Mesterman v. Home Mutual Insurance
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- Reynolds v. Canton Insurance Office, Ltd. (Wash. 1917)
- Shultice v. Modern Woodmen of America (Wash. 1912)
- Berry v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. (N.M. 1928)
- Stebbins v. Westchester Fire Insurance (Wash. 1921)
- Day v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance (Wash. 1920)
- Wilson v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (Vt. 1916)
- California Reclamation Co. v. New Zealand Insurance (Cal. Ct. App. 1913)
- Western Nat. Ins. Co. v. Marsh (Okla. 1912)
- Granville v. American Casualty Co. (Wash. 1912)
- Richardson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (Wash. 1912)
- Western Nat. Ins. v. Marsh (Okla. 1912)
- Atlanta Home Insurance v. Smith (Ga. 1911)
- Bothell v. National Casualty Co. (Wash. 1910)
- Staats v. Pioneer Insurance (Wash. 1909)
- Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane (Minn. 1906)
- Foster v. Pioneer Mutual Insurance (Wash. 1905)
- Hart v. Niagara Fire Insurance (Wash. 1894)
- Merchants' Mutual Fire Insurance v. Harris (Colo. 1911)
- Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (6th Cir. 1901)
- Cole v. Union Central Life Insurance (Wash. 1900)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Although there are some cases'holding the contrary, we think the decided weight of authority, as well as the better reasoning, is in favor of the rule that an insurance company is estopped from asserting the invalidity of its policy at the time it was issued for the violation of any of the conditions of such policy, or the application therefor, if, at the time that it was so issued, the fact of such violation was known to the company, or its duly authorized agent. That the Northwest Fire and Marine Insurance Company had knowledge, at the time of the issuance of the policy by the appellant, of the existence of the additional insurance which it is alleged l’endered it void, is made entirely clear by the proofs, and is in fact conceded; hence, under the rule above stated, a policy issued by it could not be avoided on account of such additional insurance.
It only remains to determine as to whether or not the appellant is chargeable with knowledge of the facts thus known to said company. There is some proof tending to show that the fact of such additional insurance was communicated to the appellant, but such fact was not established by undisputed proofs. It follows that, if there was no other ground upon which the appellant could be held
The contention of the appellant that the indorsement that the company which delivered the policy was its agent was unauthorized cannot be sustained as against the respondent. The Northwest Fire and Marine Insurance Company was its agent, at least for the purpose of the delivery of the policy, and the assured had the right to assume that, as it was delivered to him, it came from the hands of the appellant. Under all the circumstances of the case, it must be held that said Northwest Fire and Marine Insurance Company was the agent of the appellant, and not of the assured, in the matter of the issuance and delivery of the policy in question. It follows that the knowledge of said company was the knowledge of the appellant. All the facts upon which this conclusion is founded were established by undisputed proofs; hence, the instruction to the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff was proper, and the judgment rendered thereon must be affirmed. -
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.