The plaintiff, Baldwin, seeks recovery of compensation claimed to be due him as an attorney for legal services rendered by him to the defendant, McClaine, in the foreclosure of a mortgage in the superior court for Franklin county. A trial upon the merits in the superior court for Spokane county, sitting without a jury, resulted in findings and judgment denying recovery, from which Baldwin has appealed to this court.

The record brought here enables us only to determine whether the findings made by the trial court call for an affirmance or reversal of the judgment upon the merits. They are not very definite in some particulars, but, as we read them, they seem to us to establish the following: McClaine was the owner of promissory *80 notes executed by one Phillips for the aggregate sum of $6,628, who had, also, to secure the indebtedness so evidenced, executed a second mortgage upon land owiied by him situated in FranHin county. The land was subject to a large first mortgage, rendering the second mortgage of little value as security. McClaine made an agreement with Baldwin, as an attorney, to foreclose the second mortgage, by which he was to pay Baldwin for that service the sum of $200, with the further understanding that, should the premises be redeemed from the foreclosure sale, Baldwin should receive'$300 additional; this, apparently, upon the assumption that Baldwin would succeed, as he did, in having the court award an attorney’s fee of $500 in the foreclosure taxable as part of the costs and disbursements therein, and that, upon the foreclosure sale, McClaine would necessarily become the purchaser of the land because of its being so heavily encumbered by a first mortgage. McClaine did become such purchaser for want of other bidders. It is conceded that no redemption was had, and that McClaine was finally given a sheriff’s deed for the land, though this is not made very, plain by the court’s findings. The court found that McClaine fully paid Baldwin for the foreclosure services rendered by him. This finding, we may concede, as Baldwin argues, means only that the agreed $200 was paid by McClaine to Baldwin.

Counsel for both sides go somewhat outside the findings in their argument upon the merits, but, as already noticed, we cannot follow them there for want of a full statement of facts occurring upon the trial. It seems plain that the above summary of the facts calls for an affirmance of the judgment upon the merits.

Baldwin’s contentions seem to rest particularly upon the theory that he is in any event entitled to be *81 paid $300 by McClaine, in addition to tbe $200, because McClaine bid in tbe land upon tbe foreclosure for tbe full amount of the indebtedness, costs and disbursements, including tbe $500 attorney’s fee awarded by tbe court in tbe foreclosure. But here we are confronted with tbe fact that there was no redemption bringing any money to McClaine. All be got was title to tbe land, subject to tbe first mortgage, which title, so encumbered, was of little value. McClaine was evidently willing that Baldwin should have tbe additional $300, if it should be produced by redemption from bis purchase of the land. So, when McClaine bad paid tbe $200 to Baldwin and by lapse of time there ceased to be any right of redemption, Baldwin was fully compensated according to bis employment contract. Manifestly, McClaine’s bid was made for the full amount of tbe foreclosure judgment, including tbe $500 attorney’s fee awarded therein, for tbe very purpose of enabling Baldwin to receive tbe additional $300 should it be produced by a redemption, which both realized was not likely to occur in view of tbe large first mortgage, subject to which tbe land bad to be sold upon tbe foreclosure of tbe second mortgage. Plainly, we think Baldwin has received all that be is entitled to from McClaine.

Tbe judgment is affirmed.

Tolman, C. J., Mackintosh, Mitchell, and Main, JJ., concur.