State v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON JUNE 18, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON JUNE 18, 2026 SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 103748-1 Respondent, EN BANC v. Filed: June 18, 2026 META PLATFORMS, INC., formerly doing business as FACEBOOK, INC., Petitioner. PER CURIAM1— This case concerns the application of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), former ch. 42.17A RCW (2024), to petitioner Meta Platforms Inc. As explained below, the resolution favored by the majority of this court is to affirm the Court of Appeals with respect to Meta’s liability for violating the FCPA. However, there is no majority view with respect to the resulting civil penalty. Therefore, the penalty judgment stands affirmed. 1 This court may issue a per curiam opinion summarizing the votes of the justices in a plurality decision, preceding the lead opinion. WASH. SUP. CT. INTERNAL R. II-8(B). State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (Per Curiam) Members of the public requested information from Meta regarding certain political advertisements on its platforms. Meta does not dispute that its response to these requests violated the FCPA and its implementing regulations. The State of Washington brought this action against Meta, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, ruled that Meta was liable for violating the FCPA, and imposed a civil penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. State v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 2d 138, 560 P.3d 217 (2024). On review in this court, Meta argues that (1) the ruling on liability should be reversed because the FCPA and its implementing regulations violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied, (2) the penalty calculation should be reversed because it is based on a misinterpretation of the relevant statutes, and (3) the penalty should be reversed because it violates the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As to the first issue, in the lead opinion, three justices (Justice Whitener, Chief Justice Stephens, and Justice Pro Tempore Yu) would apply exacting scrutiny, uphold the FCPA as applied, and affirm the ruling on liability. In the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, three justices (Justice Mungia, Justice González, and Justice Montoya-Lewis) would apply deferential scrutiny, uphold the FCPA as applied, and affirm the ruling on liability. In the dissenting opinion, three 2 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (Per Curiam) justices (Justice Gordon McCloud, Justice Johnson, and Justice Pro Tempore Madsen) would reverse the ruling on liability and remand to the trial court for fact- finding on Meta’s First Amendment claim. As a result, the lead opinion and the concurrence/dissent represent the majority view affirming the ruling on liability. As to the second issue, the three-justice lead opinion would affirm the penalty and hold that the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes by counting each advertisement included in a request as a separate violation. The three- justice concurrence/dissent would reverse the penalty and hold that the number of violations should be based on the number of advertisements, regardless of the number of requests that were made for the same information. The three-justice dissent would hold that the trial court correctly interpreted the relevant statutes but does not join the lead opinion in affirming the penalty. As a result, there is no majority view to affirm or reverse on this issue and the judgment stands affirmed. As to the third issue, the three-justice lead opinion would affirm the penalty and hold that it does not violate the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, assuming without deciding that the Eighth Amendment applies in this case. The three-justice concurrence/dissent joins the lead opinion on this issue, assuming without deciding that the Eighth Amendment applies. The three-justice dissent would reverse the penalty and hold that it violates the excessive fines clause of the 3 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (Per Curiam) Eighth Amendment. As a result, the lead opinion and the concurrence/dissent represent the majority view that the penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is affirmed with respect to liability and the penalty judgment stands affirmed by a divided court. 4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 103748-1 Respondent, En Banc v. META PLATFORMS, INC., formerly Filed __________________ doing business as FACEBOOK, INC., Petitioner. WHITENER J. – Washington State has a long history of requiring parties to election-related communications to publicly disclose information about their advertisements to help voters make fully informed choices. To best promote this interest in election transparency, Washington amended the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), former ch. 42.17A RCW (2024),1 to require digital communications platforms to publicly disclose some of the data they regularly collect on a small 1 Former chapter 42.17A RCW has since been recodified as Title 29B RCW, effective January 1, 2026. Former chapter 42.17A RCW will be referenced throughout as it applied to Meta at the time of the action. State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 subset of their advertisements: “political advertising and electioneering communications” targeted at Washington State users. Meta Platforms Inc., one of the wealthiest corporations in the world, controls platforms like Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Messenger. Billions of people across the globe consume content posted on Meta’s platforms every day, including countless advertisements chosen specifically for them using “microtargeted advertising” based on their demographic information and browsing habits. In this case, Meta asks this court to find the FCPA as applied to them is burdensome and violates their right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. We hold that it does not. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This action concerns 12 separate requests for records from three members of the public: Eli Sanders, Tallman Trask, and Zach Wurtz. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 256- 64. Meta does not dispute that its response to the requests for records violated the disclosure law. CP at 5859-63. The Attorney General’s Office filed a complaint in King County Superior Court in April 2020 and later amended it to include additional charges. CP at 1-16, 247-69. Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment in July 2022. CP at 379-412, 413-44. The superior court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. CP at 5571-79. 2 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 The disclosure law authorizes up to $10,000 in penalties for each violation, plus legal costs. Former RCW 42.17A.750(1)(c) (2019), .780 (2018). The superior court imposed the maximum penalty for each advertisement sought in a request, a total of 822 violations. 2 State v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 2d 138, 194, 560 P.3d 217 (2024). Additionally, finding that Meta intentionally violated the law, the superior court trebled both the civil penalties and legal fees as permitted by the statute. State v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 20-2-07774-7 SEA, 2022 WL 20697995 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2022); CP at 5571-79. The superior court assessed $24,660,000.00 in civil penalties and $10,522,159.59 in legal costs for a total of $35,182,159.59, plus granted the State’s request for an injunction. CP at 5592-93, 5812. 3 Meta argued to the Court of Appeals that the disclosure law violates the federal First Amendment and section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Am. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 19-60 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 84661-2-I (2023)). It further argued that the superior court’s method of calculating damages was based on an improper reading of the statute because it authorizes a penalty only for each request Meta does not respond to, not each advertisement included in those requests. Id. at 2 The superior court found that Meta committed 254 violations in response to two plaintiffs’ 2019 requests, 157 violations in response to one plaintiff’s 2021 request, and 411 violations in response to another 2021 request. CP at 5575. 3 The injunction is currently stayed. Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 146. 3 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 60-66. Meta also claimed that the fine was so excessive as to violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 73-74. The Court of Appeals found in the State’s favor on all issues. In its petition to this court, Meta renews its federal First and Eighth Amendment challenges, as well as its statutory misinterpretation claim regarding the calculation of damages. Meta, the parent company of social media sites Facebook, Instagram, and other platforms, sells advertising space to individuals and organizations. CP at 5858- 59. Meta does not dispute that as a “digital communications platform” and a “commercial advertiser” it is subject to the disclosure law. WAC 390-18-050(7)(g); former RCW 42.17A.345 (2019); Am. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 10 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 84661-2-I (2023)); see also Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 152 n.7. Advertisers use Meta to target narrow groups of users based on traits like age, gender, and location, a concept known as “microtargeting.” CP at 599-601, 6344-59, 7164, 7184. As microtargeted advertising has become more prevalent, some parties have raised concerns about how it will impact voters and election transparency. CP at 7214, 7218; see also Br. of League of Women Voters of Wash. et al. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp’t at 7-12. Potential risks include increased political polarization and the ease of spreading misinformation, risks now heightened by the rise of artificial 4 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 intelligence. Br. of League of Women Voters of Wash. et al. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp’t at 7-12. In December 2018, Meta received a $200,000 penalty for failing to respond fully to two requests under Washington’s disclosure law. CP at 26-28. Shortly after, Meta announced it would no longer accept advertisements in Washington State that related to “candidates, elections or ballot initiatives.” CP at 615. According to Meta, the disclosure law is so burdensome that there is no economic incentive to carry political advertisements in the state. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 10. However, such advertisements have continued to appear on Meta platforms since the ban. CP at 5859, 5937-38, 5974, 6010-11, 6015, 6025-26. In 2018, Meta created an “Ad Library” to comply with disclosure laws in multiple jurisdictions. CP at 606-07, 7008, 7305-06. The “Ad Library” is a free tool that allows anyone to view information about advertisements hosted on Meta platforms that concern “social issues, elections, or politics.” CP at 7007-08. Available information may include approximate price and audience size, expressed as a percentage or range. Id. Information is added to the library within 24 hours of an advertisement’s first impression, updated regularly, and retained for 7 years. CP at 5910, 7305-06. Here, neither party disputes that much of the information required by Washington’s disclosure law is included in Meta’s Ad Library, but not all. CP at 5 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 5859-60. Required information that is not featured in the Ad Library includes the (1) street address of the individual sponsor that paid for the advertisement, (2) payment dates, payment method, and exact cost per advertisement, (3) audience targeted, and (4) number of impressions. CP at 7394-95; WAC 390-18-050. ISSUES 1. Do the FCPA (former RCW 42.17A.345) and its implementing legislation (WAC 390-18-050) together violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? 2. Did the superior court err by calculating Meta’s penalty based on each advertisement for which it failed to disclose the required information? 3. Did the superior court’s civil penalty violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? ANALYSIS Standard of Review We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). In determining whether 6 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact,” the court “must construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Ranger, 164 Wn.2d at 552. “A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation.” Id. “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it submits affidavits establishing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” unless the nonmoving party “‘set[s] forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut the moving party’s contentions and disclose the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wn.2d 847, 852, 719 P.2d 98 (1986)). We review questions of law, including constitutional issues, de novo. State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405, 419, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007); State v. Valdiglesias LaValle, 2 Wn.3d 310, 317, 535 P.3d 856 (2023). The court’s goal in interpreting a statute is to “ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine the statute’s plain meaning, based on the text, context, related provisions, and the statute as a whole. State v. Haggard, 7 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 195 Wn.2d 544, 548, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020). If a statute “can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way,” it is ambiguous, and the court may look to legislative history, case law, and statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass’n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342, 354, 144 P.3d 276 (2006). “A statute is ambiguous only if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way, not merely because other possible interpretations exist.” Id. (citing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (plurality opinion)). “Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.” Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). 4 1. The FCPA does not violate Meta’s First Amendment right to free speech The purpose of Washington’s FCPA, which dates back to 1972, is to ensure that “political campaign and lobbying contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed to the public and that secrecy is to be avoided.” Former RCW 42.17A.001(1) (2019). The FCPA also includes a command that “the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote complete disclosure … [and] 4 Civil penalties imposed by a trial court “within the statutory limits” are reviewed “for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 199 Wn. App. 506, 525, 398 P.3d 1271 (2017). Here, because Meta challenges only the superior court’s interpretation of the statute, we review the issue de novo. 8 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 assure continuing public confidence of fairness of elections and governmental processes.” Former RCW 42.17A.001(11). In 2011, the Washington State Legislature added an additional statement emphasizing the importance of full disclosure and transparency and declaring an intent to levy larger penalties against those who violate the law. The legislature finds that timely and full disclosure of election campaign funding and expenditures is essential to a well-functioning democracy in which Washington’s voters can judge for themselves what is appropriate based on ideologies, programs, and policies. Long-term voter engagement and confidence depends on the public knowing who is funding the multiple and targeted messages distributed during election campaigns. The legislature also finds that recent events have revealed the need for refining certain elements of our state’s election campaign finance laws that have proven inadequate in preventing efforts to hide information from voters. The legislature intends, therefore, to promote greater transparency for the public by enhancing penalties for violations; regulating the formation of, and contributions between, political committees; and reducing the expenditure thresholds for purposes of mandatory electronic filing and disclosure. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 145, § 1. In 2018, the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), the regulatory body charged with enforcing the FCPA, enacted WAC 390-18-050. This provision requires “digital communication platforms” to maintain records of the political advertisements they host. The records must be updated within 24 hours of the advertisement’s first distribution and maintained for 5 years, and must include, 9 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 among other things, a copy of the advertisement, the name of the candidate or ballot measure supported or opposed, the cost of the advertisement, and “a description of the major work components or tasks … that were required to provide the advertising.” WAC 390-18-050(3), (6)-(7). Those “components or tasks” include (i) A description of the demographic information; (ii) The statistical characteristics of a population (e.g., age, gender, race, location, etc.), of the audiences targeted and reached, to the extent such information is collected by the commercial advertiser as part of its regular course of business; (iii) The total number of impressions generated by the advertisement or communication; and (iv) Any generative adversarial network techniques, artificial intelligence, or other digital technology, provided by the commercial advertiser to produce any ‘synthetic media,’ as defined under [former RCW 42.62.020 (2023)], for the advertisement or communication. WAC 390-18-050(7)(g). Regarding disclosure of the records, the 2018 updates further state: Until such time as the PDC provides an open access platform on its website for this information, which will replace the following methods of inspection for all required information, such information must be available for public inspection by any person, and provided: (a) In person during normal business hours; or (b) Electronically, in machine readable format and structured in a way that enables the data to be fully discoverable and useable by the end user: (i) By digital transmission, such as email, promptly upon request, but no later than two business days; or 10 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (ii) By online publication in one of the following formats: (A) On the advertiser’s primary website; or (B) On a website controlled by the advertiser, created for purposes of publishing the information required by this section, if a link is prominently displayed on the advertiser’s primary website directing users to the website on which the information is provided. WAC 390-18-050(4). Prior to the 2018 additions, Meta was already subject to the FCPA under former RCW 42.17A.345(1), which requires that [e]ach commercial advertiser who has accepted or provided political advertising or electioneering communications during the election campaign shall maintain current books of account and related materials … that shall be open for public inspection during normal business hours during the campaign and for a period of no less than five years after the date of the applicable election. Information required under this provision includes the names of parties who purchase political advertisements, plus the cost, manner of payment, and “the exact nature and extent of the services rendered.” Id. Commercial advertisers must provide copies of the information to the PDC upon request. Former RCW 42.17A.345(2). Here, former RCW 42.17A.345 and its implementing legislation, WAC 390-18-050, do not violate Meta’s First Amendment rights. Campaign finance disclosure laws “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). However, they remain a “less 11 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech” that allow states to pursue important interests like informing voters, deterring corruption, and monitoring elections without banning speech outright. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently applied the less restrictive exacting scrutiny standard to campaign-related disclosure laws. Under exacting scrutiny, a disclosure law will be upheld if it is substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 607, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 210 L. Ed. 2d 716 (2021). The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the important role that disclosure laws play in informing voters about how money is spent to influence elections, finding that exacting scrutiny strikes the appropriate balance between upholding the First Amendment while pursuing the goal of election transparency. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76 (upholding required disclosure of campaign contributions “to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (upholding disclosure requirements for campaign advertisements because “disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of 12 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages”); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 192, 199, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 L. Ed. 2d 493 (2010) (holding that public disclosure of referendum signatures “promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other measures cannot”); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 224, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information.”).5 We have also reiterated that “‘exacting scrutiny applies in the campaign finance disclosure context.’” State v. Evergreen Freedom Found., 192 Wn.2d 782, 799, 432 P.3d 805 (2019) (quoting Hum. Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also State v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 198 Wn.2d 888, 893, 502 P.3d 806 (2022) (GMA) (“to guard against infringing on these First Amendment rights, laws mandating disclosure ‘must survive exacting scrutiny’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Voters Educ. Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 161 Wn.2d 470, 482, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007))). 5 The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated in 2021 that “[r]egardless of the type of association, compelled disclosure requirements are reviewed under exacting scrutiny,” expanding application of exacting scrutiny beyond merely campaign finance laws. Ams. for Prosperity, 594 U.S. at 608. 13 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Meta argues that because Washington’s “content-based” disclosure law restricts platforms rather than candidates or lobbyists, it must satisfy strict scrutiny to be constitutional. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 8, 10; see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015). Meta essentially asks for an exception or a change to the exacting scrutiny rule specifically for advertising platforms. It claims that disclosure laws applied to platforms are more likely to suppress speech than disclosure laws aimed at political actors because political actors wish to “‘succeed at the ballot box’” and are unlikely to curtail their speech in the face of disclosure laws, while economically motivated platforms will choose not to carry political advertising at all if disclosure obligations are too costly. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 10 (quoting Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2019)). Neither the Washington nor the U.S. Supreme Courts have previously determined which standard of review should apply to a political advertising disclosure law directed at a social media platform. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court applied exacting scrutiny to a disclosure law aimed at broadcasters. 540 U.S. 93, 237-38, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2003) (overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310). The McConnell Court upheld the law because the Federal Communications Commission 14 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (FCC) needed the broadcasters’ records to monitor compliance with the “fairness doctrine” and because the administrative burden was minimal.6 Id. Even though McConnell predates and is not a perfect analogy for the modern Internet and broadcast digital platforms, McConnell shows that the rationale behind exacting scrutiny applies to nonpolitical entities as well as to political parties. The clear weight of precedent supports exacting scrutiny as the appropriate standard in this case. The rationale behind exacting scrutiny has always been that disclosure laws are “a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech,” allowing the government to pursue the important goal of informing voters without banning anyone from speaking. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 223. The courts do not have a history of carving out exceptions based on the type of actor sharing the speech, and voters benefit just as much from disclosure laws applied to platforms as they do from disclosure laws applied to candidates. This is true even when an entity voluntarily adjusts its business decisions to account for any costs associated with compliance. The disclosure law may impact Meta’s motivation to host political speech, but it does not prevent Meta from hosting the political speech, and Meta’s business decisions should not dictate the appropriate standard of review. Even if 6 The “fairness doctrine” was an FCC rule that required broadcasters to offer a reasonable opportunity for speakers to present opposing viewpoints. The doctrine was abolished. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 113 (2026). 15 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Meta chooses to curtail advertising opportunities, claims of market deterrence do not negate the underlying rationale behind exacting scrutiny. Therefore, exacting scrutiny is the correct standard for assessing the constitutionality of disclosure laws, including the FCPA. The concurrence/dissent argues that deferential scrutiny, not exacting scrutiny, is the applicable standard of scrutiny here because Meta’s transactions with advertisement purchasers are commercial speech. Concurrence/dissent at 10-11. However, “[i]n reviewing the trial court’s decision, we confine ourselves to the issues the parties have raised and which the trial court considered.” Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 606, 809 P.2d 143 (1991). “We may not speculate upon the existence of facts that do not appear in the record.” State v. Blight, 89 Wn.2d 38, 46, 569 P.2d 1129 (1977). Neither Meta nor the State discussed deferential scrutiny in their briefs or at oral argument. Therefore, we will not address whether deferential scrutiny is appropriate in this case. In addition, the FCPA satisfies exacting scrutiny as it requires “‘a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.’” John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67). Furthermore, the disclosure 16 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 requirement is “narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest.” Ams. for Prosperity, 594 U.S. at 608. Meta suggests “the State has failed to establish that less speech-suppressive alternatives would not work to advance its stated interest,” and therefore the law must fail exacting scrutiny.7 Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 20. This misrepresents Americans for Prosperity, which specifically states that the law need not “be the least restrictive means of achieving [the government’s] ends.” 594 U.S. at 608. While it is possible to identify alternative measures Washington could take to inform voters without inconveniencing Meta, that alone is insufficient to find that the law fails exacting scrutiny. Furthermore, none of those alternative options are sufficient to provide full transparency as contemplated by the FCPA. Former RCW 42.17A.001. For example, Meta argues that Washington could limit disclosure obligations to certain periods of time, such as 21 days before the election. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 21. However, this will limit the scope of information voters have access to, especially given how long campaigns can run. Meta also argues that Washington could require Meta to disclose information only on those advertisements the purchaser self-identifies as political. 7 Meta claims that other states have enacted “considerably less intrusive disclosure” laws that shift the burden from platforms to advertisers by requiring purchasers to identify an advertisement as political before the platform is required to disclose it. Pet’r’s Answer to Amicus Curiae Brs. at 14-29. 17 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Id. However, while it is not clear how many advertisements are mislabeled by the purchaser, there is certainly the potential for mislabeled advertisements to go unreported, thus limiting again the scope of information voters have access to. Meta also argues that Washington could require that Meta disclose information only to the State upon request, rather than allowing for individual requests from the public. Pet’r’s Answer to Amicus Curiae Brs. at 21-23. However, the FCPA is intended most of all to protect Washington voters, and the legislature deemed it necessary to allow the public direct access to Meta’s data to achieve full transparency. Finally, amicus argues that the State could merely require Meta to label advertisements on their platforms as “political” to signal to users that they are viewing political content. Br. of Amicus Curiae Digit. Advert. All. at 32-37. However, this approach will provide almost no information because the label “political” will not necessarily tell users where the advertisement came from or why they were targeted by it. No alternative option provides voters with the same scope of information as the disclosure law. The legislature reasonably concluded that the law as is best serves the FCPA’s goal of transparency. As the State explains, “Our federalist system of government contemplates differences between states’ laws,” and the fact that other states have taken different approaches “does not make Washington’s law ‘dubious,’ nor is there anything suspect about the overriding importance Washington voters 18 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 placed on transparency when they adopted the FCPA.” Resp’t’s Answer to Amici Curiae Brs. at 10. Washington’s disclosure law is both substantially related to an important government interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Therefore, it satisfies exacting scrutiny. The “vital provision of information repeatedly has been recognized as a sufficiently important, if not compelling, governmental interest.” Hum. Life, 624 F.3d at 1005-06. The State describes its “important governmental interest” as “achieving election integrity and transparency by requiring timely and detailed information disclosures about political ads, facilitating an informed electorate.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 13-14. Meta does not dispute that this is an important state interest, but it does challenge both the substantial relationship and narrow tailoring prongs of the exacting scrutiny analysis. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 13-14. The State argues that the disclosure law is substantially related to voter education because “[i]nformation about sponsorship, targeting, and reach inform voters about an ad’s intent, meaning, and impact, including if the ad intends to mobilize or demobilize through tactics like fear mongering or misinformation.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 14; see also CP at 6344-59. According to one expert, the public can properly evaluate the meaning and impact of a political advertisement only by knowing who paid for it, what its content is, and who it targets. CP at 6348. 19 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Another expert explained that people may view a political advertisement differently if they knew why it was targeted at them and that knowing how an advertisement is targeted can make it easier to detect misinformation. CP at 6423, 6426. The State also established that only Meta has access to all pertinent information related to their use of microtargeted advertising services. CP at 6364-65. The State has shown that the FCPA is substantially related to the State’s interest in achieving election transparency and fostering an informed electorate. To satisfy the final step of an exacting scrutiny analysis, the disclosure law must “be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest.” Ams. for Prosperity, 594 U.S. at 608. Here, the FCPA is narrowly tailored because only Meta can provide all relevant information related to political advertising on its platforms. Meta makes four primary arguments as to why the disclosure law is so overly burdensome as to fail exacting scrutiny. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 12-22. First, the State can, and in some cases already does, obtain the desired information from other parties. Id. at 14. Second, Meta received only a few disclosure requests from members of the public. Id. at 7, 18. Third, the law disincentivizes platforms from hosting political advertisements, which leads to the sharing of less political information. Id. at 10, 15-17. Fourth, the State has not shown it is technically 20 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 feasible for Meta to comply with the disclosure law. Id. at 18-19. Meta’s arguments are unpersuasive. First, Meta argues the FCPA requirement results in redundant disclosure. It may be true that much, though not all, of the information Meta is required to disclose must also be disclosed by the campaigns or groups that purchase political advertisements. Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 162. However, as one expert explained, the platforms have information the purchasers do not, including demographic information, so applying the disclosure law to Meta yields information not otherwise available to the public. CP at 6366-68; see also Resp’t’s Answer to Amici Curiae Brs. at 29-30 (“When a particularly impactful or controversial political ad is observed, the FCPA’s recordkeeping requirements for commercial advertisers allow the public and media to rapidly access detailed information about that ad from where it was seen or heard rather than having to wait until the next reporting deadline and a potential report that will include only the information available to the sponsor.”). Despite two years of discovery, Meta has not offered sufficient evidence to show that advertisers alone could provide the same information required of Meta. In addition, the State is allowed to require both parties to a transaction to disclose overlapping information, even if other parties could disclose the same data. In fact, 21 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 this further promotes transparency because it gives the public a means of fact- checking. Second, Meta highlights that in this case, three individuals made a total of 12 requests for political advertising information. CP at 256-64. Meta asserts that two of the individuals made the requests solely to test Meta’s compliance and that a third made requests to support a consulting business. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 7; CP at 38- 50, 5241, 7580-82. Meta argues that this type and level of use shows that the law is not substantially related to the goal of informing voters. However, this argument is unconvincing, given that journalists and academics may disseminate information widely even if they submit only one request. Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 162. Third, suggesting it would be “financially irrational” to host political advertisements while the disclosure law is in place, Meta banned political advertisements in Washington in 2018.8 Pet. for Rev. at 2; CP at 615-16. Meta characterizes its decision as evidence that the law subverts, rather than serves, the State’s interest in increasing access to political information. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 15-16; see also Pet’r’s Answer to Amicus Curiae Brs. at 8-9 (“Meta and other major platforms had no realistic choice but to ban Washington political advertising on their services.”). Candidates, particularly those with fewer resources, may be impacted by 8 Despite the ban, political advertisements have continued to run on Meta platforms in Washington since 2018. CP at 7328, 7335, 7372. 22 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Meta’s ban because they rely on its low-cost targeted advertising. 9 CP at 5329-78, 7115-16, 7410-19; see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Inst. for Free Speech at 11-15. Meta repeatedly cites Washington Post, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Maryland law that required platforms, including newspapers, to disclose the purchaser and price of political advertisements displayed on their websites.10 944 F.3d at 514; Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 20. The Fourth Circuit based their holding in part on their conclusion that Maryland’s law discouraged online newspapers from selling political advertising space. Wash. Post, 944 F.3d at 515. However, the Washington Post court expressly limited their holding to news outlets and did not wish to “expound upon the wide world of social media and all the issues that may be pertinent thereto.” Id. at 513. The State counters that “Meta chose not to comply with the FCPA because it was inconsistent with its own stated priorities—not because the law is overly burdensome.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 19; see also Resp’t’s Answer to Amici Curiae Brs. at 37. The superior court agreed, concluding that “‘the only reason why Meta refuses to comply with the law is, to put it colloquially, they don’t want to let the 9 Meta argued at the Court of Appeals that the law overly burdens both its own speech and the speech of its users. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected its argument as to third parties for lack of standing. 10 The Washington Post court declined to determine whether strict scrutiny or exacting scrutiny should apply, instead concluding that the Maryland law failed to satisfy even exacting scrutiny. 944 F.3d at 520. 23 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 public see how the sausage is made.’” Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 174 (quoting CP at 5630). Meta’s ban on advertising is self-imposed and does not impact this court’s exacting scrutiny analysis. Enforcing disclosure requirements is an essential tool the State has available to educate and keep the public informed about how billions of dollars are spent to influence their votes. The State cannot account for internal corporate decisions. Therefore, some platforms may choose to reject political advertisements because they decide it is not in their interest to comply with the requirements of the FCPA. Meta’s argument that the disclosure law reduces the amount of political speech available to the public misconstrues the purpose of the disclosure law, which is to facilitate election transparency, not to ensure a proliferation of political advertisements. FCPA is a disclosure requirement, and “disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they … ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201). Here Meta, not the State, chose to foreclose advertising opportunities for candidates. Finally, whether to consider compliance costs as applied to this type of platform and, if we do so, how it is to be applied are issues of first impression for us. Meta does not dispute that it already collects the required information in its 24 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 regular course of business yet claims that complying with the disclosure law is overly and technically burdensome. 