Davy v. Cross Cultural Communications Inc

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE LISA M. DAVY, CASE NO. C22-5938-JCC Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. CROSS CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to strike. (Dkt. No. 8.) Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court hereby DENIES the motion for reasons explained herein.

Plaintiff brings employment discrimination claims, alleging that Cross Cultural Communications, Inc. (“Defendant”) violated her constitutional and state rights. (Dkt. No. 1.)

Following Defendant’s answer, Plaintiff moves to strike, (Dkt. No. 8 at 5), and asks for sanctions (Dkt. No. 14 at 2–3). A district court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A motion to strike must “state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). Such motions are generally disfavored and ordinarily will not be granted absent prejudice to one of the parties or a showing that the matter has no logical connection to the controversy. Polaris PowerLED Techs., LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 2022 WL 3646575, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2022). The moving party bears the burden of satisfying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)’s stringent standard. Id. Since Plaintiff has proceeded pro se, she “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).1 6 In moving to strike Defendant’s answer, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s attorneys are unlicensed. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 6.) This is not correct. This Court’s bar consists of “those who have been admitted to practice before this court.” LCR 83.1(a). The Clerk of the Court grants a petition for admission if an attorney complies with the admission requirements. LCR 83.1(c)(1).

10 An attorney is eligible for admission if they are a member “in good standing of the Washington state bar.” LCR 83.1(b). Here, the Defendant’s attorneys entered an appearance, (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6), and the Clerk determined they met the requirements for practice before the Court and admitted them. Plaintiff provides no evidence to dispute this finding. Instead, Plaintiff cites legally unsound authorities regarding licensure status. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 2–4).2 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant “failed to establish grounds . . . upon which the court should find cause to dismiss [this case] . . .” and stated “no laws” and “fail[ed] to support” its affirmative defenses “with any laws.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 5–7.) This incorrectly articulates the standard for pleading a general or affirmative defense to survive a motion to strike; Defendant is not required to support its responses or affirmative defenses with legal authority. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Loi Nguyen v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Because there is no Defendant points out that the length of Plaintiff’s motion to strike exceeds the page limit by seven pages. LCR 7(d)(3)–(e)(4). While this is correct, the Court grants pro se litigants extra license, therefore the Court will consider the motion to strike in full.

2 “House Bill 1788,” for example, was never codified into law. H.B. 1788, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).

1 basis to strike, there is no basis to impose sanctions.3 2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED.

3 DATED this 7th day of February 2023.

A John C. Coughenour 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25 3 The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s request is procedurally deficient. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Plaintiff’s request for was not filed as a new motion, but as a reply to the motion to strike.