Warren Lee Weisman v. Ronald Lee Wyden, U.S. Senator of Oregon, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE WARREN LEE WEISMAN, Pro Se, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01966-JNW Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. RONALD LEE WYDEN, U.S. Senator 11 of Oregon, et al., 12 Defendants.

INTRODUCTION The Court raises this matter of its own accord. Pro se Plaintiff Warren Lee Weisman pursues this action against Defendants in forma pauperis (“IFP”). After reviewing the complaint, Dkt. No. 6, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court finds that Weisman fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Rather than dismissing this case outright, the Court grants Weisman leave to amend the complaint within 14 days of this order.

1 2. DISCUSSION 1.1 Legal standard.

When a plaintiff proceeds IFP, Section 1915 requires the Court to dismiss the action if the Court determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To survive Section 1915 review, a complaint must meet the pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

At the same time, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Therefore, a “document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on the Court by Section 1915 are unwavering, and when an IFP plaintiff fails to state a claim, the action must be dismissed.

1.2 Weisman’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Weisman’s complaint names several Defendants but fails to allege unlawful conduct attributable to any Defendant. He alleges that in 2007, he moved to Oregon to start a renewable energy company “based on anaerobic digestion of organic waste into flammable biogas.” Dkt. No. 6 at 3. He asserts that he “proposed a biogas bus demonstration project . . . [but it] was summarily denied by Defendant Susie Smith,1 a member of the Lane County Metropolitan Wastewater Management Commission. Id. Weisman alleges that Smith’s husband, Defendant Alan Zelenka, consults for a company that proposed a project similar to his the following year. He states that complained to Defendant Rick Wallace of the Oregon Department of Energy, and Wallace did not “address[] the problem of copyright infringement.” Id. at 4.

Separately, Weisman alleges that Defendant Ethan Nelson of the City of Eugene inspected his prototype, “yet refused to assist securing grant financing for The Court has modified citations to the Complaint, which capitalizes Defendants’ names throughout.

1 commercialization . . . [w]hile helping to secure millions in foreign financing for the ill-conceived Junction City Biomethane Plant Plaintiff advised against, planned by . . . biogas company owner [Defendant] Dean Foor.” Id. Weisman states that while he has been unable to secure additional funding from the State of Oregon for his project, “JC Biomethane, Kennedy Jenks, and Oregon solar panel manufacturers including now-failed First Solar, continue to receive hundreds of millions in public money . . . from Lane County and State of Oregon, including federal subsidies [that his] company did not require through the offices of U.S. Senator Ronald Wyden and U.S. Representative Peter Defazio.” Id. at 5.

10 Weisman asserts, generally, that Defendants conspired with prosecutors to arrest and detain him for five years as retaliation for him exercising his First Amendment rights. Id. at 2. Weisman does not state why he was arrested or what he was charged with. See generally id. And—save for a vague reference to copyright infringement—his prayer for relief does not clarify what his causes of action are.

15 Based on the complaint’s factual allegations, the Court cannot draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for . . . misconduct[.]” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 17 at 678.

18 Finally, Weisman’s claims against U.S. Senator Ronald Wyden and U.S. Representative Peter Defazio appear barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

20 Generally, plaintiffs cannot sue agents and officers of the United States unless Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States. Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A]ny waiver must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied.” Id. (citation modified). If the plaintiff does not establish waiver, then “courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over cases against the [federal] government.” Jd. (alteration in original) (“We conclude that the plaintiffs have not alleged a waiver of sovereign immunity that would confer subject ||/matter jurisdiction on the district court.”). Weisman has failed to state what cause (or causes) of action he pursues against Wyden and Defazio, nor has he alleged a G source of waiver. Accordingly, sovereign immunity appears to bar any claim against 7 these Defendants.

3. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court FINDS that the operative complaint, Dkt. No. 6, 10 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. But rather than dismissing the case outright, the Court GRANTS Weisman leave to amend the complaint and le ORDERS Weisman, within FOURTEEN (14) days of this Order, to submit an amended 13 complaint that states a claim on which relief may be granted. Failure to do so will || vesult in dismissal of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

15 The Clerk is directed to place this Order to Show Cause on the Court’s 16 calendar for 14 days from the date of this Order.

It is so ORDERED.

18 Dated this 3rd day of November, 2025.

United States District Judge