11 CP at 5861-62; see also CP 7167-74; Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 18. Since McConnell, cases assessing ongoing costs associated with disclosure requirements in the FCPA context are few and technology has changed significantly. 540 U.S. 93. In McConnell, a broadcaster claimed that election-related recordkeeping and inspection requirements imposed a serious burden, but the Court rejected their argument because compliance required only about “six to seven hours of work per year” at the whole organization, a minor inconvenience. 540 U.S. at 235. Here, the State’s expert estimated that including a Washington-specific region in Meta’s Ad Library would cost around $200,000, an overall “very inexpensive route” that would be “comfortably within Meta’s capabilities.”12 CP at 6501, 6498, 6495. In response, Meta’s expert witness stated in his report that “complying with the Washington Disclosure Law is not as simple or straightforward” as the State’s experts alleged, explaining that it would be challenging for Meta to identify every political advertisement and would require ongoing human review. CP at 7859; see also Br. of NetChoice et al. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pet’r at 18-23. Additionally, 11 Meta also argues that whether compliance is feasible or not is irrelevant because the burden is still disproportionate, citing Americans for Prosperity. That case, however, turned on the burden imposed on the associational and privacy rights of charitable donors. It does not speak to the issue of technical burdens. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 12-13; Ams. for Prosperity, 594 U.S. at 607. 12 Meta is not required to comply with the law via its Ad Library, but this expert testified that modifying the Ad Library is the most cost-effective option. WAC 390-18-050(4); CP at 6495, 6501. 25 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 updating the Ad Library would require “substantial changes to its carefully designed transparency tools” and responding to individual requests would be a “complex and burdensome process.” CP at 7859, 7870-75, 7880-89; see also CP at 7007. However, Meta has created region-specific disclosure programs for other countries in its Ad Library. CP at 5933-36, 6289-91. The superior court found that “Meta failed to provide evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding its inability to comply, whereas the State presented sufficient evidence explaining both how and why Meta could comply.” CP at 5575. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that “[a]fter years of discovery, we know nothing more about the burden on Meta than high level, even ‘speculative,’ generalities that lack the ‘specificity’ to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 173-74. We also agree. The dissent finds that Meta’s general statements about the difficulties of compliance are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, dissent at 22, but to overcome summary judgment, it is for Meta to “set forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut” the State’s claims. Meyer, 105 Wn.2d at 852 (emphasis added). Meta has failed to do so. After more than two years of discovery, Meta has failed to provide specific details about what compliance with Washington’s FCPA would actually cost, and its expert did not attempt to quantify the resources needed to 26 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 comply, instead stating that some elements of the burden “probably are not subject to very precise quantification.” CP at 7026-27, 7033-54. In addition, at oral argument Meta conceded that it can comply with the law but finds it burdensome to do so and continued to provide only generalized statements about the burden. Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., State v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (Oct. 28, 2025), at 9 min., 06 sec.; 11 min., 57 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-supreme-court-2025101109/. Meta’s ability to comply with our FCPA and its claimed burdens and costs associated with compliance are vague and inconclusive only because Meta failed to provide necessary information that would allow our courts to meaningfully evaluate its claimed burden. Under the facts of this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Meta concedes that it can comply with the FCPA. Any issues of material facts regarding its burden are totally within Meta’s control and exist because of Meta’s refusal to clarify the details of that burden. Meta has complied with similar laws in other jurisdictions yet has failed to disclose requested information required by the FCPA. CP at 5861-62. Washington’s FCPA disclosure requirement is narrowly tailored, and Meta has failed to prove that it is unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the disclosure law satisfies exacting scrutiny. 27 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 2. The superior court’s per-advertisement penalty correctly upholds the FCPA’s goal of full transparency “A person who violates any of the provisions of [the FCPA] may be subject to a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars for each violation.” Former RCW 42.17A.750(1)(c). 13 The FCPA defines a “violation” in the negative, as anything other than a “remediable violation, minor violation, or an error classified by the commission as appropriate to address by a technical correction.” Former RCW 42.17A.005(54) (2025). There is no dispute that Meta committed general violations of WAC 390-18-050. The superior court imposed the maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation, granted attorney fees and costs, and trebled all damages.14 CP at 5791-93, 5814-17. It counted each advertisement included in a request as a separate violation. Id. To reach the total number of 822 advertisements, the court counted advertisements requested by the first two individuals, a total of 411, then doubled that number to account for the third individual’s broad request. 15 CP at 5574, 5791-93. The total 13 The FCPA lists 14 factors the court may consider in assessing a civil penalty, including “the respondent’s compliance history,” the organization’s or individual’s experience with campaign finance law and their available resources, the impact on the public, whether they “benefited politically or economically from noncompliance,” and “[g]ood faith efforts to comply.” Former RCW 42.17A.750(1)(d). 14 The FCPA authorizes the award of “all reasonable costs of investigation and trial, including reasonable attorneys’ fees” and treble damages (of both the penalty and the attorney fees) if the violation is intentional. Former RCW 42.17A.780. 15 The third requester sought information on “‘every political ad shown in Washington State since 2016,’” which included at least 1,600 advertisements, including every advertisement sought in the earlier two requests. CP at 5574. 28 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 penalty is $35,182,159.59, including $24,660,000.00 in civil penalties and $10,522,159.59 in costs. CP at 5791-93, 5814-17.16 The FCPA is intended to be “liberally construed” to allow for maximum disclosure, and a per-advertisement calculation is best aligned with that objective. Former RCW 42.17A.001; see also former RCW 42.17A.904 (1973). Meta argues that the superior court should have assessed a penalty for each request it failed to adequately respond to (12) rather than for each advertisement included in those requests (822). Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 22-23. It argues that “[a] platform satisfies its obligations under the disclosure law by making information available ‘promptly upon request.’” Id. at 23 (quoting WAC 390-18-350(4)(b)(i)). Therefore, in Meta’s view, the only violation it can be penalized for is the failure to respond to a request. The State argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Meta, as a commercial advertiser, is required under former RCW 42.17A.345(1)-(2) to “‘maintain current books of account and related material[]’ that shall remain ‘open’ for public inspection” during normal business hours. Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. at 23. As a result, each The superior court calculated the number of advertisements in the scope of the third request by adding together the number of advertisements sought in the two earlier requests. 16 At the summary judgment hearing, the judge stated that “enforcement penalties and so on – have to be limited to the requests ... [w]hen somebody makes a request and they don’t produce it, then they’re not complying with the law. But before … I don’t think that’s something I can enforce against them with – absent somebody making a request.” Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 195 (alterations in original) (quoting CP at 5526-27). In its final written order, the superior court calculated Meta’s penalty on a per-advertisement basis. CP at 5575, 5587. Because its ultimate conclusion was correct, the superior court’s initial thoughts on the matter are irrelevant. 29 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 advertisement for which Meta fails to provide the required information is a separate violation.17 We find the superior court’s calculation of damages based on the number of advertisements where Meta failed to disclose the required information is correct and best supports the legislative intent. The legislature intends maximum disclosure, and to support this position every advertisement is subject to the disclosure requirements. Former RCW 42.17A.001. Former RCW 42.17A.750 discusses penalties imposed on those who fail to file reports “as required by this chapter,” referring to FCPA provisions requiring candidates, political committees, and lobbyists to file automatic disclosure reports. Former RCW 42.17A.345. “A person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter may be subject to a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars for each violation.” Former RCW 42.17A.750(1)(c). The listed entities clearly commit a “violation” when they fail to file an accurate report. However, platforms like Meta are not obligated to file regular reports. Therefore, the moment at which they commit 17 Meta cites a nonpublic document created by the PDC stating that “[b]asing the number of violations solely upon the number of ads referenced in a request could quickly lead to a penalty amount grossly disproportionate to other violations of RCW 42.17A.” CP at 8011. The Court of Appeals dismissed the document as “hardly convincing” and correctly pointed out that under a de novo review, they are not required to interpret the law in accordance with unofficial commentary. Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 199-200. We are also under no obligation to do so and do not find this document, which represents the opinion of one PDC staffer, persuasive. 30 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 a “violation” is less clear.18 To comply with the FCPA, Meta is required to do three things. First, Meta must “maintain current books of account and related materials as provided by rule that shall be open for public inspection during normal business hours during the campaign and for a period of no less than five years after the date of the applicable election.” Former RCW 42.17A.345(1). Second, “[a]t the request of the commission,” Meta “shall provide to the commission copies of the information that must be maintained and be open for public inspection.” Former RCW 42.17A.345(2). Third, Meta is required to disclose additional information in the following manner: (4) Until such time as the PDC provides an open access platform on its website for this information, which will replace the following methods of inspection for all required information, such information must be available for public inspection by any person, and provided: (a) In person during normal business hours; or (b) Electronically, in machine readable format and structured in a way that enables the data to be fully discoverable and useable by the end user: (i) By digital transmission, such as email, promptly upon request, but no later than two business days; or (ii) By online publication in one of the following formats: 18 Both parties cite Bittner v. United States in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided whether a person who has failed to file annual disclosure statements about their foreign bank accounts may be assessed a $10,000 penalty per faulty annual report or per each account they failed to disclose. 598 U.S. 85, 89, 143 S. Ct. 713, 215 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2023). There, because each individual had the obligation to file only one annual report regardless of how many foreign bank accounts they had, the court favored the per-report reading. Id. Similarly, in GMA, this court considered penalties for political actors who were obligated to file automatic reports. 198 Wn.2d at 894. Neither case is analogous here because both scenarios involved regular required reports. 31 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 (A) On the advertiser’s primary website; or (B) On a website controlled by the advertiser, created for purposes of publishing the information required by this section, if a link is prominently displayed on the advertiser’s primary website directing users to the website on which the information is provided. WAC 390-18-050. This third provision gives Meta four disclosure options, including but not limited to providing information “promptly upon request.” WAC 390-18- 050(4)(b)(i). The FCPA contains a “Declaration of Policy.” The legislature’s purpose in enacting the law is “[t]hat political campaign and lobbying contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed to the public and that secrecy is to be avoided.” Former RCW 42.17A.001(1). The law “shall be liberally construed” to promote its goals. Former RCW 42.17A.001(11); see also former RCW 42.17A.904. In sum, the Court of Appeals concluded, this language demonstrates an “intent to preserve and sunlight relevant data of each individual ad on Meta’s social media platforms, without any requirement that any particular voter or the government step into the sunlight to inspect the records.” Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 197. Additional language in the statute reaffirms “that timely and full disclosure of election campaign funding and expenditures is essential to a well-functioning democracy” and that the legislature “intends, therefore, to promote greater transparency for the public by enhancing penalties for violations.” LAWS OF 2011, ch. 145, § 1 (emphasis added). 32 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 We agree that the disclosure law, taken as a whole, shows that the legislature intended that Meta be held accountable for each advertisement it fails to disclose to the public when a request is made. Meta is correct that this procedure means the State will have no opportunity to assess a penalty until a request is made. However, under Meta’s interpretation, the failure to disclose information related to 1 advertisement in response to one request will receive the same penalty as the failure to disclose information related to 100 advertisements sought in one request. Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. at 25-26. This interpretation is unpersuasive because each advertisement that is not disclosed deprives voters of relevant information about how and by whom campaign finance dollars are spent. The disclosure law clearly and repeatedly promotes maximum disclosure of campaign finance information. It creates a right of “public inspection by any person,” WAC 390-18-050(4), and it seeks to ensure that information is “fully disclosed to the public.” Former RCW 42.17A.001(1). The Court of Appeals aptly explained: [O]ur courts, in a variety of different but related settings, have reiterated the Washington’s campaign finance laws’ intent to ensure full disclosure of individual records. … These statements of intent do not rely on the voter prompting or availing themselves of such transparency. 