Mendenhall v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 10 CATREENA R. M., CASE NO. 3:24-CV-5582-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY 12 DISABILITY APPEAL ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.

15 Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 17 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned. After considering the record, the Court finds no reversable error and affirms the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.

20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff applied for SSI on July 18, 2019. Administrative Record (AR) 17. Her amended alleged date of disability onset is the same day. Id. Hearings were held before the Administrative Law Judge on September 19, 2022 (AR 36–44); May 4, 2023 (AR 45–70); and September 26, 2023 (AR 71–80). On October 19, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 14–35. The Appeals Council declined Plaintiff’s timely request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency action subject to judicial review. AR 1–6. On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 5.

5 II. STANDARD 6 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

10 III. DISCUSSION 11 In her opening brief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly assess the medical opinions of Peter Weiss, Ph.D., and Stephen Meharg, Ph.D. See generally Dkt. 9.

13 For applications, like Plaintiff's, filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs need not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to” particular medical opinions, including those of treating or examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).

16 Rather, ALJs must consider every medical opinion in the record and evaluate each opinion’s persuasiveness, considering each opinion’s “supportability” and “consistency,” and, under some circumstances, other factors. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. §§ 19 404.1520c(b)–(c), 416.920c(b)–(c). Supportability concerns how a medical source supports a medical opinion with relevant evidence, while consistency concerns how a medical opinion is consistent with evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 22 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2); 416.920c(c)(1), (c)(2).

1 A. Dr. Weiss 2 Consulting examiner Dr. Weiss completed opinions in May 2019 (AR 574–78) and June 2023 (AR 960–64). He opined Plaintiff had marked or severe limitations in her abilities to maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting; complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; set realistic goals and plan independently; communicate and perform effectively in a work setting; and perform activities within a schedule and maintain regular attendance. See AR 575–76, 962.

8 The ALJ found the opinions unpersuasive. AR 25. He found the opinions “inconsistent with the treatment record, which reflects generally intact functioning on mental status exams and good response to medications.” Id. (citing AR 785, 792, 881, 884).

11 This finding was supported by substantial evidence. Elsewhere in his decision, the ALJ explained that, during mental status examinations, Plaintiff had normal memory, concentration, affect, thought process, insight, and judgment, and oftentimes denied significant mental issues.

14 See AR 23 (citing AR 881–90). She did display abnormalities during some mental status examinations, but, the ALJ explained, these examinations followed Plaintiff being off of various medications she was taking. See AR 22–23 (citing AR 789–94, 896–97). As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff did not seek further treatment between being prescribed medication in March and April 2020 and February 2022, when she presented with symptoms after having been off medication for two weeks. See AR 23.

20 The ALJ reasonably concluded—based on the few abnormal mental status examinations when Plaintiff was medicated—that her medications were effective and her mental functioning while on medication was inconsistent with Dr. Weiss’s extreme limitations. See Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding normal mental status examination results undermined extreme limitations in mental functioning); Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling . . . .”); Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming discounting of medical opinion based on “gradual improvement” from medication).1 5 The ALJ properly found Dr. Weiss’s opinions inconsistent with the medical record.

6 Because this is a sufficient basis on which to affirm the ALJ’s findings, the Court need not consider whether the remaining reasons given for rejecting the opinions were erroneous, as any error with respect to those reasons would be harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (error harmless if “there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion”); Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (discrepancy with medical evidence “is a clear and convincing reason for not relying on the doctor's opinion”).

13 B. Dr. Meharg 14 Examining provider Dr. Meharg submitted an opinion in December 2019. See AR 756– 65. He opined Plaintiff had several mild, moderate, and marked limitations, including marked limitations in her abilities to (1) understand and remember detailed instructions and (2) respond appropriately to work pressures. See AR 764–65.

18 The ALJ found the opinion “somewhat persuasive” but rejected the marked limitations opined by Dr. Meharg. AR 24–25. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the opined Plaintiff argues the ALJ erroneously relied upon notations that her condition was “stable” in finding her medications effective (Dkt. 9 at 9–10), but the ALJ supported his determination with normal mental status examinations demonstrating her conditions were not as limiting when she was on medication (see AR 23), so any error in relying upon such notations is harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff also argues Dr. Meharg’s abnormal mental status examination conflicts with the ALJ’s finding (Dkt. 9 at 12), but that examination occurred prior to her medications being prescribed in March 2020 (see AR 22–23), and therefore does not cast doubt upon the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.

1 marked limitations but does not contend the ALJ inadequately assessed the mild and moderate limitations opined. See Dkt. 9 at 4–9.

3 With respect to the first marked limitation, understanding and remembering detailed instructions, any error in assessing this limitation was harmless. At step five, the ALJ identified positions Plaintiff could perform that require Level 2 Reasoning (requiring a worker “to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions”) as well as one position, agricultural produce sorter, which requires Level 1 Reasoning. See AR 26; Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), App’x C. Level 1 reasoning does not require carrying out detailed instructions. See DOT App’x C (Level 1 Reasoning requires “simple one- or two-step instructions” and “standardized situations with occasional or no variables”). The ALJ found, based on the VE’s unchallenged testimony, there were 30,000 agricultural produce sorter positions in the national economy. See AR 26.

13 Because the agricultural produce sorter position independently exists in significant numbers in the national economy and does not require any detailed instructions, any error with respect to Dr. Maharg’s limitation in understanding and remembering detailed instructions was inconsequential to the ALJ’s step five finding and therefore harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 17 1104; Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528–29 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 25,000 jobs is a significant number available in the national economy); see also Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1110 n.7 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding error in finding claimant could perform one position harmless where other positions existed in significant numbers).

21 With respect to Dr. Meharg’s second marked limitation, responding appropriately to work pressures, the ALJ properly found the limitation inconsistent with objective medical evidence, including Plaintiff’s “minimal treatment and good response to medications.” AR 25.

1 As discussed, this finding was supported by substantial evidence—the ALJ reasonably concluded, based on Plaintiff’s minimal treatment and normal mental status examinations during periods when she was on medication, that Plaintiff’s conditions were not severely limiting. See AR 22–23. As the ALJ noted, mental status examinations found Plaintiff’s judgment, insight, behavior, mood, and affect were normal. See id. This is inconsistent with a marked limitation in responding to work pressures.

7 In sum, the ALJ did not reversibly err in considering the marked limitations opined by Dr. Meharg. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to address the supportability of the opinion (Dkt. 9 at 4–5), but such error is, at best, harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1104; Woods, 32 F.4th at 792– 93 (finding proper consideration of one of supportability-and-consistency factors to be adequate basis to affirm).

12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby AFFIRMS Defendant’s decision denying benefits.

15 Dated this 2nd day of January, 2025.

A David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge