Rinne v. Wilson
Rinne v. Wilson
Opinion of the Court
— The plaintiff, Einne, commenced this action in the superior court for King county, seeking a decree requiring the defendant Wilson to reconvey to him good title to a quarter section of land situated in the province of Alberta, Canada; and, .in the alternative, for damages against all of the defendants in the sum of $5,000. The defendants resist the claims of the plaintiff, asserting that Wilson received conveyance of the Alberta land from Einne in exchange for land conveyed by him to Einne, situated in this state. The defendant Wilson, by his cross-complaint, seeks specific performance of the exchange contract in so far as it is unperformed by the plaintiff, Einne, claiming that Einne has failed to pay him the sum of $133.30, the proceeds of the crop produced upon the Alberta land, which Einne collected after the exchange of the lands and which it was agreed should go with the Alberta land to Wilson, this being the only respect in which the exchange contract remains unperformed. The defendant Wilson also seeks to have'this $133.30 decreed to be a lien upon the Washington land conveyed by him to Einne, should Einne fail to pay the same. Trial in the superior court for King county resulted in findings and judgment denying to the plaintiff the relief prayed for by him, and awarding recovery to Wilson of the $133.30 as prayed for by him. Prom this disposition of the cause, the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
• Preliminary to stating the facts of the case, it may be well to state that the main controversy is as to the authority of the respondent Kessinger, as agent of Einne, to make the exchange contract and deliver the deed of conveyance which 'was executed by Einne to Wilson for the Alberta land.
On October 28, 1916, Einne owned two quarter sections of land in the province of Alberta; one was in
“We authorize you to hold these documents for a period of fifteen days from date, subject to the order of the said William J. Wilson, who shall have the said fifteen days to inspect the Alberta property. If Mr. Wilson finds the property satisfactory and notifies you to that effect, you are hereby authorized to deliver the warranty deed to Bichard Binne or his order and the Alberta transfers to William J. Wilson or order.”
Wilson, having caused the Alberta lands to be examined by his agent there, concluded that he would not consummate the exchange, and notified all parties concerned accordingly, within the fifteen-day period named in the contract. This, it is conceded, put an end to the exchange contemplated by that contract, leaving each party without obligation thereunder. On
“The proposition was that he was to give us, that is, he would give Mr. Rinne, the improved forty acres over there, free and clear of incumbrances, and would assume a mortgage for $500 on the one hundred and sixty acres in Alberta, and interest and taxes if they didn’t exceed $100, and he was to get the crop on the land.”
Soon thereafter Kessinger reported to Rinne this proposition of Wilson’s, as we think the evidence shows, so that Rinne plainly understood it. Rinne then directed Kessinger to go ahead and make the exchange with Wilson upon those terms. In the meantime, the deed of conveyance from Rinne to Wilson for the Alberta quarter section subject to the $500 mortgage had remained in the possession of Kessinger, as Rinne’s agent, which lacked nothing to become effective save delivery: We think the evidence warrants the conclusion that Rinne left this deed with Kessinger to the end that he might deliver it in the consummation of this deal. Kessinger, being so authorized to proceed, thereafter, on November 13, 1916, as agent for Rinne, entered into a written contract with Wilson, in form a letter to Sewall & Powell, accompanied by this deed to the Alberta quarter-section subject to the $500 mortgage, and a deed from Wilson
“Seattle, Wash., Nov. 13, ’16.
“Sewall & Powell,
“108 Cherry St.,
“Seattle, Wash.
“Dear Sirs: We herewith hand you transfer of title Richard Rinne to Wm. J. Wilson and John J. Mulvey to certain lands in the Province of. Alberta and warrant deed, William J. Wilson to Richard Rinne, to certain lands in the state of Washington, this being the S. E. % of S. W. % sec. 32 — twp. 23 range 1 (this is the improved 40 that was in former escrow).
“We authorize you to hold these documents for such time as will be necessary to secure abstracts of title and tax notices on the Alberta land.
“If interest on mortgage, taxes, etc., together with mortgage do not exceed $600, you are authorized to deliver deed to Washington land to Richard Rinne and transfer of title to Wm. J. Wilson covering Alberta land. Yours very truly,
“(Signed) R. Rinne,
“By H. P. Kessinger, Agent,
“W. J. Wilson.”
Thereafter title to the Alberta land appearing satisfactory to Wilson and he being satisfied that the mortgage debt against the land, with interest and taxes, did not exceed $600, at the instance of Wilson and Kessinger, as agent for Rinne, the deed to the Alberta land was delivered to Wilson and the deed to the Washington land was delivered to Kessinger, as the agent of Rinne. On November 15,1916, Wilson by letter notified Foster, the lessee of the Alberta land, that he had purchased the land and succeeded to the right of Rinne as to the one-third of the crop of the land for that year. This brought an answer from Foster saying that he had sent to Rinne’s agent $133.30, being the proceeds of one-third of the crop due as rent for that year. The evidence, we think, plainly calls for the con
This, we think, is one of those cases which call for but little argument touching the rights of the parties, when the facts are stated. While considerable of the argument is directed to the question of Kessinger’s authority to enter into and sign the written contract, as agent of Einne, with Wilson, the controversy resolves itself into the question of Kessinger’s authority to deliver the deed executed by Einne to Wilson for the Alberta land, upon the conditions named in the contract. It seems quite clear to us that, whatever may be said as to Kessinger’s authority to enter into that
Contention is made in behalf of appellant that the trial court erred in awarding Wilson recovery of the $133.30 and in making the same a lien upon the Kitsap county land. As already stated we think the evidence clearly warranted the trial court in concluding that Binne had actually received this money from Foster when it should have been paid to Wilson. We are of the opinion, however, that the trial court erred in decreeing the $133.30 judgment against Binne and in favor of Wilson a specific lien upon the Kitsap county land. Of course it may become a lien upon that land as a general judgment, but that is another matter.
We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed in so far as it denies to appellant Binne the relief prayed for by him. It is so ordered. We also conclude that the judgment should be reversed in so far as it awards to Wilson a lien upon the Kitsap county land for the $133.30 recovery awarded him against Binne. To the end that Wilson’s recovery be made plain upon the records of the superior court, we direct that court to enter a simple money judgment against Binne and in favor of Wilson for the sum of $133.30 with interest thereon from January 1, 1917, which is, in any event, as late a date as Wilson was entitled to be paid that amount by Binne. In view of this disposition of the
■ Main, C. J., Fullerton, Tolman, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Richard Rinne v. William J. Wilson
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Principal and Agent — Authority of Agent — Evidence. The authority of an agent to deliver deeds for an exchange of .property is sufficiently established where the principal’s subsequent acts, if not. amounting to a ratification, makes the proof, as a whole, conclusive. Exchange of Properties — Judgment — Decree. Upon sustaining an exchange of properties, and allowing defendant’s claim for one-third of the crop taken from the land obtained by him, as per agreement, it is error to decree the same a lien upon the land conveyed to plaintiff, other than as the same becomes a lien upon entry of a money judgment therefor.