Johnny McMurry, Jr. v. Neiders Company LLC

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 JOHNNY MCMURRY, JR. , CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00824-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO v. DISMISS 10 NEIDERS COMPANY LLC, 11 Defendant. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Johnny McMurry sues his former employer, Neiders Company, LLC, 15 alleging race and disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, hostile work 16 environment, retaliation, and conspiracy. McMurry, who is Black and has PTSD 17 and anxiety, worked as a Front Desk Agent at a Seattle hotel for 84 days before 18 Neiders terminated his employment. This is McMurry’s fifth complaint. Despite 19 multiple opportunities to amend, most of his claims remain insufficiently pleaded. 20 The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Neiders’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 21 No. 45. 22 23 1 2. BACKGROUND 2 2.1 Factual background. McMurry sues Neiders for racial and disability discrimination, failure to 3 accommodate his disability, retaliation, hostile-work environment, and conspiracy 4 to discriminate. See Dkt. No. 44. He alleges the following facts in his Fifth Amended 5 Complaint (“5AC”), which the court assumes are true at the pleading stage of the 6 case.1 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 195 (2024). 7 McMurry is a Black man with “post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 8 severe anxiety.” Dkt. No. 44 at 2, 4; see also Dkt. No. 46 at 2. On March 29, 2024, 9 Neiders hired McMurry as a Front Desk Agent at the Curben Hotel in Seattle, 10 Washington. Dkt. No. 44 at 2. McMurry alleges that Neiders represented that “he 11 would be promoted to Community Manager once he completed training and 12 probation.” Id. 13 A month into the job, on April 29, 2024, McMurry submitted a “Medical 14 Inquiry Form” to Neiders requesting “two reasonable accommodations: (a) flexibility 15 to work remotely during periods when anxiety symptoms became severe; and (b) 16 permission to have his support animal (dog) present at work as needed.” Id. 17 According to McMurry, Neiders “acknowledged receipt of this documentation but 18 19 20 1 The 5AC references numerous exhibits, but they do not appear in the record. See Dkt. No. 44 at 8–9 (table listing exhibit filenames). To the extent McMurry intended 21 to incorporate exhibits attached to earlier complaints that were struck from the docket, Local Civil Rule 15(a) prohibits a proposed amended pleading from 22 “incorporat[ing] by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits.” (emphasis added). See also Dkt. No. 38 at 2 (noting concern that McMurry may have 23 modified an exhibit attached to earlier filings). 1 failed to act upon it in good faith.” Id. Instead, McMurry alleges, “management, 2 including Ms. Sedgemore, questioned the legitimacy of Plaintiff's disability and 3 demanded additional documentation already provided.” Id. McMurry alleges that 4 after disclosing his disability, his “work environment deteriorated rapidly” and 5 “[m]anagement began to monitor Plaintiff's attendance more closely, call him 6 during approved sick leave, and question his commitment to the job.” Id. He further 7 alleges that “Ms. Sedgemore made disparaging comments implying Plaintiff was 8 ‘playing sick’ or ‘using excuses.’” Id. 9 On May 30, 2024, McMurry “submitted a formal complaint to Human 10 Resources alleging harassment, discrimination, and failure to accommodate.” Id. at 11 3. McMurry contends that Neiders “opened a superficial ‘internal investigation’ that 12 relied primarily on statements from the accused supervisors while ignoring 13 corroborating witnesses.” Id. He alleges that Neiders then “intensified retaliation,” 14 that his “requests for PTO were denied,” and that his “workload increased.” Id. 15 On June 13, 2024, McMurry “filed a second internal complaint describing 16 escalating retaliation and loss of promotion opportunities.” Id. He alleges that he 17 “was denied the promised promotion” and that “a less qualified employee without a 18 disability was selected instead.” Id. McMurry also alleges that he “reported racially 19 insensitive remarks by coworker Steve, but no corrective action was taken.” Id. 20 The next day, on June 14, 2024, McMurry “informed Defendant he was 21 taking medical leave due to worsening symptoms caused by workplace stress” and 22 “contacted the EEOC.” Id. 23 1 On June 20, 2024, “one day after EEOC contact,” McMurry “received a 2 termination notice citing vague ‘policy violations.’” Id. McMurry alleges that 3 Neiders “never identified any specific violation and failed to follow progressive 4 discipline policies.” Id. The 5AC also contends the stated reason for termination was 5 “communicat[ing] with a resident’s mother concerning rent issues.” Id. at 4. 6 McMurry alleges that he contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity 7 Commission (EEOC), however it is unclear from the complaint what this contact 8 entailed. On June 21, 2024, Neiders terminated McMurry for internal company 9 policy violations, specifically for communicating with a resident’s mother concerning 10 rent issues. Dkt. No. 44 at 4. In all, McMurry’s employment with Neiders lasted 84 11 days. 12 2.2 Procedural background. 