs to have a well-founded fear that violence is imminent. In Washington, the threat needs to induce a reasonable apprehension of imminent violence. We believe a well-founded fear of imminent violence is the equivalent of a reasonable apprehension of imminent violence.

*188 ¶22 Finally, both offenses must be committed with a “deadly weapon.” While Idaho’s assault statute encompasses “instruments” along with a deadly weapon, Washington’s definition of “deadly weapon” also includes an “instrument.” RCW 9A.04.110(6). A knife, Mr. Miller’s weapon of choice in both cases, constitutes a deadly weapon in both states. Again, this element is shared by the two statutes.

¶23 The two statutes are virtually identical. An aggravated assault in Idaho, which constitutes an assault with a deadly weapon, is the equivalent of Washington’s second degree assault by means of an assault with a deadly weapon. Both statutes use the same definition of “assault” and the same definition of “deadly weapon.” In each instance, the statutes require that the victim have either a “well-founded fear” or “reasonable apprehension” of imminent violence.

¶24 Agreeing with the trial court, we hold that an Idaho aggravated assault is the legal equivalent of Washington’s second degree assault. The trial court properly characterized the prior Idaho conviction as a “strike” when it sentenced Mr. Miller as a persistent offender.

¶25 A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder having no precedential value shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Review denied at 188 Wn.2d 1005 (2017).