Montano v. State of Washington Department of Health

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA SANDY FLETCHER MONTANO, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05850-DGE Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 v. RECUSAL (DKT. NO. 32) 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al., Defendants.

Presently before the Court is a motion for recusal filed by Plaintiff Sandy Fletcher Montano. (Dkt. No. 32.) The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(f), directs the clerk to “refer [the motion] to the active judge with the highest seniority” in this district.

Motions for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Recusal is required if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if the judge harbors personal bias or prejudice against a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Such bias or prejudice must derive from an extrajudicial source. Agha-Khan v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2022 WL 24 501564, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984).

2 Under both 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is appropriate if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993).

5 This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance of bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1992).

7 Plaintiff asks the undersigned to recuse himself due to unspecified evidence “detailing prior unethical and/or illegal conduct or conduct which gives [Plaintiff] a solid pretext to believe [the undersigned] cannot hear [this case] in a fair and impartial manner.” (Dkt. No. 32 at 3.)

10 Plaintiff asks the undersigned to recuse himself due to a “lack of impartiality” and deliberate violations of the personal liberties of other litigants or behavior “inconsistent with that which is needed for full, fair, and impartial hearings.” (Id.) 13 Plaintiff cites no specific conduct by the undersigned that would support his allegations.

14 The Court notes that at a scheduling hearing held on February 21, 2025, Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the Court as the Court was attempting to explain the status of the case, and ultimately self-terminated his participation in the hearing. (Dkt. No. 31.) However, Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the Court does not provide a basis for recusal. United States v. Azhocar, 581 18 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding there was “no merit to [a party’s] claim of bias based on adverse rulings”); Hayes v. U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services, 2022 WL 494889, at *1 (affirming denial of recusal when the movant “[p]resent[ed] no evidence of bias from an extrajudicial source”); United States v. Arant, 2007 WL 3348443, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2007) (instructing that “[a] litigant cannot . . . use the recusal process to remove a judge based on adverse rulings”).

1 Ultimately, “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Central Dist. Of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff has not provided a legitimate reason to recuse. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and directs the Clerk to refer the motion to United States District Judge Tana Lin, the active judge with the highest seniority.

7 Dated this 28th day of February, 2025.

A David G. Estudillo 10 United States District Judge