13 McMurry filed his original complaint on May 9, 2025. On July 30, 2025, 14 McMurry filed an amended complaint. Neiders moved to dismiss, and on August 14, 15 2025, the Honorable John C. Coughenour granted the motion, dismissing 16 McMurry’s equal protection claim and granting McMurry leave to amend the 17 complaint on his remaining claims for “disparate treatment, failure to 18 accommodate, hostile workplace, and retaliation[.]” See Dkt. No. 24 at 7. 19 On August 15, 2025, McMurry filed a Notice of Filing Amended Complaint, 20 indicating that he intended to rely on his previously filed amended complaint. On 21 September 3 and September 9, 2025, McMurry filed his second and third amended 22 complaints. On September 26, 2025, Judge Coughenour struck these amended 23 1 complaints because McMurry had exceeded the scope of leave afforded by the court. 2 Dkt. No. 38 at 2. In doing so, Judge Coughenour reminded McMurry that leave to 3 amend was granted “with limitations,” and that further amendment “was limited to 4 pleading additional facts and/or allegations in support of Plaintiff's Title VII and 5 ADA ‘disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, hostile workplace, and 6 retaliation claims.’” Dkt. No. 38 at 2 (emphasis in original). Judge Coughenour 7 further noted that McMurry had “added newly asserted claims (including those 8 brought under state law, which the Court may decline to exercise supplemental 9 jurisdiction on if the federal claims remain inadequately pleaded).” Id. 10 Nevertheless, Judge Coughenour afforded McMurry “one final opportunity to file an 11 amended complaint” limited to the leave provided in the Court’s prior order. Id. at 12 2. 13 On October 17, 2025, McMurry filed his fourth amended complaint, followed 14 by the 5AC, on October 20, 2025. Notwithstanding the Court's prior admonitions, 15 McMurry's fifth amended complaint reasserts all previously raised federal claims 16 and adds four new causes of action: (1) racial discrimination under the Washington 17 Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”); (2) disability discrimination under the 18 WLAD; (3) retaliation under the WLAD; and (4) conspiracy to discriminate under 42 19 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Dkt. No. 44 at 4-6. 20 On October 31, 2025, Neiders filed this motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 45. 21 McMurry filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 46, and Neiders filed a reply, Dkt. No 48. 22 McMurry also filed a surreply without leave of court. Dkt. No. 49. Though surreplies 23 1 are generally disfavored and this one was filed without permission, the Court will 2 considered it. 3 Finally, the Court notes that McMurry and Neiders have numerous pending 4 motions before the Court. The Court will rule on those motions in a separate order. 5 3. DISCUSSION 6 3.1 Legal standards. 7 McMurry proceeds in forma pauperis. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss 8 this action if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 9 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Neiders has also moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 10 Procedure 12(b)(6). The standard is the same either way: the Court must consider 11 whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Watison v. Carter, 668 12 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations in a complaint, but “it 14 demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 15 accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “must contain 16 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 17 on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 18 claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 19 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 20 alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides only 21 “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 22 action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 23 1 A pro se complaint must be “liberally construed,” even if it is “inartfully 2 pleaded,” and “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 3 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). 4 Courts generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 5 unless “‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 6 cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 7 (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 8 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam))). But even so, the 9 duties imposed on the Court by Section 1915 are unwavering, and when an IFP 10 plaintiff fails to state a claim, the action must be dismissed. 11 3.2 The Court will consider all claims despite McMurry’s repeated violations of the scope of leave to amend. 12 Neiders argues that the 5AC should be dismissed because it exceeds the 13 bounds of the Judge Coughenour’s orders granting leave to amend with limitations. 14 In two previous orders, Judge Coughenour instructed McMurry that amendment 15 “was limited to pleading additional facts and/or allegations in support of Plaintiff’s 16 Title VII and ADA ‘disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, hostile workplace, 17 and retaliation claims.’” Dkt. Nos. 24, 38. McMurry violated these orders by adding 18 new claims under the WLAD and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Court is troubled by 19 McMurry’s repeated disregard for the boundaries Judge Coughenour established. 