Littlefield v. Washington Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 11 JOSEPH TYLER LITTLEFIELD, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-05711-TL-SKV 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION v. TO TAX COSTS WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF 14 CORRECTIONS et al., 15 Defendants.

17 This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action. On January 25, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Joseph Tyler Littlefield for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. No. 48; see also Dkt. No. 57 (denying motion for reconsideration). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs. Dkt.

21 No. 49. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. No. 60) and the relevant record, the Court DENIES the motion.

23 “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). “Rule 54(d)(1) codifies a venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs.” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013). “Notwithstanding this presumption, the word ‘should’ makes clear that the decision whether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. (citing Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 565 (2012)).

6 However, “[t]hat discretion is not unlimited.” Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “A district court must ‘specify reasons’ for its refusal to award costs.” Id. (quoting Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass’n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978)). The Ninth Circuit has held that 10 [a]ppropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial public importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficult of the 11 issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s limited financial resources, and (5) the economic 12 disparity between the parties. This is not ‘an exhaustive list of “good reasons” for declining to award costs,’ but rather a starting 13 point for analysis.

14 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ass’n of Mexican-Am Educators, 231 F.3d at 592–93). Of particular interest here, “proceeding in forma pauperis does not, by itself, exempt a prisoner from paying costs.” Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 17 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2016). “Thus, the final two factors must be considered in the context of the record as a whole.” Id. 19 Defendants seek $305, the cost of obtaining transcripts associated with an attempted deposition of Plaintiff, scheduled for October 12, 2023. Dkt. No. 49 at 1–2; see also Dkt. No. 50 (redacted invoice); Dkt. No. 21 (motion to compel) at 1. Defendants state that “Plaintiff refused to be deposed.” Dkt. No. 49 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 21 at 1. In response, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants engaged in acts of impropriety” in that they “did in fact threaten Plaintiff with physical assault for participating in civil litigation, including the deposition in this case.” Dkt.

1 No. 60 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that the threat was “carried out” on November 21, 2023, when Plaintiff was attacked by two other prisoners whom Plaintiff alleges were “acting on behalf of” Defendants.1 Id. at 2; see Dkt. No. 61 (Plaintiff declaration) at 2; id. at 5 (incident report).

4 Here, the Court finds that an award of costs is not appropriate. The Court starts with the fact that although Plaintiff refused to participate in the deposition, she attempted to register her objection with Defendants in advance: she sent a “Notice of Objection to Deposition” that was dated October 3, 2023, postmarked October 6, 2023, and received by Defendants on October 11, 2023. See Dkt. No. 22-1 (notice). While Plaintiff could have moved for a protective order, Plaintiff is pro se, and she attempted to notify Defendants of her objection sufficiently in advance of the deposition. Plaintiff is incarcerated, and she is not responsible for the delay in the physical transport of her mailing or its processing by Defendants. Having received the notice one day before the deposition, Defendant could have canceled the deposition and perhaps only have incurred a late cancellation fee. Defendants also could have avoided the unnecessary costs it now seeks by moving the Court in advance to compel the deposition instead of proceeding on October 12, 2023.

16 Other circumstances also caution against an award of costs. While Defendants prevailed, this matter was dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust remedies (see Dkt. No. 47); without further development, it cannot be said that the underlying allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint were without merit or not of substantial public importance. And considering the above facts and the complete record in this case, the Court also notes Plaintiff’s limited financial resources and the vast economic disparity between Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, and Defendants, a Plaintiff also argues that the motion should be denied because Defendants did not provide a sworn declaration as required by LCR 54(d)(1). Dkt. No. 60 at 4. But Defendants provided a Bill of Costs form that is sworn and explicitly permitted by the rule. See Dkt. No. 49-1 (sealed).

1 state correctional agency and its employees. See Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5–6 (finding of indigency and waiver of fees and surcharges); see also Draper, 836 F.3d at 1089 (“There is no comparison between [plaintiff’s] limited resources and those of the state of California, which bore the defense costs.”).

5 For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Tax Costs (Dkt. No. 49).

6 Dated this 22nd day of February 2024.

A Tana Lin United States District Judge