Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Conlan
Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Conlan
Opinion of the Court
Tbe appellant, a corporation, began an action against tbe respondents seeking to have them enjoined from acting as its trustees, alleging that they bad unlawfully and without right assumed to act as such, and bad attempted to oust from its management tbe only person lawfully having that authority. Tbe respondents for answer denied many of the allegations of tbe complaint, and filed a cross-complaint, in which they asked that tbe affairs of tbe corporation be wound up, that its property be sold, and that tbe proceeds of tbe sale be divided among those lawfully entitled to tbe same, and that tbe court appoint a receiver for that purpose. On filing their answer they moved for tbe appointment of a receiver pending tbe action. This motion was denied by tbe judge before whom it was first beard, but later on tbe application was renewed before another judge of the same court, who appointed a receiver and directed him to- take possession, charge, and control of all tbe property of tbe corporation, pending tbe final determination of tbe action between tbe parties. Tbe appellant excepted to tbe order,
The record sets forth the grievances of the parties at length, but we shall not discuss tbe evidence, as the
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Manufacturing Company, Apppellant v. Thomas F. Conlan
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Receivers—Appeal and Error—Supersedeas oe Temporary Receivership—Judgment—Remanding With Recourse to Bond in Lieu oe Appointment oe Receiver. Upon, appeal from an order appointing a temporary receiver of a corporation, with a supersedeas of the receivership pending the appeal, the supreme court will not prejudice the trial on the merits by discussing the merits, where there was no abuse of discretion in appointing the receiver, and the cause may he remanded with directions that the supersedeas bond stand in lieu of tbe receivership until tbe termination of the merits of tbe case, with recourse thereto by respondents for any loss sustained by reason of superseding tbe receivership.