¶1 Kenneth Linville Jr. appeals his convictions for leading organized crime, burglary, trafficking in stolen property, theft, possession of stolen property, unlawful firearm possession, and possession of controlled substances. Linville was convicted of 137 crimes.

¶2 In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that Linville’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper joinder of charges, and, consequently, we reverse Linville’s convictions and remand for separate trials. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we further hold that the State produced sufficient evidence to support the first degree burglary convictions. We do not address Linville’s other arguments. 1

FACTS

¶3 Following an increase in residential burglaries in Thurston County, law enforcement officers noticed similarities among several burglaries. Officers ultimately recovered from Linville’s home numerous items taken during the burglaries.

¶4 The State charged Linville with 1 count of leading organized crime, 35 counts of residential burglary, 1 count of attempted residential burglary, 4 counts of first degree burglary, 3 counts of second degree burglary, 39 counts of *464 trafficking in stolen property, 17 counts of first degree theft, 18 counts of second degree theft, 1 count of attempted second degree theft, 3 counts of third degree theft, 5 counts of theft of a firearm, 5 counts of identity theft, 4 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, 1 count of possession of stolen property, and 1 count of possession of a controlled substance, for a total of 138 charges with numerous deadly weapon sentencing enhancements. 2 , 3 The State alleged that Linville was armed with a firearm during the commission of the 4 first degree burglaries. 4 At no point did Linville argue that joinder of any offenses was improper under RCW 9A.82.085.

¶5 During the jury trial, the State presented testimony from numerous codefendants who identified Linville as the instigator and leader of the burglary scheme. The codefen-dants’ testimony was corroborated by law enforcement officers and victims who described the common characteristics among the burglaries and identified stolen goods recovered from the homes of Linville and his codefendants. 5

¶6 The jury found Linville guilty of 137 offenses, 6 and he was sentenced to 914 months in prison, which included 240 months for four firearm sentencing enhancements. Linville appeals.

*465 ANALYSIS

¶7 Linville argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for severance of offenses that were not “part of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity” from the charge of leading organized crime under RCW 9A.82.085. 7 , 8 Br. of Appellant at 17. We agree.

¶8 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) defense counsel’s conduct was deficient and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). To show deficient performance, Linville must show that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 130. To show prejudice, Linville must show a reasonable possibility that but for counsel’s purportedly deficient conduct the outcome of the proceeding would have differed. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 130. We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009).

*466 1. Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance

¶9 Linville argues that the plain language of RCW 9A.82.085 prohibits the joinder of crimes not “alleged to be part of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity” to a prosecution for leading organized crime and, therefore, defense counsel rendered deficient performance by not objecting to the joinder of charges not included in the definition of “criminal profiteering.” Br. of Appellant at 17. We agree.

¶10 We review the meaning of a statute de novo. State v. Wooten, 178 Wn.2d 890, 895, 312 P.3d 41 (2013). We employ statutory interpretation to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 192.

¶11 RCW 9A.82.085 states, in relevant part:

In a criminal prosecution alleging a violation of [leading organized crime], the state is barred from joining any offense other than the offenses alleged to be part of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity.

RCW 9A.82.010(12) defines “pattern of criminal profiteering activity” as “engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering.”

¶12 RCW 9A.82.010(4) defines “criminal profiteering” as

any act, including any anticipatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain, that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state in which the act occurred and, if the act occurred in a state other than this state, would be chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state had the act occurred in this state and punishable as a felony and by imprisonment for more than one year, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted, as any of the following ....

*467 ¶13 RCW 9A.82.010(4) then lists 46 crimes and their defining statutes. First and second degree theft, trafficking in stolen property, leading organized crime, and identity theft are included in the list. See RCW 9A.82.010(4)(e), (r), (s), (kk). However, residential burglary, first degree burglary, second degree burglary, attempted residential burglary, theft of a firearm, third degree theft, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of stolen property are not included in the list. See RCW 9A.82.010(4).

¶14 Linville argues that because these latter offenses are not listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4), RCW 9A.82.085 prohibits the State from joining them in its prosecution against him for leading organized crime. The State responds that the list applies only to acts that occurred outside of the state of Washington.

¶15 The State contends that the statute should be read as:

Criminal Profiteering means

(1) any act, including any anticipatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain,

(2) that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state in which the act occurred and,

(3) if the act occurred in a state other than this state, would be chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state had the act occurred in this state and punishable as a felony and by imprisonment for more than one year, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted, as any of the following: [list of specific felonies]. . . .

Corrected Br. of Resp’t at 14-15.

¶16 Linville contends that the statute should be read as:

Criminal Profiteering means

(1) any act, including any anticipatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain,

(2) that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state in which the act occurred

*468 and, if the act occurred in a state other than this state, would be chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state had the act occurred in this state and punishable as a felony and by imprisonment for more than one year,

(3) regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted,

(4) as any of the following: [list of specific felonies]. . . .

Reply Br. of Appellant at 2.

¶17 Washington courts have agreed with Linville’s interpretation of RCW 9A.82.010(4), stating, “ ‘Criminal profiteering’ is defined as commission of specific enumerated felonies for financial gain,” Trujillo v. Nw Tr. Servs., Inc., 183 Wn.2d 820, 837, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015) (emphasis added) (citing RCW 9A.82.010(4)), and “ ‘Criminal profiteering’ is any act committed for financial gain that is chargeable as one of the predicate felonies enumerated in RCW 9A.82- .010(4).” State v. Munson, 120 Wn. App. 103, 106, 83 P.3d 1057 (2004) (emphasis added).

¶18 We note that the State’s interpretation of RCW 9A.82.010(4) on appeal conflicts with its position at trial. During its closing argument, the State explained “criminal profiteering” to the jury:

You get further information in terms of criminal profiteering because it’s only specific types of crimes, right, that qualify for criminal profiteering. We have theft in the first degree charged multiple times here, theft in the second degree charged multiple times here, trafficking in stolen property in the first degree charged multiple times here, and then identity theft in the second degree, also charged multiple times, and you’re well in excess of three for each of those. And it has to be committed for financial gain, whether by an accomplice or the principal, and it includes any attempted or completed commission of those offenses.

30 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 15 & 16, 2015) at 5405-06. At trial, the State clearly understood “criminal profiteering” to mean only those crimes explicitly listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4).

*469 ¶19 We hold that a plain reading of RCW 9A.82.085 and 9A.82.010(4) make it clear that the State was statutorily barred from joining charges of residential burglary, first degree burglary, second degree burglary, attempted residential burglary, theft of a firearm, third degree theft, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of stolen property to Linville’s prosecution for leading organized crime.

¶20 The unreasonable failure to research and apply relevant statutes without any tactical purpose constitutes deficient performance. In re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 102, 351 P.3d 138 (2015). Here, defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s improper joinder of charges based on RCW 9A.82.085 and 9A.82.010(4) was unreasonable and constitutes deficient performance.

2. Counsel’s Deficient Performance Resulted in Prejudice

¶21 To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Linville must also show that but for his counsel’s deficient performance the outcome of the trial would have differed and, therefore the deficient performance was prejudicial. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 130. He meets this burden.

¶22 We review this issue differently from the related issue of discretionary joinder or severance pursuant to CrR 4.4(b). Under CrR 4.4(b), a trial court must grant a motion to sever offenses if it determines that “severance will promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.” A defendant seeking such a severance bears the burden of demonstrating that a trial involving all counts would be so manifestly prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy. State v. Huynh, 175 Wn. App. 896, 908, 307 P.3d 788 (2013). Appellate courts review a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever under CrR 4.4(b) for manifest abuse of discretion.

¶23 In contrast, RCW 9A.82.085 leaves no room for the trial court’s discretion. The State is barred from joining offenses other than those alleged to be part of the criminal *470 profiteering activity in a prosecution for leading organized crime. As a result, severance of the charges here was mandatory, and severance would have been granted had Linville’s counsel brought RCW 9A.82.085 to the trial court’s attention.

¶24 The State argues that because it had sufficient evidence against Linville to support all of the convictions, Linville would have eventually been convicted of all charges. However, our focus in determining whether counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial is on the proceeding at hand; we do not speculate on the potential results of a hypothetical future proceeding. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 130.

¶25 When assessing whether counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, we ask whether but for counsel’s purportedly deficient conduct the outcome of this trial would have differed. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d at 130. Because of defense counsel’s failure to object, Linville was improperly tried for 138 total charges and convicted of 137 offenses. Had counsel properly objected to the joinder, 56 of the charges, including all of the burglary charges, would have been severed, the trial would not have included convictions for those 56 improperly joined charges, and the outcome of this trial would have been different. See State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 341, 352 P.3d 776 (2015). Moreover, each of the four firearm enhancements, which resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months, were associated with the four counts of first degree burglary, which would not have been considered but for defense counsel’s deficient performance.

¶26 The improper joinder had additional prejudicial consequences. For example, by improperly joining four charges of unlawful possession of a firearm, the State was permitted to introduce evidence of Linville’s prior felony for possession of a controlled substance without a prescription. This prior conviction evidence was highly prejudicial given that the State’s theory was that Linville’s crime ring was *471 motivated by drugs. See State v. Acosta, 123 Wn. App. 424, 438, 98 P.3d 503 (2004). Also, the State relied heavily on the burglaries as evidence of Linville’s guilt for leading organized crime. A jury separately considering the burglary charges would not necessarily have heard testimony of Linville’s accomplices accusing him of orchestrating a broad scheme.

¶27 The State contends that this evidence would have been cross admissible even if the charges were tried separately. But to admit such evidence, the State would bear the burden of proving that the probative value of the evidence would outweigh the prejudice. See ER 404,609. Without any such findings on the record, we have no way to know what would be found admissible or inadmissible in some hypothetical trial. Ultimately, the State’s argument requires us to make too many assumptions.

¶28 Consequently, we hold that Linville’s defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the joinder of offenses in violation of RCW 9A.82-.085. We reverse Linville’s convictions and remand for separate trials.

¶29 A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Petition for review granted and review of issue raised in respondent’s answer denied at 189 Wn.2d 1016 (2017).