Mehrad Ghasedi v. Cammilla Wamsley, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE MEHRAD GHASEDI , 9 Petitioner, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01984-RSM-BAT 10 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CAMMILLA WAMSLEY, et al., 12 Respondents.

Petitioner Mehrad Ghasedi, a national of Iran currently in immigration detention, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through counsel to obtain his release and prevent removal to a third country. Ghasedi is currently in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), at Northwest Immigration and Customs Enforcement Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington. ICE originally detained him for a few months in 2021 following a felony drug conviction, and he was ordered removed to Iran, but he was never removed and was released. In July 2025, ICE re-detained him at a check-in. He now challenges his detention as unlawful and unconstitutional.

Having reviewed the petition (Dkt. 1), the government’s response (Dkt. 6), and Ghasedi’s response to the government (Dkt. 8), the Court recommends that the petition be GRANTED and that a writ of habeas corpus issue directing Ghasedi’s release from custody subject to appropriate conditions of supervision.

2 BACKGROUND 3 Petitioner Mehrad Ghasedi is a 38-year-old national of Iran. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 1 (petition). He arrived in the United States for lawful permanent residence at age 14, on March 6, 2001. Id.; Dkt.

5 6 at 4 (government’s response). He has lived in the United States for 24 years, during which time he has attended and graduated from high school, learned to speak English, and maintained gainful employment. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 44. He was convicted in 2019 of felony delivery of heroin and possession of methamphetamine. Id. After he served his sentence, ICE took him into custody on February 25, 2021, issued him a Notice to Appear, and charged him as removable. Id. at ¶ 45.

10 On March 24, 2021, an immigration judge ordered Ghasedi removed to Iran. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 47. He appeared pro se in those removal proceedings, did not apply for relief from removal, and waived appeal. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 9 (Ghasedi declaration); Dkt. 6 at 5.

13 ICE detained him from February 25, 2021 to July 29, 2021. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 48. During his detention, ICE interviewed him regarding his travel document and sent a travel document request to Iran. Dkt. 7 at ¶¶ 8–9 (De Castro declaration). ICE continued to communicate with the Iran embassy, but did not receive a travel document. Id. 17 After a post-order custody review, Ghasedi was released on July 29, 2021 under an order of supervision which required him, among other things, to report in person to the ICE office in Eugene, Oregon; assist ICE in obtaining travel documents; provide ICE with written copies of requests to consulates for issuance of a travel document; wear an ankle monitoring device; notify ICE and obtain approval for travel outside Oregon of more than 48 hours; and commit no crimes.

22 Id. at ¶ 49; Dkt. 8-1 at 19 (order of supervision). The record does not reflect why Ghasedi was released.

1 While released, Ghasedi lived with his mother in Eugene, Oregon. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 50. He worked for a roofing company until he became ill before the end of last year, and assisted his mother in caring for disabled adults at her adult care home business. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 14. Ghasedi contends that, during his release, he fully complied with the conditions of the order of supervision. Id. at ¶ 13; Dkt. 1 at 51. The government claims Ghasedi violated the conditions of release: he left Oregon in December 2021 and was placed under more regular reporting as a result, and in March 2022 the GPS monitor revealed he had left Oregon several times. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 11. Ghasedi replies that all his trips were less than 48 hours, which did not trigger the requirement to notify ICE. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 15. He agrees that because of the “issues” with travel, ICE thereafter told him he needed to notify of all travel. Id. The government also claims Ghasedi was “determined as not being cooperative in obtaining a travel document” from the Iran embassy. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 12. Ghasedi replies that he attempted to contact the Iran consulate but was never successful and the consulate was unwilling to provide him with written proof of the attempts. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 13. In February 2025, ICE removed his ankle monitoring device. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 85; Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 16.

16 When Ghasedi reported to the ICE office on July 17, 2025, he was arrested and detained unexpectedly and transferred to Tacoma, Washington for detention. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 69. At the Tacoma detention center, Petitioner was given a notice of revocation of release, which stated that the decision to re-detain him “has been made based on a review of [his] case, [his] existing order of removal, and determination that there is a significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.; see Dkt. 8-1 at 16 (notice of revocation of release). ICE officers gave Ghasedi no explanation for the arrest beyond that “the judge in Tacoma wanted to see [him] in court.” Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 19.

1 While in detention, Ghasedi has been suffering from cutaneous abscess, a medical condition causing him serious pain and discomfort. Id. at ¶ 23. He claims a nurse suggested surgery on August 31, 2025, but ICE ignored repeated requests for medical treatment, including after his attorney wrote to ICE. Id. He was taken to the hospital on October 21, 2025, seven days after the filing of his habeas petition. Id. 6 In his petition, Ghasedi claims (1) the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act via arbitrary and capricious agency action by re-detaining him without a rational connection to the facts of his case, (2) the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and statute require that before third country removal, the government must reopen his removal proceedings, provide evidence that a third country will accept him, and allow him to present a claim under the Convention Against Torture as to that country, (3) his detention violates due process under Zadvydas v. Davis because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, and (4) if his removal proceedings are reopened, due process prohibits Respondents from re-detaining him without a hearing before a neutral adjudicator at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his release conditions should be modified. Dkt. 1 at 28–31. He prays for a writ of habeas corpus releasing him from custody and enjoining transfer to another district before this proceeding is concluded, as well as an injunction preventing Respondents from designating a third country for removal without reopening removal proceedings. Id. at 31–32.

19 DISCUSSION 20 A district court may issue a writ of habeas corpus on a showing that a petitioner’s custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is held contrary to law. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992). Under § 2241, federal courts have jurisdiction over challenges to the detention of noncitizens prior to their removal. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). District courts lack jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions challenging final orders of removal. Aden v. Nielsen, 409 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1005 (W.D. Wash. 2019). But courts retain jurisdiction over petitions like the one here, which challenges not the order of removal but detention, the process used to detain, and the designation of a removal country outside of removal proceedings. Id. 7 I. Zadvydas Claim 8 Ghasedi argues he is detained in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as required by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The government responds his detention is reasonably foreseeable. Ghasedi has the better argument.

12 Ghasedi is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs the detention and release of noncitizens who have been ordered removed (as opposed to noncitizens apprehended at the border under § 1225, or those not yet ordered removed, § 1226). Under § 1231, the government must detain a noncitizen during the 90 days following the entry of the removal order, during which time ICE attempts removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Ghasedi’s 90-day removal period expired on June 22, 2021. Dkt. 6 at 6. After 90 days, the government may detain the noncitizen or release the noncitizen under supervision. § 1231(a)(6).

19 While the government may detain a noncitizen, § 1231 “does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 at 689. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693. Due process requires a noncitizen be detained under § 1231 no longer than “a period reasonably necessary to bring about . . . removal from the United States.” Id. at 689. Detention is presumptively reasonable for six months after the removal period. “After this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701. If the government fails to rebut the noncitizen’s showing, the noncitizen is entitled to habeas relief.

6 Ghasedi’s detention is outside the presumptively reasonable period because his total detention exceeds six months. He was detained from March 24, 2021 to July 29, 2021 and again from July 17, 2025 to the present day. Total length of confinement need not be consecutive to reach the six-month presumptively reasonable limit established in Zadvydas. Nguyen v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025).

11 A. Petitioner’s Burden Under Zadvydas 12 Ghasedi has met his initial burden to show good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. First, he correctly argues the government has failed to remove him for the four years since March 2021, states no timeframe for removal, and has not yet obtained a travel document for him from Iran or another country.

16 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 81; Dkt. 8 at 5. The government’s response confirms it has not received—or requested—a travel document from Iran or another country. See Dkts. 6, 7. The government did send a travel document request to Iran when Ghasedi was first detained in April 2021, and the Iran embassy interviewed Ghasedi back then, but Iran did not send a travel document. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 9. Now, the government states it has internally prepared a renewed travel document request but does not mention sending that request to Iran and does not mention any communication with Iran since Ghasedi was re-detained. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 16.

1 Second, Ghasedi argues ICE has designated Iran as one of 15 “uncooperative” countries that does not facilitate deportations of its citizens. Dkt. 8 at 5. He substantiates this statement with a November 2024 ICE memorandum, which says 2,618 Iran nationals have yet to be removed and lists specific factors that lead to a country being classified as “uncooperative,” including “hindering ICE’s removal efforts by refusing to conduct consular interviews when necessary; refusing to accept charter removal missions; having an unacceptable ratio of releases when compared to removals and/or unacceptable average time from executable final order of removal to removal; and/or denying or delaying issuance of travel documents, such as passports.” Dkt. 8-1 at 8 n.4 (ICE memorandum, Exhibit A to Ghasedi’s response).

10 In sum, Ghasedi meets his burden by arguing the government does not indicate a date or timeframe for Ghasedi’s removal, apparently has not renewed its travel document request with the Iran embassy, does not state when it expects to finalize or send the request to Iran, does not mention communication with Iran about Ghasedi’s case since he was re-detained, and has designated Iran as uncooperative with removal efforts. See Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F. 15 Supp. 2d 37, 50 (D.D.C. 2002) (removal not reasonably foreseeable where government had “not demonstrated . . . that any travel documents are in hand, nor have they provided any evidence, or even assurances from the [foreign] government, that travel documents will be issued in a matter of days or weeks or even months”); Singh v. Whitaker, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93, 101–02 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (removal not reasonably foreseeable where government had no specific timeframe for removal and no travel document despite frequent follow-ups with the consulate); Andreasyan v. Gonzales, 446 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1189-90 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (finding removal not likely in reasonably foreseeable future when noncitizen detained for eight months and consulate stated only that case was still under review pending a decision).

1 Ghasedi also argues that his detention violates due process because he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, as demonstrated by his “history of attending his ICE check-ins and complying with the terms of his release, his track record of the past four years, and his long residence in the U.S. and his family ties in the local community.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 83. He also points out before he was re-detained, ICE removed his ankle monitoring device, which implicitly indicates ICE does not consider him to be a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id. at ¶ 85.

7 Respondents do not contest this point, focusing instead on whether removal is reasonably foreseeable. Dkt. 6 at 7. To be clear, relief under Zadvydas does not require a finding that Ghasedi is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. However, as a separate basis for relief, the absence of any showing that Ghasedi poses a flight risk or a danger supports release from detention.

12 Finally, Ghasedi argues the “multi-step processes” of designating an additional removal country and presenting a claim under the Convention Against Torture could take a year to several years and render his removal not reasonably foreseeable. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 81. He cites no authority supporting Zadvydas relief under these conditions. As no such proceedings have commenced, and the government contends it does not intend third country removal, the possibility of this process delaying his removal is too speculative to weigh in his favor. However, as discussed above, he has met his burden for other reasons.

19 B. Respondents’ Burden Under Zadvydas 20 Once Ghasedi has met his burden, the burden shifts to respondent to rebut the showing.

21 Zadvydas. Respondents’ materials, as discussed above, confirm the government sent a travel document request to the Iran embassy in 2021, scheduled and completed an interview with the Iran embassy. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 9. Although the government “continued to communicate with the embassy,” it did not receive a travel document from Iran at that time. Id. After Ghasedi was re- detained, Enforcement and Removal Operations prepared an updated travel document request, including a copy of Ghasedi’s passport and birth certificate, which was sent to the Detention and Deportation Officer within ICE on October 29, 2025. Id. at ¶ 16. It appears that request has not yet been sent to the Iran embassy. Id. Respondents do not mention communicating with or scheduling an interview with the Iran embassy since Ghasedi’s re-detention. The government states that since it has Ghasedi’s national ID number and passport number, Iran “should be able” to confirm his citizenship status, and that it “expects that Iran will issue a travel document for Petitioner.” Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19. But the government provides no concrete facts on which to premise that expectation.1 11 Respondents also contend there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to Iran, despite prior difficulties in executing removal,” because “[a]ccording to [Enforcement and Removal Operations headquarters], Iran is currently issuing [travel documents] for individuals ordered removed and there are flights to Iran to effectuate removal of [noncitizens] from the United States.” Dkt. 7 at ¶ 18. However, Respondents do not specify how many travel documents the Iran embassy has recently issued or how many noncitizens with final orders of removal have successfully been removed to Iran. The generalized statement that Iran Ghasedi argues that the government’s expectation of receiving a travel document is also unreasonable because his file contains copies rather than originals of his passport and birth certificate. He cites to Kamyab v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-00389-RSL, Dkt. 21 (W.D. Wash. Oct 14, 2025) for the proposition that Iran requires original documents to issue travel documents. Dkt. 8 at 4–5. In Kamyab, a declaration from an ICE officer stated that the Iran government required original documents to process a travel document request. See Kamyab, Dkt. 13 at ¶ 5 (“Iran is aware of the case and stated they need to review original documents, for example, passport or birth certificate.”). However, there is no indication of whether that requirement was specific to that petitioner’s case, and here the government has not stated affirmatively that it cannot procure original documents. The Court therefore does not weigh this point in the Zadvydas analysis.

1 “is currently issuing” an unspecified number of travel documents during an unknown time period is insufficient to rebut Ghasedi’s specific contentions that ICE has designated Iran as uncooperative and that 2,618 Iran nationals with final orders of removal remain in the United States. See Nguyen, 2025 WL 2419288, at *16 (similar declarations were insufficient to meet the government’s burden where “[a]t most, they establish that [the country of removal] is accepting more of its citizens for repatriation,” which does not equate to a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-CV-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 8 WL 2791778, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (removal not reasonably foreseeable where respondent merely stated deportees had recently been removed to China, whereas petitioner showed that the Chinese government had been designated as recalcitrant to repatriation and that respondents had failed for years to deport him to China).

12 The government’s representation is therefore insufficient to rebut Ghasedi’s showing.

13 “Courts in this circuit have regularly refused to find Respondents’ burden met where Respondents have offered little more than generalizations regarding the likelihood that removal will occur.” Nguyen, 2025 WL 2419288, at *16; see Singh v. Gonzales, 448 F.

16 Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2006); Chun Yat Ma, 2012 WL 1432229, at *4–5.

17 The government’s other arguments are unavailing. First, Respondents argue there is no bright-line rule that ICE must have a travel document in hand for removal to be reasonably foreseeable. Dkt. 6 at 9. That is correct as far as it goes. See Khan v. Fasano, 194 F. Supp. 2d 20 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (removal reasonably foreseeable where travel document request was pending approval). However, the government not only lacks a travel document but has not yet renewed its request for one, states no expected timeframe for procuring one, has failed to remove the petitioner for over four years, and has designated the country of removal as uncooperative.

1 Ghasedi has more support for his claim than the mere absence of a travel document. See Singh v. Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (ICE had not met its burden where it could not provide any substantive indication regarding how or when it expected to obtain the travel document).

5 Respondents also contend “[d]etention becomes indefinite in situations where the country of removal refuses to accept the noncitizen or if removal is legally barred,” and Ghasedi has not shown either is the case. Dkt. 6 at 10. The case cited for that proposition is Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008), which the Court reads differently. The Ninth Circuit denied the petitioner Zadvydas relief because the record provided “no reason to believe” that he would be “unremovable even if the government defeated his petition for review,” and continued: “There is no evidence, for example, that Senegal would refuse to accept him, or that his removal is barred by our own laws.” The Court reads these as examples of sufficient conditions to meet the Zadvydas burden, not a statement of what is necessary to meet the burden.

