Tang v. Bondi

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 DABONA TANG, Case No. 2:25-cv-01473-RAJ-TLF 11 Petitioner, ORDER 12 v. 13 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States; 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland 15 Security; DREW BOSTOCK, Seattle Field Office Director, United 16 States Citizenship and Immigration Services; WARDEN 17 of Immigration Detention Facility; and the United States Immigration 18 And Customs Enforcement, 19 Respondents.

20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Dabona Tang’s motion for temporary retraining order, dkt. # 20, and the Federal Respondents’ motion to strike Mr. Tang’s motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. # 17. 1 The Court has reviewed the 1 “Respondents” refer to all respondents in this case. “Federal Respondents” refer to all respondents except the warden of the Northwest ICE Processing Center.

1 motions, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Mr. Tang’s request for immediate release from custody under a temporary restraining order, but sets expedited briefing on Mr. Tang’s pending motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. # 16, as detailed below. The Court DENIES the Federal Respondents’ motion to strike.

6 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 Mr. Tang challenges his current detention at the Northwest ICE Processing Center as unconstitutional and unlawful, and moves the Court for a temporary restraining order directing his immediate release from custody. Dkt. # 20. The Court will summarize Mr. Tang’s immigration history and other relevant factual background in a future order, but will limit the discussion here to the procedural history of this case.

12 On May 21, 2025, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Mr. Tang when he appeared for a scheduled check in. Dkt. # 20-1 ¶ 4. On August 5, 2025, Mr. Tang filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention and requesting that the Court order his release. Dkt. # 1. On August 7, 2025, Magistrate Judge Fricke ordered Respondents to file a return by September 8, 2025 (within 30 days of the order). Dkt. # 5. The order further stated the return will be treated in accordance with LCR 7(d)(4) and noted for consideration no earlier than 28 days after it is filed. Id. 19 Mr. Tang filed a motion to expedite. Dkt. # 7. He argued Magistrate Judge Fricke’s order—giving Respondents 30 days to file a return and the parties another 28 days to fully brief the matter—prolonged Mr. Tang’s detention and was contrary to the purpose of habeas corpus as a speedy remedy to challenge unlawful detentions. Id. On August 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Fricke issued an order to show cause why Respondents cannot file their return by August 25, 2025 (two weeks earlier than the date set out in the original order). Dkt. # 8. As directed, the Federal Respondents filed their return and motion to dismiss on August 25, 2025 and noted the motion for September 22, 2025. Dkt. # 12.

3 On August 29, 2025, Mr. Tang filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking an order requiring his release from custody and for other relief. Dkt. # 16. On the same day, the Federal Respondents filed a motion to strike Mr. Tang’s motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. # 17. They argued, among other things, that the motion seeks remedy that is duplicative of what will be addressed by resolution of the pending petition and motion to dismiss. Id. Moreover, they argued the motion delays proceedings because pursuant to LCR 7(d)(4), it is noted for September 26, 2025, four days after the motion to dismiss noting date. Id. In response, Mr. Tang argued emergency relief before adjudication of the pending petition and motion to dismiss is critical because he suffers irreparable harm every day he is unlawfully detained. Dkt. # 18.

13 On September 2, 2025, Mr. Tang filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Dkt. # 20. He represents the motion is substantively identical to the motion for preliminary injunction but was filed to “address concerns raised in Respondents’ Motion to Strike.” Id. at 1. On the same day, the Federal Respondents filed a notice of intent to oppose Mr. Tang’s motion for TRO. Dkt # 21. They asked the Court to deny the TRO motion without a response, or allow Federal Respondents “meaningful time to respond.” Dkt. # 21. Mr. Tang responded, asking the Court to order Respondents to file a TRO response by the end of the week. Dkt. # 22.

21 III. DISCUSSION 22 A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “Although the standard for obtaining a [TRO] and a preliminary injunction is identical, they serve fundamentally different purposes.”

1 Nguyen v. Scott, No. 25-cv-1398, 2025 WL 2165995, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2025).

2 “The purpose of a [TRO] is to preserve an existing situation in status quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction.”

4 Id. TROs are thus “restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing and no longer.” Id. A TRO is not designed to replace the “thorough consideration contemplated by full proceedings pursuant to a preliminary injunction.” Id. 8 In Nguyen, a case challenging a petitioner’s detention under similar circumstances, Judge Cartwright denied the petitioner’s request for immediate release under a TRO but ordered expedited briefing for a motion for preliminary injunction. Id., at *9–10. Judge Cartwright explained that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s request for release from detention is the same relief ultimately sought by his habeas petition . . . it falls outside the limited purpose of a TRO and should instead be decided either after a preliminary injunction hearing or through regular adjudication of the habeas petition itself.” Id., at *7. Judge Cartwright further noted that “[w]hile there could be circumstances where a petitioner’s detention is so obviously unconstitutional that release should be granted on an emergency basis, that is not the case here.” Id. 18 Here, like in Nguyen, the Court finds a TRO is not the appropriate vehicle to adjudicate Mr. Tang’s request for immediate release from custody and denies the motion on that basis. However, the Court finds, in its discretion, that expedited briefing of Mr. Tang’s pending motion for preliminary injunction is appropriate. As of this order, Mr. Tang has been detained for more than three months and will at minimum be detained for a further three weeks if his case is heard on the current briefing schedule. On the other hand, the Federal Respondents have been on notice of Mr. Tang’s petition since August 5, 2025 and have already filed a motion to dismiss that they acknowledge covers much of the same ground as Mr. Tang’s request for emergency relief. On balance, the Court finds that ordering a one week briefing schedule for Mr. Tang’s preliminary injunction motion will ensure efficient resolution of Mr. Tang’s constitutional challenges while giving Respondents adequate time to present their opposition.

5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Tang’s motion for temporary restraining order, dkt. # 20.

8 The Court ORDERS expedited briefing on Mr. Tang’s motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. # 16, as follows: Respondents shall file their response to the motion for preliminary injunction by no later than September 10, 2025. No reply is required.

11 The Court DENIES Federal Respondents’ motion to strike the motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. # 17.

14 Dated this 3rd day of September, 2025.

15 A 17 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge