Brittney C. Boyd v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 701, et al.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 BRITTNEY C. BOYD, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01225-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 12 v. COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 13 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 701, 14 et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. This Court has repeatedly warned Plaintiff 18 Brittney Boyd that if she continued to violate applicable law, the Court would impose sanctions 19 up to and including dismissal of her suit. Ms. Boyd nevertheless continued to file frivolous 20 submissions and violate applicable rules and this Court’s orders. Accordingly, the Court ordered 21 Ms. Boyd to show cause why her case should not be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. No. 68. Ms. 22 Boyd has failed to do so, and the Court therefore dismisses her claims with prejudice. 23 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 At the inception of this case in June 2025, Ms. Boyd filed over 1,100 pages of materials 3 with the Court: a 1,061-page complaint “consist[ing] of multiple embedded complaints, motions, 4 charts, declarations, exhibits and random other documents,” Dkt. No. 16 at 2–3 (citing Dkt. Nos. 5 13, 13-1, 13-2); an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. No. 2; an Emergency 6 Motion to Compel Disclosure, Dkt. No. 3; a Motion to Compel Disclosure, Unseal Gagged 7 Account, and Enforce Beneficiary Access Rights, Dkt. No. 9; and a Motion to Show Cause and 8 Forensic Audit, Dkt. No. 10. The Court denied the motions and dismissed the complaint, 9 cautioning Ms. Boyd that she was not permitted to (1) “submit multiple complaints, a[s] any 10 amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint”; (2) “file serial and duplicative motions 11 dedicated to the same subject matter”; (3) seek to amend a pleading, seek relief, or communicate 12 with the Court through an “exhibit packet”; (4) seek discovery from any source before the parties 13 have conferred as required by Rule 26(f). Dkt. No. 16 at 3–4. After providing links to the Federal 14 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Civil Rules, and the Western District of Washington’s guide 15 for pro se litigants, the Court warned Ms. Boyd that she “must ensure that her filings are 16 procedurally appropriate, or else they will continue to be dismissed, stricken, or denied, and the 17 Court may also impose sanctions.” Id. at 5 & n.2. 18 On August 28, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining 19 order (“TRO”) requesting that the Court “immediately enjoin Defendants from gagging or 20 withholding” her “ERISA plan benefits and Related accounts” as well as “compel the release of 21 all withheld accounts and assets,” Dkt. No. 21 at 1–2. The Court denied her motion, in part because 22 she did not certify “in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why [notice] should 23 not be required,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Dkt. No. 23 at 2 (quoting Fed. 24 R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B)). 1 On September 12, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a “Notice of Pro Se Leniency” to “remind the 2 Court that her filings must be construed liberally[.]” Dkt. No. 25-1 at 2. The Court struck this filing 3 as procedurally improper on September 25, and warned Ms. Boyd that because she had “already 4 submitted hundreds of pages of procedurally improper filings,” “the Court may summarily strike 5 procedurally improper filings going forward.” Dkt. No. 26 at 2 n.1. The Court also noted that “[it] 6 has already liberally construed—and continues to liberally construe—Ms. Boyd’s ‘inartful’ 7 submissions . . . and has directed her to resources to assist pro se litigants.” Id. 8 On October 22, 2025, the Court dismissed Ms. Boyd’s third amended complaint and gave 9 her leave to amend once more. Dkt. No. 43 at 7. In dismissing Ms. Boyd’s multiple proposed 10 amended complaints, the Court observed that, “[a]s with her prior pleadings, Ms. Boyd’s sprawling 11 filings are incomprehensible.” Id. at 2. 