14 And, while it is true that “mere delay in the issuance of a travel document” is insufficient to meet a petitioner’s burden, Dkt. 6 at 9, Respondents cite cases to support this point in which the government uniformly made more progress in procuring the travel document than it has here.

17 Galtogbah v. Sessions, 2019 WL 3766280, at *2 (W.D. La. June 18, 2019) (travel document request sent to consulate, interview occurred, petitioner approved for charter flight); Walcott v. Homeland Sec. (BICE), No. CIV.A. 05-0410 (MLC), 2005 WL 3544342 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2005) (only apparent reason petitioner had not yet been removed was the stay of removal pending habeas relief); Khan v. Fasano, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (travel document request submitted and pending approval, meeting scheduled with consulate); Nasr v. Larocca, 2016 WL 23 3710200, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2016) (consulate requested and received travel documents, petitioner had multiple telephone conversations with consular officials). Similarly, Respondents’ argument that delay by the foreign government does not meet the burden, Dkt. 6 at 10, is beside the point. As a new travel document request has not been sent, the United States, not Iran, is causing the delay.

5 C. Petitioner’s Compliance with the Order of Supervision 6 There is a fact dispute regarding Ghasedi’s compliance with his order of supervision.

7 Ghasedi claims he complied fully with the order while released. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶ 13. The government contends Ghasedi violated the conditions of his order of supervision, by leaving Oregon several times and by failing to cooperate in obtaining a travel document from the Iran embassy. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 11–12. For his part, Ghasedi claims all his trips were less than 48 hours, that he attempted to contact the Iran consulate but was never successful, and that ICE’s removal of his ankle monitoring device in February 2025 implies his compliance. Dkt. 8-1 at ¶¶ 13, 15, 16.

13 The fact dispute may matter for two reasons. However, on both counts the Court finds this dispute does not affect the Zadvydas analysis and it is therefore unnecessary to resolve it.

15 First, Ghasedi may lawfully be re-detained upon a finding that he did indeed violate a condition of his order of supervision. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 at 700 (noncitizen “may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation” of release conditions). But the government does not argue that Ghasedi was re-detained because he violated any specific release condition. Nor does the record reflect that any ICE official made a finding of non-compliance in ordering re-detention.

20 Rather, the government merely mentions in a footnote that “while on supervised release Ghasedi repeatedly violated the conditions of his release,” Dkt. 6 at 4 n.2. Respondents have made no showing that any process was followed to re-detain Ghasedi that involved consideration of his compliance with the conditions of release. Thus, the passing mention of his noncompliance appears extraneous to the analysis. Pacito v. Trump, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[p]ost-hoc rationalizations cannot justify an agency’s action;” nor can courts infer an agency’s reasoning from silence). Indeed, this dispute over compliance with conditions of release reflects the importance of ICE following its own procedures when re-detaining noncitizens, to ensure a record of exactly what happened to trigger re-detention.

6 Second, the government alleges Ghasedi was “determined as not being cooperative in obtaining a travel document” from Iran. Dkt. 7 at ¶ 12. The Ninth Circuit has held that a noncitizen who refuses to cooperate to secure a travel document cannot meet his burden under Zadvydas to show that removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Lema v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Ghasedi’s alleged noncooperation, even if true, does not rise to the level of dooming his Zadvydas claim. In Lema v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2003), for example, the court held the petitioner could not meet his Zadvydas burden where he repeatedly obstructed removal efforts by lying about his nationality, refusing to accept a letter requiring him to apply for travel documents, refusing to provide the government with relevant documents, and refusing to contact the consulate. In Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008), ICE successfully completed arrangements for removal twice, but the petitioner refused to depart even though he was detained. Here, by contrast, the bare allegation that he was “determined as not being cooperative,” without details, is insufficient to defeat his Zadvydas claim.

