State Of Washington, V. Alfonso V. Senior, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON,

No. 82879-7-I Respondent,

DIVISION ONE v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION ALFONSO V. SENIOR, JR.,

Appellant.

PER CURIAM — Alfonso Senior was sentenced in 2011 based on an offender score of “6,” which included three points for out-of-state drug possession convictions. He appeals the superior court’s rulings denying his request for resentencing pursuant to State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The State concedes that Senior is entitled to resentencing with a reduced offender score. The State also concedes that to the extent the superior court’s treatment of Senior’s resentencing request did not comply with CrR 7.8(c),1 judicial economy is best served by remanding for resentencing rather than for further consideration under CrR 7.8. We accept the State’s concessions and remand to the superior

No. 82879-7-I/2 court to resentence Senior with an offender score that comports with Blake and with this court’s later decision in State v. Markovich, ___ Wn. App. ___, 492 P.3d 206, 210 (2021) (holding that under Blake, out-of-state possession convictions cannot be included in an offender score because they are not comparable to any valid Washington offense).

In a statement of additional grounds for review (SAGR), Senior argues that the superior court erred in denying his request for an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Because we remand for resentencing under Blake and because the remedy Senior requests is resentencing, this ground for review is moot, and we need not consider it. See Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) (issue is moot “if a court can no longer provide effective relief”). On remand, Senior will be free to renew his request for an exceptional sentence downward.2

Senior also argues in his SAGR that resentencing should take place before a different judge because the judge who denied Senior’s request for resentencing “used to be a King County prosecutor when they found Mr. Senior guilty of murder in . . . King County,” “[i]t’s clear on record that she worked for the King County prosecutor’s office for 20 years,” and it “seems like her loyalty still resides there.” But the judge’s status as a former prosecutor is not enough to establish judicial bias, and Senior points to no evidence of the judge’s bias other than his

No. 82879-7-I/3 dissatisfaction with the judge’s rulings. Reassignment is not warranted.3 See In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004) (holding that petitioner failed to establish bias where he “has not provided specific facts establishing that the trial judge had a personal bias against him” and observing, “Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid showing of bias.”).

Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.