Genie James v. Alaska Airlines

FILED APRIL 14, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE GENIE JAMES, ) No. 41202-4-III ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ALASKA AIRLINES, SEDGWICK ) CLAIMS & DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) AND INDUSTRIES, ) ) Respondents. ) HILL, J. — Genie James appeals the superior court’s order granting Alaska Airlines’ motion to dismiss her appeal from a decision of the Board of Industrial Appeals (Board) on jurisdictional grounds for failing to comply with RCW 51.52.110. Although James acknowledges that she mistakenly referenced the wrong order in her notice of appeal, she argues she actually complied with the statute. We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND James, an Alaska Airlines flight attendant, sustained a work-related injury in March 2021. The following year, the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) filed an order allowing James’s claim for benefits related to that injury. The Department thereafter issued various orders that James appealed to the Board. After hearing the No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines appeals, the industrial appeals judge issued a proposed decision and order on January 9, 2024 (January proposed order). James petitioned the Board to review the January proposed order. The Board did so and issued an order denying the petition on March 6, 2024 (March order):

No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines On April 1, 2024, James filed a notice of appeal with the superior court:

James filed an amended notice of appeal the next day. The only difference between the notices was the addition of the Department as a party.

In January 2025, Alaska Airlines filed a motion to dismiss James’s appeal.

Alaska Airlines argued dismissal was proper because the superior court lacked appellate jurisdiction because James’s notice designated the Board’s January proposed order for No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines appeal, but that order was not appealable and the March 2024 order was now final and binding because James failed to appeal it within 30-days, as required by RCW 51.52.110. In response, James acknowledged her error and filed a motion to amend.

The superior court granted Alaska Airlines’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the court did not have jurisdiction because James failed to appeal the final order within 30- days and RCW 51.52.110 required actual compliance with the timing requirement.

Having found it did not have jurisdiction, the court did not consider James’s motion to amend.

James now timely appeals the superior court’s decision.

ANALYSIS The question before the court is one of jurisdiction, which we review de novo.

Long Painting Co. v. Donkel, 14 Wn. App. 2d 582, 587, 471 P.3d 893 (2020). Under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW which provides an exclusive remedy for injured workers, the Department has original jurisdiction and the superior court has appellate jurisdiction. Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d 194, 197, 796 P.2d 412 (1990); see RCW 51.52.110; Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 587. The superior court may properly exercise its appellate jurisdiction when a party files a notice of appeal from the

No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines Board’s final decision with the superior court within 30-days from the date on which the party learns of the final order. RCW 51.52.110 reads: [W]ithin thirty days after a decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review upon such appeal has been communicated to such worker . . . such worker . . . may appeal to the superior court. If such worker . . . fails to file with the superior court its appeal as provided in this section within said thirty days, the decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review or the final decision and order of the board shall become final.

Such appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the board. If the case is one involving a self-insurer, a copy of the notice of appeal shall also be served by mail, or personally, on such self-insurer.

See also Fay v. Nw. Airlines, 115 Wn.2d at 197-98.

As she did before the superior court, James acknowledges that she mistakenly designated the Board’s January proposed order for appeal. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, James argues that the superior court had appellate jurisdiction because she complied with RCW 51.52.110’s timing and service requirements and substantially complied with the content requirement. Since her notice of appeal conveyed a clear intent to appeal the Board’s final decision and order, she argues the superior court should have disregarded her error under RALJ 2.6(f) and allowed her to amend her notice.

Alaska Airlines responds that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance. Since the

No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines 30-day time limit to appeal the March order has long since passed, Alaska Airlines argues James can no longer appeal the Board’s decision.

To support its argument that RCW 51.52.110 requires actual compliance, Alaska Airlines cites Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 584. In that case, Long Painting Company (LPC) appealed a final decision of the Board to the superior court. LPC electronically filed the notice of appeal in the final days within which it had to appeal the order under RCW 51.52.110. Three days later, after the expiration of the 30-day filing period, the superior court notified LPC that the filing had been rejected because the local court rules did not permit the electronic filing of administrative appeals. LPC appealed the superior court’s decision to Division One of this court, arguing that the superior court erred in rejecting its notice of appeal because it substantially complied with the requirements of RCW 51.52.110.

In addressing LPC’s argument, Division One analyzed whether LPC actually complied with the filing requirements under RCW 51.52.110 and determined it did not.

The court then considered whether the doctrine of substantial compliance applied to the statute’s requirement to file the notice of appeal within 30-days. The LPC court recognized that substantial compliance with procedural rules can invoke appellate jurisdiction but opined “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance does not save a party from the failure to comply with statutory time limits, such as the 30-day filing and service No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines requirements of RCW 51.52.110.” Long Painting, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 588. Echoing our state’s Supreme Court, the LPC court recognized “‘it is impossible to substantially comply with a statutory time limit in the same way. It is either complied with or it is not.’”(quoting City of Seattle v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 116 Wn.2d 923, 928, 809 P.2d 1377 (1991)).

While we agree Long Painting requires actual compliance with the 30-day filing and service requirements, substantial compliance may otherwise still grant a superior court appellate jurisdiction. While the definition is not entirely helpful, “‘[s]ubstantial compliance has been defined as actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [the] statute.’” City of Seattle, 116 Wn.2d at 928 (quoting In re Habeas Corpus of Santore, 28 Wn. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702 (1981)). Perhaps more helpful is the purpose behind the doctrine of substantial compliance, which recognizes there is a distinct preference “‘to allow appeals to proceed to a hearing on the merits in the absence of serious prejudice to other parties.’” Black v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 131 Wn.2d 547, 552, 933 P.2d 1025 (1997) (quoting Hoirup v. Empire Airways, 69 Wn. App. 479, 483, 848 P.2d 1337 (1993)).

The question becomes whether James’s notice of appeal complied with the timing and service requirements of RCW 51.52.110 and otherwise substantially complied with

No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines the statute, such that Alaska Airlines was not prejudiced by the notice’s deficiency. We conclude that it did.

Under the statute, an “appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the director and on the [B]oard.” RCW 51.52.110. It is undisputed that James filed her amended notice of appeal within 30-days of when she learned of the Board’s final order and that she timely served the notice of appeal on all necessary parties. James’s error resides in the language of the notice, not in its timing or service, and RCW 51.52.110 does not require specific language to be used in the notice of appeal for the superior court to obtain appellate jurisdiction.

Instead, the defect is akin to an error under RALJ 2.6 (a)(3) for incorrectly designating “each decision which the party wants reviewed.” When such an error occurs, “[t]he superior court will disregard defects in the form of a notice of appeal if the notice clearly reflects an intent by a party to seek review.” RALJ 2.6(f). This rule can be applied in principle in this case.

Under ordinary circumstances, timely filing and serving a notice of appeal is meaningless if it does not give the opposing party fair notice as to what is being appealed.

However, that is not the situation here. Although James incorrectly referenced the January proposed order in her notice of appeal to the superior court, the notice correctly No. 41202-4-III James v. Alaska Airlines listed the proper parties, claim number, and docket numbers, and indicated James was appealing “each and every part of said Decision and Order.” Clerk’s Papers at 1. While this language referred to her designation of the January proposed order, James’s intent was clear. The Board’s final decision and order (March order) specifically adopted the January proposed order as its final decision without alteration. Under these circumstances, James’s timely filing and service perfected her appeal and Alaska Airlines was not prejudiced by James’s error. Therefore, the superior court has appellate jurisdiction to hear James’s appeal.

We reverse the superior court’s dismissal of James’s appeal.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________ Hill, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ __________________________________ Staab, C.J. Murphy, J.