19 Because Ghasedi has met his burden to show removal is not reasonably foreseeable and the government has failed to rebut it, Ghasedi is entitled to release “conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.” Zadvydas, 533 22 U.S. 678 at 700.

1 II. Third Country Removal 2 Ghasedi contends he “is currently living in near-paralyzing fear that ICE will remove him to a third country [other than Iran] where he would have no family ties and would be at direct risk of torture,” from which country he could then be deported to Iran (a process known as “chain refoulement”). Dkt. 1 at ¶ 73. He does not contest Respondents’ authority to remove him to a third country. Rather, he asks for notice and an opportunity to respond if the government should attempt third country removal. Specifically, he seeks to enjoin Respondents from removing him to a third country without first (1) reopening his Section 240 removal proceedings, so an immigration judge may designate a specific country for removal, and (2) providing him with an opportunity to present a claim for deferral of removal as to that country under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Id. at 31–32.

12 The government responds it has no “present interest” in third country removal, so Ghasedi’s concern is unsubstantiated and speculative. Dkt. 6 at 11. But it argues that if it did decide to remove Ghasedi to a third country, it would not be required to give him the process he demands. Respondents argue under “current USCIS policy,” DHS has the authority to effect third country removal without the involvement of an immigration judge, without reopening removal proceedings, and without giving a noncitizen an opportunity to present a CAT claim, “within 24 hours after the third country agrees to accept [him] and a Notice of Removal is served.” Id. at 11–12.

20 The government is incorrect. As another court in this district recently found, a “noncitizen must be given sufficient notice of a country of deportation that, given his capacities and circumstances, he would have a reasonable opportunity to raise and pursue his claim for withholding of deportation.” Nguyen, 2025 WL 2419288, at *18 (quoting Aden, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1 998 at 1010). Due process includes the right to “a full and fair hearing, an impartial decisionmaker, and evaluation of the merits of his or her particular claim.” Id. The due process clause requires the government to “provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard on asylum and withholding claims.” Id. These requirements “flow directly from binding Ninth Circuit precedent,” and to the extent ICE policy contradicts them, it is unlawful. Id. at *19 (“It would be impossible to comply both with Ninth Circuit precedent and the policy.”).

7 In Aden, the petitioner was ordered to be removed to Kenya; however, after Kenya denied his travel document request, ICE scheduled his removal to Somalia without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Aden, 409 F. Supp. 3d 998 at 1003. The court held due process required that the removal proceedings against the petitioner be reopened and a hearing held before the immigration judge so that the petitioner could apply for relief to Somalia.

12 While DHS has the authority to designate a country of removal, “it must exercise that authority in an appropriate way.” Id. at 1009. It must comply with due process. Here, that means that if DHS seeks to remove Ghasedi to a third country, it must move to reopen Section 240 removal proceedings, and a hearing must be held before an immigration judge so that the petitioner can apply for relief as to the specific country of removal.

17 The government correctly points out, however, that Ghasedi requests an injunction—he asks the Court to enjoin Respondents from designating a third country for removal without opening removal proceedings and allowing for a CAT claim—but he does not show he is entitled to an injunction under the standard in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) the relief sought is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7 at 20. The movant must make a showing on each element of the Winter test. Ghasedi fails to provide any argumentation or briefing on the Winter test.

3 As discussed above, if third country removal should occur without the reopening of removal proceedings and an opportunity to present a fear-based claim, Ghasedi has shown a likelihood of success on that prospective claim. Such an act would be unconstitutional. And the balance of equities and the public interest, “merge[d] when the Government is a party,” favor Ghasedi because of the “public interest in preventing noncitizens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm.” Nguyen, 2025 9 WL 2419288, at *28.

