Parke v. City of Clarkston

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON JOHN PARKE, SCOTT DARRINGTON, NANCY CASKEY, NO. 2:24-CV-0112-TOR and TAMARA APFELBECK; and ELVES FOR THE HOMELESS, a ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Washington non-profit corporation, MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 10 Plaintiffs, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 11 v. CITY OF CLARKSTON, a municipal corporation, Defendant.

15 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 13. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.

20 // 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case concerns homeless persons camping on public property in the City of Clarkston, Washington. Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Clarkston’s Ordinance against them between the hours of 7:00 a.m.

5 to 9:00 p.m. when they take “the most rudimentary precautions” to protect themselves from inclement weather, up to and including the use of a tent on public property. ECF No. 13 at 2. The Plaintiffs complaint alleges cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and primarily relies on the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Johnson v. City of Grants Pass, 72 F.4th 868, 892 (9th Cir. 2023) and Martin v. Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 618 (9th Cir. 2019).

11 DISCUSSION 12 A. TRO Standard 13 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a district court may grant a TRO in order to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The analysis for granting a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to that for a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). It “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).

1 To obtain this relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that a balancing of the hardships weighs in plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that a preliminary injunction will advance the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012). Under the Winter test, a plaintiff must satisfy each element for injunctive relief.

7 Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit also permits a “sliding scale” approach under which an injunction may be issued if there are “serious questions going to the merits” and “the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” assuming the plaintiff also satisfies the two other Winter factors. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.”); see also Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have also articulated an alternate formulation of the Winter test, under which serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”

18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

19 // // B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 2 Plaintiffs’ motion alleges that the City of Clarkston’s Ordinance likely violates the Eighth Amendment because it punishes the individual Plaintiffs for sheltering from bad weather by the only means they have to do so. ECF No. 13 at 8-9. Plaintiffs cite to the holdings in Johnson v. City of Grants Pass and Martin v. Boise. However, the Supreme Court of the United States just issued its opinion on June 28, 2024 in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, ___U.S. ___ (2024) which reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

11 C. Irreparable Injury 12 Plaintiffs argue irreparable injury. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”

14 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”

18 Id. 1 D. Balancing of Equities and Public Interest 2 Plaintiffs contends that the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiffs’ favor.

However, without a substantive basis for this Court to rule in Plaintiffs’ favor, these factors have no meaning. Regardless, the Court will not grant a preliminary 5|| injunction unless the public interests in favor of granting an injunction “outweigh 6|| other public interests that cut in favor of not issuing the injunction.” Cottrell, 632 7\| F.3d at 1138 (emphasis in original).

8 CONCLUSION 9 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy either the Winter test or the Cottrell sliding scale test. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to their requested relief.

12 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 14 (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.

15 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish copies to counsel.

17 DATED July 1, 2024.

a. Hrwas. 0 Kies 19 Sane THOMAS O. RICE <> United States District Judge ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY