Randall v. School District No. 44
Randall v. School District No. 44
Opinion of the Court
— This action was brought by Charles Randall, as a taxpayer and elector, against school district No. 44, its directors and the treasurer of Grays Harbor county, to cancel that part of the tax against his real estate in the district based upon a special ten mill school levy, and to enjoin the board of directors
Upon the arguments in this court, respondents move to strike appellant’s brief and abstract of record and dismiss the appeal. We have considered the grounds mentioned therefor, together with the time of presenting the motion and the condition of the record, and are of the opinion the motion should be, and it is, denied.
On the merits, the essential facts are not in dispute. District No. 44 is a school district of the- third class. Some time about the first of September, 1920 (the exact date is uncertain), the board of directors of the school district certified to the county commissioners a detailed estimate of the amount of money required in the district during that school year, as follows:
1. Expense of general control........................... $500.00
2. Expense of instruction............................... $4,500.00
3. Expense of operation of school plant.................. $3,000.00
4. Expense of maintenance of school plant..!............ $3,000.00
5. Expense of auxiliary agencies........'................ $2,000.00
6. Payment of outstanding warrants and warrant interest $.......
7. Land ............................................... $.......
8. New buildings....................................... $..,....
9. Additions to buildings............................... $.......
10. Equipment of new buildings and grounds............. $350.00
11. Equipment of old buildings and grounds.............. $4,000.00
Total...........................................$17,350.00
Dated this......day of................, 192..
FRANK A. ZEIGLER,
Clerk School District No. 44, Grays Harbor County.
This certificate was made pursuant to § 4537, Rem. Code
“I, Frank A. Zeigler, clerk of School District No. 44 Grays Harbor county, Washington, do hereby certify that at a special election, duly held in said school district, on the 27 day of Sept., 1920, the following amount of money, special 10 mill tax, was voted by the duly qualified electors of said school district, for school purposes in said school district during the present school year.
“You are hereby authorized to levy a sufficient rate on the taxable property of said school district to produce the amount voted in the excess of the estimate made by the board of directors now on file in your office.
“Dated this 27 day of September, 1920.
“Frank A. Zeigler, Clerk.
“School District .No. 44, Chehalis County, Wash.
“Note: This notice must be filed with the clerk of the board of county commissioners on or before the first day of September.”
The county superintendent of schools, under date of October 7, 1920, certified, to the county commissioners a demand for a non high school levy of $996 against district No. 44.
“And whereas, certain school districts have, in addition to the estimate of expenses above set out, voted special taxes by special election, as shown by the certificate of the clerks of said districts, on file with the clerk of this board, as follows: Dist. No. 44, Amount 19,928.00. It is therefore ordered that the county assessor extend against the taxable property of the above school districts, a sufficient number of mills levy to produce the required amounts. ’ ’
It is contended by the appellant that there was no authority by which the county commissioners could make the ten mill levy. We think the contention is sound. The certificate of the school district (pertaining as it did to the so-called special election on September 27) was not to the effect that the ten mill tax was to be devoted to building purposes, but only for “school purposes”. The statute, §4537, Rem. Code (P. C. § 5038), provides that the certificate of the school directors shall contain an estimate in detail of the amount of funds needed for all purposes for the year, and limits the levy to be made by the county commissioners at not to exceed one per cent of the assessed value of all the taxable property of the district, with
Another contention made by the appellant is that the special election to vote on the ten mill tax was void. Section 4538, Bern. Code
Immediately upon filing their annual report containing estimates, among others, of $350 for equipment of new buildings and grounds, and $4,000, equipment of old buildings and grounds the directors- instituted proceedings to procure by a vote of the people, $19,928 more for building, and didn’t know themselves at that time what they did intend to build, and consequently could not, and did not, attempt to give the taxpayers any information on that subject. One of the school directors, answering his own counsel’s questions, upon referring to the contents of the notice of the special election, testified as follows:
“Q. And how did you want them put up. A. We wanted them to be put up and wanted them to designate that this ten mills was to be used for building purposes instead of designating some special subject which would hold and bind us to that one subject; in case we had money left over from this one project we wanted to build a teachers’ cottage but if we didn’t have enough left over— Q. What was the project. A. That was the auditorium for the children. Q. A gymnasium. A. Yes, a gymnasium and play ground.”
And that is the kind of notices that were put up. Certainly, if the district needs and desires a new building, a gymnasium or additional playground, it can procure it or all of them, if within its means, by following the requirements of the statutes.
Covert intentions of the trustees of public funds find no favor in the rules for the construction of statutes designed to produce or dispose of such funds. A grant of power to levy taxes must be strictly con
We conclude the special election for a ten mill tax, and the following levy by the county commissioners attempting to carry it into execution, are void, and that the appellant is entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.
Reversed, with directions to the superior court to enter judgment accordingly.
Parker, C. J., Bridges, and Tolman, JJ., concur.
Note: See Rem. Comp. Stat., § 4834.
Note: See Rem. Comp. Stat., § 4835.
Concurring Opinion
— I concur in the judgment ordered, for the second reason stated in the foregoing opinion.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.