20 However, this case will not be decided solely on procedural missteps. Because 21 McMurry is proceeding pro se, and because his new claims mostly reference the 22 state-law analogue to his already asserted federal claims, the Court will consider all 23 1 claims asserted in the 5AC and whether McMurry has plausibly shown that he is 2 entitled to relief. 3 3.3 McMurry fails to identify a similarly situated comparator to support his disparate treatment claims. 4 McMurry’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 5 the WLAD fail for lack of sufficient factual allegations. To establish a prima facie 6 case of disparate treatment, McMurry must plead that “[1] he is a member of a 7 protected class; [2] he was qualified for his position; [3] he experienced an adverse 8 employment action; and [4] similarly situated individuals outside his protected class 9 were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse 10 employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Berry v. Dep't of Soc. 11 Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 656 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 12 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)); Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas 13 Cnty., 404 P.3d 464, 473–74 (2017) (same elements establish a prima facie case 14 under the WLAD). To satisfy the fourth element through a comparator, the 15 individual seeking relief must demonstrate that they are similarly situated to those 16 employees “in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 17 2006); see also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) 18 (“individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar 19 conduct”). 20 McMurry alleges that his Regional Manager Misty Rowell and Property 21 Supervisor Chelsey Sedgemore were treated more favorably than he was. But 22 “[e]mployees in supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be similarly 23 1 situated to lower level employees.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. Throughout his 2 complaint, McMurry refers to Rowell and Sedgemore as holding supervisory and 3 management positions and acting as “agents of Defendant.” Dkt. No. 44 at 2–3. 4 Because McMurry’s proposed comparators held different job positions than he did— 5 indeed, they were his supervisors—they are not considered similarly situated to 6 McMurry “in all material respects.” Moran, 447 F.3d at 755. 7 McMurry also references a “less qualified employee without a disability” who 8 was selected for the promotion he was denied. Dkt. No. 44 at 3. But this allegation 9 is entirely conclusory. McMurry does not identify who this employee was, what 10 position that employee held, what qualifications that employee had (or lacked), or 11 any other facts that would allow the Court to assess whether that employee was 12 actually similarly situated to McMurry or was in fact less qualified. These “labels 13 and conclusions” aren’t enough to satisfy the plausibility inquiry. See Iqbal, 556 14 U.S. at 678. 15 Accordingly, the Court dismisses McMurry’s disparate treatment claims. 16 3.4 McMurry fails to show his requested accommodations were reasonable. 17 McMurry’s failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and the WLAD also 18 fail for want of sufficient factual allegations. To state a failure-to-accommodate 19 claim, McMurry must plead that “(1) []he is disabled; (2) []he is qualified for the job 20 in question and capable of performing it with reasonable accommodation; (3) 21 [Neiders] had notice of [his] disability; and (4) [Neiders] failed to reasonably 22 accommodate [his] disability.” Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428, 433 (9th 23 1 Cir. 2018); Hines v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 112 P.3d 522, 530 (Wash. Ct. App. 2 2005). If a person with a disability cannot perform a job's essential functions, even 3 with a reasonable accommodation, then the ADA's employment protections do not 4 apply. Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2001). . 5 Judge Coughenour previously identified the deficiency in McMurry’s failure 6 to accommodate claim: it “remain[ed] unclear from the complaint what his job 7 responsibilities were” such that the Court could not “assess whether Plaintiff would 8 be able to do his job remotely because he does not allege what his job was.” Dkt. No. 9 24 at 5. Despite this guidance, McMurry’s fifth amended complaint still does not 10 cure the defect. 11 McMurry alleges that he requested two reasonable accommodations: remote 12 work flexibility and allowance of a support animal dog. But McMurry was employed 13 as a Front Desk Agent—a position that, by its nature, involves on-site customer 14 interaction. McMurry does not explain what his essential job duties were, how 15 remote work would allow him to perform those duties, or under what circumstances 16 remote work would be feasible for a front desk position. In his opposition, McMurry 17 argues that “limited remote flexibility during panic attacks and the presence of a 18 support animal are recognized accommodations under EEOC guidance for PTSD 19 and anxiety disorders.” Dkt. No. 46 at 3. True, these accommodations have been 20 upheld in some circumstances, but McMurry does not explain how these 21 accommodations would enable him to perform the essential functions of a Front 22 Desk Agent position. The Court cannot simply assume that remote work is a 23 1 reasonable accommodation for an inherently on-site role without factual allegations 2 supporting that conclusion. 