12 Once again, she has filed multiple documents that appear to comprise the Third Amended Complaint. First, she filed a “Second Amended Complaint” of roughly 13 nine pages. Dkt. No. 31 at 1–9 (capitalization removed). This was accompanied by an “index of exhibits and appendices” that are “referenced in Fourth Amended 14 Complaint.” Dkt. No. 31-2 at 1 (some capitalization removed). These “exhibits and appendices” proceed in a nonsensical manner: for example, exhibit 1 is 15 followed by exhibits S, 9, 22, F4, JJ, “App. 17,” and so on. Dkt. No. 31-2 at 1– 2. Two hundred eighty-nine pages of exhibits and appendices are “attached” to 16 this version of her complaint. Dkt. No. 35 at 1; Dkt. Nos. 35-1–35-12. Many of these are unlabeled and nonsensical. For example, roughly half of the 289 pages 17 appear to be undecipherable spreadsheet entries. Dkt. Nos. 35-1–35-7. Many other exhibits duplicate those filed in connection with another amended 18 complaint—described below—and appear to attempt to supplement her amended complaint. Compare Dkt. Nos. 35-8–35-12 with Dkt. Nos. 34-1–34- 19 14. 20 Ms. Boyd filed another amended complaint at docket entry 32 the same day. Confusingly, this document begins with a “motion to file fourth amended 21 complaint under seal,” and explains that the “THIRD Amended Complaint details a purported ‘Federal Criminal Enterprise (RICO)’ operated through the 22 International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) network.” Dkt. No. 32 at 1 (some capitalization removed). This additional complaint seeks “criminal 23 referral” under a litany of criminal statutes, among other relief duplicating that sought in her accompanying complaint. Dkt. No. 32-1 at 9–10. Ms. Boyd filed 24 over 156 pages of exhibits to this additional complaint, many of which appear to 1 be an attempt to supplement her complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 34-4 at 1–4 (legal argument styled as a “declaration” of Ms. Boyd); id. at 5–6 (same); id. at 20–21 2 (“continuance declaration” from Ms. Boyd); Dkt. No. 34-7 (“Cold Blood and Steel” declaration from Ms. Boyd). Many exhibits are unlabeled (in violation of 3 applicable law regarding the format of exhibits) and untethered to any argument in the complaint (indeed, it is impossible to tell what unlabeled exhibits relate 4 to). See, e.g., Dkt. No. 34-4 at 7–8, 11, 15; Dkt. No. 34-5 at 1–13; Dkt. No. 34- 6 at 1–9. 5 Id. at 2–3 (footnotes omitted). Relatedly, the Court noted that in Ms. Boyd’s motion for 6 appointment of counsel and for service of process by a U.S. Marshal, she had again “improperly 7 attempt[ed] to supplement th[e] motion with three separate filings submitted eight days after her 8 initial motion.” Dkt. No. 43 at 1 n.2 (citing Dkt. No. 40 “Revised Supplement in Support of Motion 9 for Appointment of Counsel”; Dkt. No. 41 “Notice of Factual Update: Geographical Risk and 10 Counsel Justification” (capitalization altered); Dkt. No. 42 “Notice of Supplemental Authority and 11 Motion to Expedite Ruling on Appointment of Counsel” (capitalization altered), which included 12 roughly 85 pages of exhibits). The Court observed that “[t]his flurry of filings continues a 13 monthslong pattern of serial motions and other frivolous submissions from Ms. Boyd,” despite the 14 Court providing her with links to applicable rules and to the pro se guide—and despite prior 15 cautions from the Court “that filings like these ‘violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 16 other applicable law in a number of ways,’” and that Ms. Boyd “is not permitted to submit multiple 17 complaints[.]” Id. at 3 (citation modified). 18 After concluding that “[i]t is apparent from Ms. Boyd’s filings that she did not consult the 19 applicable rules or the guide, and she did not heed the Court’s order,” the Court again reminded 20 her that “pro se litigants are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants,” again 21 provided links to the federal and local rules and the pro se guide, and warned that “[f]ailure to 22 comply with applicable laws, rules, or orders may result in sanctions up to and including 23 revocation of e-filing privileges and dismissal of the case altogether.” Id. at 3, 7. The Court 24 1 permitted Ms. Boyd to file no more than “one singular amended complaint, which will supersede 2 all previous complaints.” Id. at 6. 3 On November 1, Ms. Boyd filed a fourth amended complaint, followed by a motion for 4 service by a U.S. Marshal on November 10, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 44, 47. On November 19, 2025, Ms. 5 Boyd filed a “Notice of Pending Motion and Request for Expedited Briefing” asking the Court to 6 issue an “expedited ruling” on her motion for service by a U.S. Marshal. Dkt. No. 49 at 1 7 (capitalization altered). Later that same day, this Court struck the notice as procedurally improper 8 and informed Ms. Boyd that “the Court was aware of Plaintiff’s pending motion and addressed it 9 in due time.” Dkt. No. 51.1 10 On December 7, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a declaration and over 150 pages of attached 11 motions and exhibits to “demonstrate a systemic RICO enterprise, fiduciary corruption, and 12 collusive litigation tactics by the Defendants.” Dkt. No. 57 at 1; see also Dkt. Nos. 57-1–57-11. 