10 Irreparable harm, however, is more speculative. The government claims it does not intend to remove Ghasedi to a third country. The Supreme Court in Winter cautioned that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. 7 at 22. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016). Ghasedi does make some showing as to irreparable harm (though he does not label it as such) by arguing that third country removal has become a common practice, the federal government “has aggressively acted to remove individuals to countries other than those designated for removal,” and that a number of noncitizens have been removed to third countries. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 52–59.

21 Should the government move forward with removal to a third country without reopening removal proceedings, disregarding the requirements of due process as laid out in Nguyen, 2025 23 WL 2419288, and the Ninth Circuit precedent upon which it relies, Ghasedi is free to move for injunctive relief at that point, demonstrating his entitlement to an injunction and the likelihood of irreparable harm. While the Court recognizes that the Nguyen court found irreparable harm and authorized injunctive relief as to third country removal even where the government promised not to remove the petitioner to a third country, the petitioner in that case offered ICE policy and the testimony of counsel for other similarly situated individuals in support of irreparable harm.

6 Nguyen, 2025 WL 2419288, at *26–27. At this point, given the parties’ failure to brief or analyze the Winter factors, and without a showing that irreparable harm is likely as to Ghasedi specifically, the Court declines to recommend entering hypothetical injunctive relief.

9 In the same language he uses to request an injunction, Ghasedi requests declaratory relief “that Respondents may not designate a third country for Petitioner’s removal without reopening Petitioner’s removal proceedings so that an Immigration Judge can make the designation in the first instance and adjudicate Petitioner’s application under the Convention Against Torture as to that county.” Dkt. 1 at 31–32. The Court recommends that declaratory relief be denied for the same reasons that injunctive relief should be denied.

15 III. Petitioner’s Other Claims 16 Ghasedi brings a claim that his detention violates the Administrative Procedure Act. Dkt.

17 1 at ¶¶ 89–93. The government argues that claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 6 at 5–6. Ghasedi also argues, for the first time in his response to the government, that ICE did not comply with its own regulations governing re-detention. Dkt. 8 at 6–7. The government has had no opportunity to respond, so this issue has not been fully briefed, though the Court notes that several courts have found that ICE’s recent wave of revocations of orders of supervision violated its own regulations and therefore violated due process, including with respect to noncitizens with final orders of removal. See, e.g., Villanueva-Herrera v. Tate, 4:25-cv-03364 (S.D. TX Sep. 26, 2025), Dkt. 14; Yang, 2025 WL 2791778; Sun v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-02198-JLS-JC, 2025 WL 2730235 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025).

3 Because the Court recommends granting relief based upon Ghasedi’s Zadvydas claim, which encompasses the relief connected to these claims, the Court declines to address these claims.

6 Ghasedi also argues that “due process prohibits Respondents from re-detaining [him] absent a hearing at which a neutral adjudicator could determine whether the government can prove by clear and convincing evidence that [his] release conditions should be modified.” Dkt. 1 at 101. He does not, however, pray for any relief in connection with this claim, or show entitlement to injunctive relief, and Respondents also do not address this request. The Court therefore declines to address Ghasedi’s argument.

12 CONCLUSION 13 The Court recommends that a writ of habeas corpus issue and that Ghasedi be released, conditioned on appropriate forms of supervised release.

15 OBJECTIONS AND APPEAL 16 This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order. Therefore, Petitioner should not file a notice of appeal seeking review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit until the assigned District Judge enters a judgment in the case.

19 Objections, however, may be filed and served upon all parties no later than December 15, 2025. The Clerk should note the matter for December 16, 2025, as ready for the District Judge’s consideration if no objection is filed. If objections are filed, any response is due within 14 days after being served with the objections. A party filing an objection must note the matter for the Court’s consideration 14 days from the date the objection is filed and served. The matter will then be ready for the Court’s consideration on the date the response is due. The failure to timely object may affect the right to appeal.

3 DATED this 1st day of December, 2025.

4 A BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA United States Magistrate Judge