3 McMurry also argues that Neiders failed to engage in the interactive process. 4 But under federal law, “there exists no stand-alone claim for failing to engage in the 5 interactive process. Rather, discrimination results from denying an available and 6 reasonable accommodation.” Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1094 7 (9th Cir. 2018). Because McMurry has not plausibly alleged that a reasonable 8 accommodation existed that would have enabled him to perform the essential 9 functions of his job, he cannot state a failure to accommodate claim—regardless of 10 whether Neiders properly engaged in the interactive process. 11 3.5 McMurry’s hostile-work environment allegations lack sufficient detail. 12 McMurry’s hostile-work environment claims under Title VII and the WLAD 13 fail for lack of sufficient factual allegations. To state a hostile-work-environment 14 claim, McMurry must show (1) that he was “subjected to verbal or physical conduct 15 because of” a protected characteristic, (2) that the conduct was “unwelcome,” and (3) 16 that “the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] 17 employment and create an abusive work environment.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 18 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Glasgow v. 19 Georgia-Pac. Corp., 693 P.2d 708, 712 (Wash. 1985) (applying largely the same 20 formula to WLAD claims). 21 An employer is liable for a hostile-work environment when the conduct 22 alleged is “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of employment. 23 1 Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2021); Blackburn v. State 2 of Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. & W. State Hosp., 375 P.3d 1076, 1082 n.4 3 (Wash. 2016). Courts consider “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of 4 the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 5 humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes 6 with an employee's work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 7 (1993). 8 McMurry alleges that he was subjected to a work environment “permeated 9 with intimidation and humiliation due to disability and race,” but he provides few 10 concrete examples. He alleges that Sedgemore made comments implying he was 11 “playing sick” or “using excuses” and that he “reported racially insensitive remarks 12 by coworker Steve.” Dkt. No. 44 at 2–3. However, McMurry does not describe what 13 those racially insensitive remarks were, when they were made, or how often such 14 remarks occurred. Simply labeling conduct as a “pattern” or “ongoing” does not 15 satisfy the pleading standard. Without details about the nature, frequency, and 16 severity of the alleged misconduct, the Court cannot determine whether it was 17 sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. See 18 Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003); see also, Page v. 19 Clark Cnty. Fire Dist. 6, 733 F. Supp. 3d 1006 (W.D. Wash. 2024). 20 Accordingly, the Court finds that McMurry has not adequately pled a hostile 21 work environment claim and dismisses this claim. 22 23 1 3.6 McMurry states a plausible retaliation claim. Neiders argues that McMurry has failed to state a claim for retaliation under 2 Title VII, the ADA, and the WLAD. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, an 3 employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer 4 subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between 5 the protected activity and the adverse action. Cheatham v. City of Phoenix, 699 Fed. 6 Appx. 647, 648 (2017); see also Graves v. Dep’t of Game, 887 P.2d 424, 427 (Wash. 7 Ct. App. 1994). Both formal and informal complaints of discrimination constitute 8 protected activity under Title VII. Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer 9 Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000). To qualify, the employee’s opposition 10 must be directed at conduct the employee reasonably believes to be discriminatory. 11 Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994). 12 McMurry’s 5AC cures the deficiencies Judge Coughenour previously 13 identified in his earlier order. Dkt. No. 24. McMurry now alleges the specific dates 14 and circumstances of his protected activity and the retaliatory acts that followed. 15 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In particular, his May 30 and 16 June 13 complaints to HR, alleging harassment, discrimination, failure to 17 accommodate, and escalating retaliation, constitute protected activity. Neiders 18 received and investigated these complaints, so McMurry has pled knowledge on the 19 part of Defendant. And he alleges a pattern of escalating adverse treatment that 20 followed: denied PTO, increased workload, and termination eight days after his 21 second complaint for “policy violations” of which he had no prior notice. See 22 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (an adverse employment 23 1 action is conduct that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 2 supporting a charge of discrimination). These allegations, taken as true, state a 3 plausible retaliation claim. 