33 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 198. Consequently, each advertisement that is required to be disclosed but is not should be considered a separate violation. This interpretation best supports the legislature’s intent to promote maximum disclosure of all election finance information that contributes to voter education. It also aligns with the legislature’s intent to enhance public penalties to promote greater transparency.19 Furthermore, the statute permits up to $10,000 in penalties per violation, but the trial judge has considerable discretion in determining a penalty and is authorized to consider multiple factors, such as a history of compliance, available resources, and good faith efforts. Former RCW 42.17A.750(c), (d). Here, the court faced a willful repeat offender with vast resources that conceded it is able to comply with FCPA requests but chose not to provide nonspeculative reasons for its decision not to do so. The trial court’s decision to impose the maximum penalty was appropriate, but just because hundreds of advertisements may be included in a request does not mean a penalty will always lead to a “grossly disproportionate” penalty. It is one of many factors the court considers as the court here did. 19 Meta asks this court to apply the rule of lenity because the meaning of “violation” is ambiguous. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 28-29. We do not find the meaning of “violation” ambiguous. Therefore, the rule of lenity is not appropriate here. 34 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 3. The superior court’s penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,” which includes a prohibition against “excessive fines.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.20 Fines are excessive if they are “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense,” as determined by “(1) the nature and extent of the crime, (2) whether the violation was related to other illegal activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and (4) the extent of the harm caused.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 141 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1998); United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); see also City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 173, 493 P.3d 94 (2021). For the purposes of this analysis, we assume without deciding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “excessive fines” protects corporate entities such as Meta. The penalty assessed to Meta here is not excessive as it is not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of Meta’s offense. First, Meta is a sophisticated, well- resourced platform that willfully violated the FCPA after previously being held 20 The Court of Appeals declined to consider Meta’s federal Eighth Amendment argument because Meta did not address it in detail in its brief. Meta, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 207 n.37 (reasoning that “‘[p]assing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration’” (quoting Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996))). 35 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 accountable for prior noncompliance. CP at 5859, 5861-62, 5956-60. Meta has not shown a good-faith effort to comply with the disclosure law, even though after two years of discovery it admits it has the capability to comply, and the court received information that Meta has updated its Ad Library to meet requirements of other jurisdictions. CP at 6289-91. Meta is being penalized for willfully violating the disclosure law at least 822 times, not for “abstract concerns about election integrity,” as the dissent claims. Dissent at 41. The “nature and extent” of Meta’s violations are significant. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. Meta finally disclosing some of the required information does not change the fact that it intentionally withheld information the requesters were entitled to receive. In GMA, this court upheld an $18 million penalty against a trade group that failed to file required disclosure reports and funneled $11 million through a “strategic account” with the purpose of sheltering political donors from disclosure requirements. 198 Wn.2d at 894. The dissent distinguishes this case from GMA by giving Meta credit for disclosing at least the purchaser and cost of advertisements via its Ad Library. Dissent at 43. However, Meta’s disclosure of the cost and the identity of the purchaser does not necessarily decrease the severity of the infraction. The disclosure law seeks to shed light on the methods Meta uses to disseminate political advertisements, specifically through microtargeting, and Meta’s limited 36 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 disclosure fails to meet the related requirements that serve that purpose under the disclosure law. Meta’s failure to disclose the purchasers’ identities might have made the infraction worse, but the fact that Meta did disclose some information does not mean the penalty must be reduced. The dissent indicates that GMA’s violations were more severe than Meta’s, but even taking that assertion as true, GMA does not set a ceiling on appropriate penalties. Dissent at 44. Meta’s actions show a willful and repeated disregard for the disclosure law, and the nature and extent of its violations justify the penalty. The second and third Bajakajian factors are not relevant here as neither side argues that Meta’s activities relate to other legal violations or that other penalties (save for an injunction) may be imposed. 21 Meta argues that the fourth Bajakajian factor, the “extent of the harm,” is limited only to the three individuals whose requests went unfulfilled. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 30-31. In GMA, this court emphasized the importance our disclosure law places on transparency and how the trade group’s conduct directly flouted that purpose. The GMA reasoning is applicable here. Meta did not outright hide the identity of political contributors, but its repeated failures to disclose required 21 The dissent argues that “[t]he fact that Meta’s activities do not relate to other violations actually weighs in favor of Meta here.” Dissent at 45. We disagree. Meta’s violations of the disclosure law here alone provide a sufficient basis on which to impose a penalty whether it is part of a “larger plot” to “undermine election transparency” or not. Id. Meta should not get credit for not participating in additional illegal activities. 37 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 information similarly defy the FCPA’s strong goal of promoting transparency. Reducing the penalty would undercut the disclosure law’s clearly worded intent to enhance penalties for violators. Plus, the disclosure law is written in such a way that it allows any member of the public to request information from Meta and do with it what they wish, including publishing and disseminating that information widely. Meta’s failure to disclose the required information thus constructively denies all members of the public the opportunity to access information the legislature has deemed important to the law’s purpose. In our view, that harm is extensive. Finally, “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336. The legislature here authorized a $10,000 maximum per violation and the trebling of all damages, and the superior court within its discretion sustainably imposed the penalty. Accordingly, the amount of the penalty did not violate Meta’s federal Eighth Amendment rights. CONCLUSION We affirm the Court of Appeals. 38 State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 103748-1 WE CONCUR.