The order of the circuit court directing the clerk of the Glendale municipal court to accept a “perfected jury demand of Richard F. Mattingly” is reversed because Mattingly’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and not in writing, and the jury demand was not accompanied by the payment of the jury fee.

A uniform traffic citation issued to Mattingly on June 21, 1981, required his appearance in Glendale municipal court on July 2, 1981. On June 30, 1981, the clerk of the court received a letter1 dated June 25, 1981, stating *55Mattingly’s “wish to plead not guilty” to the charge and requesting a continuance from July 2 to July 30, 1981, at 8:30 a.m. The municipal court continued the case to July 30, 1981, when an attorney for Mattingly appeared and orally requested a jury trial. No written demand appears in the record. The municipal court refused the request as untimely and set a new court trial date for September 17, 1981. On the latter date the attorney for Mattingly delivered to the municipal court an alternative writ of prohibition issued by Judge Jennaro which suspended further proceedings in the municipal court and resulted in the order to accept a “perfected jury demand.”

Mattingly waived his right to a jury trial (sec. 345.43 (1) (a), Stats.) when:

(1) his jury trial demand was not made in writing; and

(2) the jury trial demand was not accompanied by the immediate payment of jury fees prescribed by sec. 345.43(1) (b).

By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the circuit court proceeding.