4 Neiders contends that McMurry nonetheless fails to state a claim because he 5 failed to show that retaliatory animus was the “but-for’ cause of the adverse 6 employment actions. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 7 (2013) (“Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional 8 principles of but-for causation”). But Rule 8 requires McMurry to allege the facts 9 underlying his claims, not to plead “magic words” or prove his case at the pleading 10 stage. See Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 744–45 (9th Cir. 1992). McMurry has 11 done so. The escalating pattern of adverse treatment following his complaints— 12 combined with the pretextual nature of his termination—supports a reasonable 13 inference of causation under both Title VII’s but-for standard and the WLAD’s more 14 lenient substantial-factor standard. Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 430 P.3d 229, 235 15 (2018) (an employee asserting a retaliation claim under the WLAD proves causation 16 by showing that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse 17 employment decision). 18 Neiders also argues that McMurry fails to allege it knew of his EEOC 19 contact. The Court need not resolve this issue because McMurry’s retaliation claim 20 does not depend on the EEOC contact; his internal HR complaints independently 21 constitute protected activity, and Neiders’s knowledge of those complaints is 22 unequivocally pled. 23 1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Neiders’s motion to dismiss McMurry’s 2 retaliation claim. 3 3.7 McMurry’s conspiracy allegations are conclusory. 4 McMurry asserts a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 5 U.S.C. § 1985(3). This claim was not included in his original complaint and exceeds 6 the scope of leave to amend that Judge Coughenour granted. Even setting aside 7 that procedural defect, the claim fails on the merits. 8 To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a 9 conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in 10 furtherance of the conspiracy and (3) a resulting injury.”Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff must also show that the conspiracy 12 was motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 13 discriminatory animus.” Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 502 (9th 14 Cir. 1979). “A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is 15 insufficient” for Section 1985(3) liability. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 16 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 McMurry alleges that “Defendant’s agents acted in concert to perpetuate 18 discriminatory and retaliatory acts” and that Misty Rowell worked at both Thrive 19 Communities (McMurry’s prior employer) and Neiders. Dkt. No. 44 at 3, 6. But 20 these allegations do not plausibly establish the existence of an actual agreement or 21 conspiracy. The mere fact that Rowell worked at both companies does not give rise 22 to an inference that she conspired with others to violate McMurry’s civil rights. 23 1 McMurry’s conspiracy allegations are entirely conclusory and lack the factual 2 specificity required to state a plausible claim under § 1985(3). 3 Accordingly, the Court finds that McMurry has not adequately pled a 4 conspiracy to interfere with civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 5 3.8 Further amendment would be futile. 6 McMurry has now filed five complaints—an original and four amended 7 versions—yet has not cured the fundamental defects in his disparate treatment, 8 failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and conspiracy claims. Judge 9 Coughenour twice granted leave to amend with express limitations, and twice 10 McMurry exceeded those limitations. In the September 26, 2025, order, Judge 11 Coughenour gave McMurry “one final opportunity” to amend. Dkt. No. 38 at 2. 12 Despite this warning, the Fifth Amended Complaint suffers from many of the same 13 pleading defects as its predecessors with respect to these claims. 14 The Court declines to grant further leave to amend. A district court's 15 discretion to deny amendment is “particularly broad” when it has previously given 16 leave to amend. Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th 17 Cir. 2014). McMurry has had ample opportunity to cure these deficiencies, and 18 further amendment would be futile. Accordingly, McMurry’s disparate treatment, 19 failure to accommodate, hostile-work environment, and conspiracy claims are 20 dismissed with prejudice. As discussed above, McMurry’s retaliation claim may 21 proceed. 22 23 1 4. CONCLUSION 9 In sum, Neiders’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part. Dkt. No. 45. 3 McMurry’s retaliation claim survives dismissal but all remaining claims in his fifth 4 amended complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice. 5 Dated this 30th day of January, 2026. Z 2 1Q— 7 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23