Tomkins v. ReliaStar Life Insurance Company

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE ANN TOMKINS as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF FLORENCE TOMKINS, a Washington Resident, Plaintiff, C18-1488 TSZ v. MINUTE ORDER RELIASTAR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota corporation, 13 Defendant.

The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, docket no. 53, is DENIED. Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider its ruling granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with prejudice. Reconsideration is appropriate “in the face of the existence of new evidence, an intervening change in the law, or as necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). “Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that reconsideration is appropriate because, in making its ruling, the Court relied on inaccurate assertions that Defendant made for the first time at oral argument that “Reliastar for the first time took the position that it had never acknowledged that it actually owed the Estate of Florence Tomkins the remaining $11,259.49 FPA balance.” Motion for Reconsideration, docket no. 53 at 3. The Court did not rely on these arguments because the statute of limitations began to run long before the correspondence in 2015 occurred. Plaintiff asserts that Reliastar may have owed Plaintiff a final supplementary annuity contract using funds in the FPA which were alleged to be $11,259.49 in 2003. In support of the Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff presents financial records showing that Reliastar may not have made this final payment.

Ex. 1 to Chambers Decl. (docket no. 45-1 at 1). Plaintiff also alleges that, according to its terms, the FPA still has not terminated because Reliastar never purchased the final supplementary annuity in 2003. By disputing the date of the FPA’s termination, Plaintiff argues that her claims could not run until June 2013 at the earliest and in the alternate, that the FPA “still has not terminated.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, docket no. 53 at 5-6. However, the accrual date of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is unrelated to the FPA’s termination date. As the Court previously ruled, a breach of contract action accrues upon breach. 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wash. 2d 566, 576 (2006) (en banc). As the Court noted in the oral ruling, in 1992, the insurance company sent a statement, Exhibit C to the Leigh Declaration, docket no. 35, that put Ms. Berg on notice that interest was paid at less than 12 percent per year. The statute of limitations began to run at that time. In the alternative, at the very latest, the statute of limitation began to run on April 5, 2005, the date that the FPA terminated. (2) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Minute Order to all counsel of record.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2020.

William M. McCool Clerk s/Karen Dews Deputy Clerk