Wamberg v. Drift NW LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA LYNELL EILEEN WAMBERG, CASE NO. C25-5183 BHS Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. DRIFT NW LLC, et al., 11 Defendants.

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Lynell Wamberg’s second emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), Dkt. 9. The Court denied Wamberg’s prior similar motion, Dkts. 1 and 2, and ordered her to file an amended complaint. She did so, Dkt. 4.

17 Wamberg’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim. She asserts that she holds a “paramount title” to her property “by virtue of a BLM Federal Land Patent” which “establishes absolute, indisputable legal ownership superior to all subsequent claims.”

20 Dkt. 4 at 2. The source of this paramount title is not described, and the legal authority for it is not provided; there is none. The Court can surmise that at some point Wamberg borrowed money using this property as collateral for her promise to re-pay that loan.

1 Wamberg attached attaches a $247,588.00, June 17, 2013, promissory note to her motion, but does not reference it or explain what is invalid about it. It does include her “copyrighted” signature. Dkt. 9 at 23. But the details of the loan are not described. Did she pay it back? What happened next? Other than her “paramount title,” why is the note unenforceable? Why is her property not security for the loan? None of these facts are in the complaint. Her arguments about some prior loan having a zero balance (perhaps paid off as part of the 2013 transaction), Dkt. 9 at 13, do not address the record evidence that she borrowed almost $250,000.

9 Instead, Wamberg simply asserts that “the foreclosure and subsequent transfers were explicitly Void ab initio (invalid from inception).” Dkt. 4 at 2. What foreclosure?

11 What transfers? Why were they void? Wamberg also repeats the spurious claim that defendant Drift NW has improperly filed UCC claims on her “genetic data,” though she alleges no facts and provides no evidence supporting such a claim. Id. 14 Wamberg’s emergency motion for a TRO was filed at the end of business Friday, April 4, asserting that the sheriff was scheduled to “eject” her from the property on April 6. Dkt. 9 at 1. There is no articulation of when that ejection was scheduled, or why Wamberg waited until Friday evening to seek to stop it.

18 In any event, Wamberg asserts that “defendants” failed to comply with various laws regarding mortgaging servicing, and implies that these failures preclude them from enforcing the terms of the parties’ contracts, including the deed of trust, but she does not assert any facts (or law-fact analysis) supporting that conclusion.

1 The purpose of a TRO is “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing [on the preliminary injunction application], and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423 (1974); see also Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. 5 McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2006). For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff “must establish that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.

9 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When considering whether to grant this “extraordinary remedy, . . . courts must balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect of granting or withholding the requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

13 Wamberg has not established that she is likely to succeed on the merits of any of her claims. Those claims and the facts upon which they rely remain entirely unclear. And, as the Court explained in its prior Order, if and to the extent Wamberg asks the Court to review, reverse, or enjoin a state court decision, it cannot and will not do so. See Dkt. 2 at 2. Wamberg has not established that the public interest or the balance of equities support enjoining an undescribed “ejectment” based on her unsubstantiated claims about her paramount title and her lenders’ conduct.

20 Wamberg’s emergency motion for a TRO is DENIED.

21 // 22 // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 Dated this 7th day of April, 2025.

A BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge