Ryan Scott Adams v. State of Washington

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA RYAN SCOTT ADAMS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05659-BHS- Petitioner, DWC 12 v. ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF 13 STATE OF WASHINGTON, RECUSAL (DKT. NO. 39) 14 Respondent.

16 This matter comes before the Court on the Honorable Magistrate Judge David W.

17 Christel’s denial (Dkt. No. 39) of Petitioner’s motion for recusal (Dkt. No. 34). Local Civil Rule 3(f) provides that whenever a judge in this District declines to voluntarily recuse themself from a case following a party’s motion to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455, they “will direct the clerk to refer the motion to the chief judge.” Accordingly, this Court now review Judge Christel’s decision not to recuse.

22 Motions for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Recusal is required if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if the judge harbors personal bias or prejudice against a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Such bias or prejudice must derive from an extrajudicial source. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge”); Agha-Khan v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2022 WL 501564, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984). Under both 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is appropriate if “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

9 Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993). This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance of bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1992).

12 Petitioner identifies three bases for his recusal motion: first, that Judge Christel showed a “predispos[ition] to dismiss” Petitioner’s petition because Judge Christel informed Petitioner about his right to move for reconsideration; second, that Judge Christel violated his due process rights by limiting his access to discovery; and third, that Judge Christel previously ruled against him in a separate case. (Dkt. No. 34 at 2.)1 17 Petitioner’s first argument appears to stem from a miscommunication between Petitioner and Judge Christel: Petitioner may have interpreted Judge Christel’s statement that Petitioner could move for reconsideration to be a statement about Petitioner’s case. But this Court finds Judge Christel’s explanation of his statement, that it was about “the Court’s decision on the motions for extension, not the case” to be the clear meaning of Judge Christel’s order. (Dkt. No. Petitioner also filed a “supplement” to his motion for recusal. (Dkt. No. 35.) This supplement is best construed as a motion for reconsideration; it identifies no facts in support of Petitioner’s motion for recusal.

1 39 at 3.) This Court finds nothing in Judge Christel’s language indicates his impartiality may reasonably be questioned. And Petitioner’s second and third claims are only disagreements with the judge’s rulings and do not serve as a proper basis for recusal. See Downs v. California Atty.

4 Gen., 639 F. App’x 435, 436 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court did not err in denying disqualification of magistrate judge, because “disagreement with the magistrate judge's rulings does not provide a basis for recusal”).

7 The Court finds Petitioner provides no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to question Judge Christel’s impartiality. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS Judge Christel’s denial (Dkt. No. 39) of Plaintiffs’ motion for recusal (Dkt. No. 34).

11 Dated this 21st day of January, 2026. a David G. Estudillo 14 United States District Judge