Jones v. BECU

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE CORTEZ DAUNDRE JONES, CASE NO. C23-1183-JCC Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 11 v. BECU, 13 Defendant.

15 Pro se Plaintiff, Cortez Daundre Jones, filed a complaint against BECU alleging violations of the law “based on banking in America, antitrust & civil rights matters,” causing him $30 million in damages. (Dkt. No. 1-1.)

18 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court must dismiss IFP complaints if “at any time” it is determined the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also id. § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (Section 1915(e) applies to all IFP proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners).

22 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and DISMISSES it for two reasons. First, Plaintiff indicates the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction as both federal question and diversity, but identifies both parties as citizens of Washington state and fails to list any specific federal laws that are at issue in this case. Second, the complaint includes no factual allegations beyond a few overly vague statements (“I only claimed due to the bank not being responsive after fees accrue & clear NSF fees & negative balance not looking suspicious to the company”). (Dkt. No. 1-1.)

2 These allegations do not set forth sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). Labels and conclusions, lacking factual enhancement are insufficient. Id. The factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

7 For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. This dismissal renders consideration of IFP status moot.

10 DATED this 1st day of September 2023.

A John C. Coughenour 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE