Bergman v. Moto

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 SIGNE BERGMAN, 11 . CASE NO. 22-cv-00161-RAJ Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING 3 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 IVAN MOTO, 15 Defendants.

17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. #23.

19 || For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion.

20 II. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiff brings tort claims against Defendant for assault and battery. See Dkt. # 1.

22 || Defendant has counterclaimed for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional || distress. Dkt. # 22. Specifically, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs “extreme and | outrageous conduct” consisting of falsely reporting sexual assault to the police inflicted || emotional distress. Defendant also sues for defamation. Plaintiff moves for dismissal for || failure to state a claim.

27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS- 1 || claim. The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint’s factual || allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. || Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory || allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. || St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must || point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell || Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint || avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the | complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 10 || 662, 679 (2009).

11 A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the | complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the || document is central to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. || Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to || judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

16 A. Defamation 17 The elements of a cause of action for defamation in Washington are (1) a false || statement; (2) lack of privilege; (3) fault; and (4) damages. Herron v. KING Broadcasting | Co., 112 Wash.2d 762, 768, 776 P.2d 98 (1989). Here, the allegations of defamation are || largely conclusory, namely that Plaintiff made false statements that the Defendant abused || and assaulted her to police. Dkt. # 22 at 7.

22 Under RCW 4.24.510, a person who communicates a complaint or information to || any branch of government is immune from civil liability for claims based on the || communication. Washington state and federal courts have affirmed that the statute || provides immunity when persons report information to the police. DiBiasi v. Starbucks || Corp., No. 10-35213, 414 Fed. Appx. 948 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2011) (employee complaint to || police regarding customer behavior was a matter of concern to the police); Cornu-Labat ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS- 2 | v. Merred, No. 13-35158, 580 Fed. Appx. 557 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2014) (call to law || enforcement was protected from liability).

3 Further, even if Defendant had shown a defamation claim, he alleges only || conclusory allegations related to his damages. He fails to provide any specific facts to || show that any entity took adverse action against him because of the alleged false || statement. As such, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to meet the damages element || of a defamation claim. As requested, the Court permits leave to file a counterclaim for || abuse of process. Dkt. # 25 at 5.

9 B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 10 To prove outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, a complainant || must establish the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) || intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) the actual result of severe || emotional distress to the plaintiff. Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wn.2d 192, 195, 66 P.3d 630 | (2003).

15 The Court will also dismiss this claim. Washington courts have stated that seeking || legal process, even with malicious intent, was not “so outrageous in character, [and] so || extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and thus fails to || claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Saldviar v. Momah, 145 Wash.App. 19 | 365, 390 (2008) (filing suit alleging sexual abuse by a physician, even under false | pretenses, did not state claim for outrage). Accordingly, Defendant fails to state a claim || for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

22 Il. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.

24 || Defendant may file a First Amended Counterclaim within fourteen (14) days of the entry || of this Order.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS- 3 1 Dated this 13%, of June, 2023.

e Honorable Richard 4. Jones 5 United States District Judge ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS- 4