Canteen Service, Inc., is in the business of leasing coin operated mechanical music machines, commonly known as juke boxes, in the Seattle area. Asserting that sections 10.96.020 and 10.96.030 of the Seattle License Code,1 as applied, violate the antimonopoly provisions of *871our state constitution and the due process provisions and equal protection provisions of our federal constitution, Can*872teen filed this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal upon respondents’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. He ruled as a matter of law. Canteen appeals.

Our review of the record convinces us, as it did the trial court, that there is a fatal lack of substantiating evidence in support of Canteen’s arguments'. See N. Fiorito Co. v. State, 69 Wn.2d 616, 419 P.2d 586 (1966); Rainier Ave. Corp. v. Seattle, 76 Wn.2d 800, 459 P.2d 40 (1969). The crux of these arguments is that the ordinances, as applied, require the written consent of an entrenched, competing sublicensee before the operator of a store, tavern, restaurant or other business can replace the machines that it is using with machines of a competing sublicensee. Canteen has failed in its proof. The record shows that neither Canteen nor any other sublicensee has, during the 10 years the ordinance has been in effect, attempted to obtain municipal approval of a replacement sublicense without written consent of an established sublicensor. There is no evidence that such consent is, in fact, necessary. No such requirement appears in the terms of the ordinances.

Canteen contends that an effort to obtain approval without the written consent of existing sublicensees would have been futile and therefore was unnecessary. Two arguments are put forward in support of this contention. First, the fact that no sublicensee has made such an effort since the ordinances took effect is offered as proof that “those in the know” regard such efforts as futile. This argument is without merit. There is no history of futility to support a conclusion by Canteen or any other operator that such efforts would fail. Under these circumstances the conclusion suggested by Canteen is inappropriate. Next, Canteen argues that it was discouraged from proceeding to seek a transfer by the disapproval of an administrative official. Canteen’s application, without the written consent of the existing sublicensee, was submitted to the licensing division of the city of Seattle. The director stated to Canteen that he did not want “the apple cart upset.” The licensing division is *873strictly administrative and has no discretionary function in these matters. Canteen could have taken the matter to the city council, which is the responsible body under the ordinances. They chose not to proceed further and now argue that such an effort would have been futile in light of the administrator’s distaste. Again, no prior history or other evidence of futility is offered.

In State v. Lundquist, 60 Wn.2d 397, 401, 374 P.2d 246 (1962), we said:

A person may not urge the unconstitutionality of an ordinance or statute unless he is harmfully affected by the particular feature of the ordinance or statute alleged to be an unreasonable exercise of the police power. A litigant who challenges the constitutionality of an ordinance must claim infringement of an interest peculiar and personal to himself, as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with the general framework of the ordinance.

Canteen has failed to demonstrate that the written consent of the established sublicensee is a prerequisite to the transfer of location sublicenses. This failure is not excused by a bare assertion that an effort to obtain municipal approval without such consent would have been futile. No prima facie case has been established. Under these circumstances, the trial court was quite correct in dismissing the suit as a matter of law.

We do not reach the substance of Canteen’s assertions that the ordinances in question, as written or applied, are unconstitutional.

Affirmed.