13 The Court struck these filings as procedurally improper on December 8, 2025, Dkt. No. 61, writing: 14 The Court has already ruled on [docket entries] 31, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40—the motions to which [Ms. Boyd’s declaration] refers. The declaration and its 15 supporting exhibits are therefore procedurally improper fugitive documents and must be stricken. The Court has reminded Plaintiff repeatedly that “pro se plaintiffs 16 . . . are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants,” Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022); see, e.g., Dkt. No. 16 at 5 17 (reminding plaintiff of procedural requirements); Dkt. No. 26 at 2 n.1 (same); Dkt. No. 43 at 7 (same). If Plaintiff continues to violate applicable rules, the Court will 18 impose sanctions up to and including dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 5354 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding failure of pro se 19 litigant to follow procedural rules justified dismissal of civil rights action). 20 Id. 21 Despite the Court’s prior orders (1) limiting Ms. Boyd to filing one singular amended 22 complaint, (2) informing her that she may not amend her complaint in a piecemeal fashion, and 23 1 The Court accepted the fourth amended complaint and ordered that “[s]ummons may now issue, and Ms. Boyd is 24 permitted to file appropriate motions and other filings in accordance with applicable law.” Dkt. No. 45. 1 (3) warning her that further frivolous submissions may result in the dismissal of her complaint, on 2 December 12, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a document titled “Notice of Supplemental Authority.” Dkt. 3 No. 63. This notice effectively sought to amend her complaint with “new factual developments 4 that ha[d] occurred since the Court’s November 1, 2025 order accepting the Fourth Amended 5 Complaint”; specifically, “investigations into the systematic pension fraud affecting the IUOE 6 pension system, including the entities named as defendants in this action.” Id. at 1–2. However, 7 these “investigations” were really Ms. Boyd sending emails, reports, and other submissions to 8 federal agencies. Id. at 2–4. In her notice, Ms. Boyd misrepresented to the Court that “five federal 9 agencies have independently determined the alleged conduct warrants investigation[.]” Id. at 5. 10 Despite the Court’s prior dismissal of her criminal RICO claims with prejudice, Dkt. No. 43 at 6, 11 Ms. Boyd attempted to resuscitate these claims in the notice. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 63 at 10–11; see 12 also Dkt. No. 64-4 at 18 (“Criminal enterprise scope: pattern sufficient for RICO[-]style referral”). 13 According to Ms. Boyd, the notifications—which “directly bear on . . . the scope of the alleged 14 ERISA violations, and the coordinated nature of Defendants’ conduct,” were “properly presented 15 as supplemental authority pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(h)” and “under [her] duty of candor to 16 the tribunal.” Id. at 2, 13. On December 17, 2025, the Court struck the notice because it constituted 17 an improper attempt to revive RICO claims that the Court had previously dismissed with prejudice 18 and because it was “factually frivolous within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 19 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Dkt. No. 68 at 6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); 20 see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is 21 appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]”)). 22 The Court further explained that “[t]here is no applicable Local Civil Rule 7(h); Local Civil Rule 23 7(n) permits supplemental authority in support of a motion, but Ms. Boyd’s filing does not relate 24 1 to any motion, and as the Court has repeatedly explained to her, she may not supplement her 2 complaint or otherwise attempt to communicate with the Court in this manner.” Dkt. No. 68 at 6 3 Despite the Court’s earlier warnings to Ms. Boyd that she may not seek discovery from 4 any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), and that Local Civil Rule 5 37(a)(1) requires any motion to compel to contain a certification that the moving party has met 6 and conferred with the party allegedly failing to make any disclosure, Dkt. No. 16 at 4, on 7 December 14, 2025, before any Rule 26(f) conference took place and without certifying that she 8 met and conferred with any Defendant, Ms. Boyd filed an “Emergency Motion to Compel,” 9 consisting of a two-page motion and over 50 pages of “exhibits.” Dkt. Nos. 64, 64-1–64-5 10 (capitalization altered). In her motion, she requested that the Court compel “immediate and full 11 production of all outstanding ERISA-mandated plan documents” because the “continuous refusal 12 to disclose these documents constitutes willful obstruction of a federal investigation and is a direct 13 continuation of a six-year fraudulent concealment scheme.” Dkt. No. 64 at 1 (emphasis omitted). 14 She also asked for “in camera review” of “Plaintiff’s recorded evidence,” which is a “‘Gag Order’ 15 Transcript/Audio” that she drafted. Id. at 1; Dkt. No. 64-4 at 3–6 (titled “Exhibit TT-3A” by Ms. 16 Boyd). Other exhibits were similarly self-authored or random and nonsensical. See generally Dkt. 17 Nos. 64-1–64-5. In its December 17, 2025 order, the Court denied the motion because it “violate[d] 18 Local Civil Rule 37, disregard[ed] the Court’s prior order informing Ms. Boyd of that rule’s 19 requirements, and [wa]s frivolous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” 20 Dkt. No. 68 at 7. 21 Despite the Court’s prior order denying Ms. Boyd’s earlier motion for a TRO in part due 22 to her failure to comply with Rule 65’s notice provisions, Dkt. No. 23 at 2, on December 16, 2025, 23 Ms. Boyd filed another motion for a TRO that failed to describe any efforts made to give notice to 24 Defendants or give reasons why such notice should not be required. See generally Dkt. No. 66; 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). The motion sought to “bind” Defendants “from transferring, 2 liquidating, or disposing of” various assets. Dkt. No. 66 at 1–2. Ms. Boyd based her request on the 3 potential for “immediate and irreparable” injury due to Defendants’ (1) ability to secret away or 4 move the subject funds, (2) “regulatory dark period exploitation,” and (3) “active, coordinated 5 obstruction of justice” for their “failure to produce required discovery documents for over 2,425 6 days.” Id. at 1 (citation modified). In its December 17, 2025 order, the Court denied the motion 7 because it “violate[d] Rule 65, disregard[ed] the Court’s prior orders regarding that rule and 8 regarding how discovery works, and [wa]s frivolous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Dkt. No. 68 at 7. 10 The Court noted in its December 17 order that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 11 permits the Court to sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff’s case when she fails to comply with court 12 orders.” Id. at 8 (citing Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th 13 Cir. 2005)). The Court ordered Ms. Boyd to “show cause within 21 days why the Court should not 14 dismiss her case with prejudice,” and directed that her response “conform to the word limits of 15 Local Civil Rule 7(e)(3), contain a word count certification, and be formatted in accordance with 16 Local Civil Rule 10(e).” Id. at 9 (capitalization altered).2 17 2 Within eight hours of the Court posting its order, Ms. Boyd filed a “Notice of Filing Investigative Disclosure 18 Regarding Judicial Obstruction and Conflict of Interest.” Dkt. No. 69 (capitalization altered). The filing was accompanied by a 20-page document addressed to the U.S. Marshal’s Service and titled “Recusal Request for Judge 19 Lauren King,” Dkt. No. 69-2 (capitalization altered), and an eight-page document titled “Judge Lauren King – Pattern of Obstruction,” Dkt. No. 69-3 (capitalization altered). Ms. Boyd contended that the undersigned judge “dismissed a 20 fully documented $56 trillion fraud case on hyper-technical procedural grounds without considering merits,” “created impossible procedural traps designed to prevent case from proceeding,” “manipulated the court docket (CM/ECF system) to prevent proper service of defendants,” “threatened sanctions to chill plaintiff’s legitimate claims,” 21 “demonstrated coordination with defendants through suspicious timing and denial of due process,” and “added defendants to the case without plaintiff’s authorization, creating service confusion.” Dkt. No. 69-2 at 2 (capitalization 22 altered). According to Ms. Boyd, these actions constituted “a pattern of conduct that violates 28 U.S.C. § 455 (judicial disqualification).” Id. Ms. Boyd also alleged that the undersigned judge had a conflict in this case because her former employer, Foster Garvey P.C, “is inextricably linked to the Defendants in this action.” Dkt. No. 69 at 1. 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, the Court determined that “Ms. Boyd’s assertions [we]re unsupported factually and legally,” and noted that “[a] judge is not disqualified by a litigant’s suit or threatened suit against him [in the 24 1 On December 17, 2025, along with her motion for recusal, Ms. Boyd filed a one-page 2 “Sworn Statement of Good Cause in Response to Order to Show Cause.” Dkt. No. 69-1. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 “Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to 5 preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of 6 other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil 7 Procedure 41(b) permits the Court to sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff’s case when she fails to comply 8 with court orders. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 9 2005). Dismissal is likewise available as a sanction pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to 10 control its docket. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 11 1986) (per curiam); accord Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (a “primary 12 aspect” of the district court’s inherent authority “is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction 13 for conduct which abuses the judicial process,” including “outright dismissal of a lawsuit”). 14 A district court must weigh five factors in deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to 15 comply with a court order: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 16 court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 17 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” In 18 re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006); accord 19 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987); see also id. (“[I]t is preferred [but] 20 not required that the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has considered 21 22 context of] a litigant’s intemperate and scurrilous attacks[.]” Dkt. No. 74 at 3 (quoting United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 958 (9th Cir. 2007)). As such, the Court found “no basis to find that the undersigned judge’s impartiality 23 might reasonably be questioned or to find that there is an appearance of bias in this case,” and denied the request for recusal. Id. at 4. In accordance with Local Civil Rule 3(f), the Court then referred Ms. Boyd’s motion to Chief Judge Estudillo, who affirmed the denial of recusal, finding “no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to question 24 Judge King’s impartiality.” Dkt. No. 76 at 4. 1 these factors[.]” (citation omitted)). “[W]here a court order is violated, factors 1 and 2 support 2 sanctions and 4 cuts against case-dispositive sanctions, so 3 and 5, prejudice and availability of 3 less drastic sanctions, are decisive.” Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 4 (9th Cir. 1998). “[F]actor 5 involves consideration of three subparts: whether the court explicitly 5 discussed alternative sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the recalcitrant party 6 about the possibility of dismissal.” Id. However, “it is not always necessary for the court to impose 7 less serious sanctions first.” Id. The factors are “a way for a district judge to think about what to 8 do, not a series of conditions precedent before the judge can do anything,” id., and the decision to 9 dismiss under Rule 41(b) is ultimately “committed to the discretion of [the] district judge,” Smith 10 v. Legacy Partners, Inc., No. 2:21- CV-00629-JHC, 2022 WL 2135369, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 11 14, 2022). 12 The present case involves numerous violated court orders and, as Valley Engineers lays 13 out, three of the factors require little analysis. The first two factors—the public’s interest in 14 expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket—favor dismissal. 15 Ms. Boyd’s contumacious filings “preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to 16 consider the meritorious claims of other litigants,” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148, and “[i]t is 17 incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance 18 of litigants,” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Farson v. City of 19 Lake Stevens, No. 22-CV-00405-LK, 2023 WL 2913754, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2023) 20 (noting that a plaintiff’s “repeated disobedience in the face of multiple warnings evinces a strong 21 likelihood that he will continue to flout the Court’s directives and cause delays,” and finding that 22 the first factor weighed in favor of dismissal where “[n]othing suggests that [the plaintiff] intends 23 to constructively participate in this litigation, let alone abide by the Court’s orders and applicable 24 law in working towards an expeditious resolution of the case”). The fourth factor—the public 1 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—“cuts against” dismissal with prejudice, as it 2 is a case-dispositive sanction. Valley Eng’rs Inc., 158 F.3d at 1057. 3 As to the third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendants, “[a] defendant suffers prejudice 4 if the plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the 5 rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 Defendants in this case have to date had relatively little involvement. However, as discussed above, 7 Ms. Boyd has repeatedly filed premature and frivolous motions to compel and other filings seeking 8 to revive claims against the Defendants that the Court dismissed with prejudice. Nothing suggests 9 that Ms. Boyd intends to stop this behavior and abide by the Court’s orders and applicable law, 10 and her continued intransigence would impair the Defendants’ ability to proceed to trial and would 11 threaten to interfere with the expedient and rightful decision of the case. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 12 642. The Court therefore finds that the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 13 With respect to the availability of less drastic sanctions, Ms. Boyd is proceeding pro se, so 14 the Court lacks the ability to refer her to the bar for sanctions as would be possible for an attorney. 15 Similarly, Ms. Boyd is proceeding in forma pauperis, meaning any monetary sanctions would 16 likely be meaningless. Revoking Ms. Boyd’s e-filing privileges is an option, see Dkt. No. 43 at 7, 17 but simply requiring her to file paper motions does not make it more likely that she will abide by 18 Court orders or comply with applicable law. In sum, the Court lacks viable and adequate 19 alternatives to dismissal. The Court has warned Ms. Boyd repeatedly that her behavior could lead 20 to dismissal of her complaint. See Dkt. No. 16 at 3–5 & n.2; Dkt. No. 43 at 3, 7; Dkt. No. 61; Dkt. 21 No. 68 at 9. But the Court’s warnings have had no effect on Ms. Boyd’s behavior. The Court 22 therefore finds that the fifth factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 23 Ms. Boyd’s response to this Court’s order to show cause, Dkt. No. 69-1 (“Plaintiff’s Sworn 24 Statement of Good Cause in Response to Order to Show Cause”), is a microcosm of all the issues 1 discussed above, and reinforces the Court’s view that dismissal is warranted. Most importantly, 2 Ms. Boyd does not acknowledge her violations of this Court’s orders. Compare Dkt. No 69-1 with 3 Dkt. No. 68. And while Ms. Boyd herself quotes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as requiring 4 that complaints contain a “short and plain” statement of the claim, she accuses the Court of 5 “evidentiary suppression” for dismissing her third amended complaint because it included 6 hundreds of pages of purported evidence. Dkt. No. 69-1 at 1. She also fails to mention that the 7 Court allowed her to amend that complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 44–45. As the Court previously 8 explained, “[a]t a bare minimum, Rule 8(a) mandates that a plaintiff ‘give the defendant fair notice 9 of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” Dkt. No. 43 at 4 (quoting Bell Atl. 10 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and “[n]either defendants nor the Court are obligated 11 to search through hundreds of pages in order to determine what allegations she is attempting to 12 make; the burden of providing a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 13 entitled to relief” falls squarely on plaintiff,” id. (citation modified). 14 Furthermore, just as Ms. Boyd previously mischaracterized her submissions to federal 15 agencies as “investigations into the systematic pension fraud affecting the IUOE pension system, 16 including defendants named in this action,” Dkt. No. 63 at 1–4, and misrepresented to the Court 17 that “five federal agencies have independently determined the alleged conduct warrants 18 investigation,” id. at 4–5, she now asserts that the undersigned Judge has a conflict which is “now 19 a matter of formal investigation by the DOJ Public Integrity Section,” Dkt. No. 69-1 at 1. Ms. 20 Boyd appears to base that statement on the mere fact that she “caused . . . the Notice of Filing 21 Investigative Disclosure, the Motion for Recusal, and all associated Exhibits to be prepared for 22 service upon [DOJ] via Certified Mail[.]” Dkt. No. 69-4 at 1. This unsupported assertion only 23 reinforces the Court’s finding that Ms. Boyd does not intend to cease her frivolous filings. 24 1 Ms. Boyd also makes several irrelevant arguments against dismissal, including (1) that 2 “dismissal on January 8 would occur before [some] Defendants have even filed a substantive 3 response[,]” and (2) that Defendants are playing a “shell game” regarding the proper address for 4 service and “the duty to resolve these address discrepancies for an IFP litigant lies with the U.S. 5 Marshal, not the Plaintiff.” Id Ms. Boyd concludes her response by stating she “has shown 6 ‘automatic good cause’ for an extension.” Dkt. No. 69-1. The Court did not base its order to show 7 cause on any issues with respect to service, and the Defendants’ substantive responses are 8 irrelevant to the matter at hand. Finally, Ms. Boyd’s response does not contain a word count 9 certification and is not formatted in accordance with Local Civil Rule 10(e), as the Court 10 previously ordered. Dkt. No. 68 at 9. 11 On January 9, 2026, Ms. Boyd filed a second, untimely, unauthorized, 17-page “Response 12 to Order to Show Cause,” accompanied by a declaration and over 400 pages of exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 13 79, 80, 80-1–80-21. Because the response is unauthorized and untimely, the Court does not 14 consider it.3 To the extent this response could be considered a motion for reconsideration of the 15 Court’s order denying Ms. Boyd’s request for recusal, it is untimely and the Court therefore does 16 not consider it. LCR 7(h)(2). 17 3 Even if the Court were to consider this response, it would not change the result. As with the first response, the second 18 response makes no attempt to address the Court’s concerns regarding Ms. Boyd’s repeated violations of Court orders and applicable rules governing civil litigation, and instead perpetuates her contumacious behavior: she filed two 19 responses when the Court allowed her one, did not abide by the Court’s order requiring her response to “conform to the word limits of Local Civil Rule 7(e)(3), contain a word count certification, and be formatted in accordance with Local Civil Rule 10(e),” Dkt. No. 68 at 9, and again ignores the Court’s prior order dismissing her RICO claims and 20 her requests to assert violations of criminal statutes, see Dkt. No. 79 at 15 (“RICO enterprise affecting 400,000+ workers”); Dkt. No. 80 at 11 (asserting that “[t]his case presents substantial questions of federal law involving . . . 21 securities fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, RICO violations, and identity theft affecting thousands of workers and billions of dollars in pension assets.”); see also Dkt. No. 43 at 2–3, 6. In addition, Ms. Boyd again makes misrepresentations to the Court, stating that “five federal investigations are active” and that “Form 5500 records prove 22 Foster Pepper represented IUOE during Judge King’s tenure.” Dkt. No. 79 at 16. As the Court previously stated, “to the extent any of the undersigned judge’s former colleagues represented any parties to this action, no such 23 representation occurred in the same or a related matter during the time the undersigned was associated with the firm.” Dkt. No. 74 at 3 n.2. Furthermore, a search of the Form 5500 records for IUOE Local 701’s plan for the years that the 24 undersigned was employed at Foster Garvey (2012 to 2021) reveals no relationship with Foster Garvey. See generally https://www.efast.dol.gov/5500Search/. 1 The Court finds that Ms. Boyd has not shown good cause why her suit should not be 2 dismissed with prejudice, and that the five Phenylpropanolamine factors favor dismissal with 3 prejudice. 4 III. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Ms. Boyd’s suit with prejudice. 6 Dated this 9th day of January, 2026. 7 A 8 Lauren King United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24