This is a consolidated appeal from non-final orders by the trial court declining to undertake de novo review of a determination by a court commissioner that there was probable cause to detain *203involuntarily Louise M. and Theodore S. under the civil-commitment criteria set out in § 51.15(1), Stats.1 *204We reverse.

Probable-cause hearings for both Louise M. and Theodore S. were held under § 51.20(7), Stats., which provides, inter alia, that if a person "is detained under s. 51.15 ... the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the allegations" in support of detention. Court commissioners are empowered by statute to hold this type of probable-cause hearing in lieu of the circuit court. See § 757.69(1)(h), Stats.2 After the trial court denied de *205novo review, both Louise M. and Theodore S. sought jury trials, as is permitted by § 51.20(11), Stats. The petitions for involuntary commitment of both Louise M. and Theodore S. were subsequently dismissed. Louise M. was held under her involuntary-detention order for seventeen days; Theodore S. was held under his involuntary-detention order for nineteen days.

The question of whether there must be de novo review in the circuit court of a court commissioner's finding of probable cause under § 51.20(7), Stats., is a question of law that we review de novo. See Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. Town of Rhine, 170 Wis. 2d 293, 298-299, 488 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1992). Neither Louise M. nor Theodore S. are now in custody. Thus, whether there was probable cause to hold them in involuntary detention is moot. Nevertheless, we consider their appeal because this case presents an important issue that is likely to recur. See State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 340 N.W.2d 460, 464 (1983).

We do not write on a clean slate. Dane County v. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992), held that review of a court commissioner's determination under § 51.20(7), Stats., that there was no probable cause to detain a person involuntarily was reviewable in the first instance by the circuit court and that the review must be de novo. Id., 165 Wis. 2d at 705, 478 N.W.2d at 385. C.M.B.'s rationale was clear: First, § 51.20(15), Stats., provides that appeals in civil-commitment matters "may be taken to the court of *206appeals." See id., 165 Wis. 2d at 707, 478 N.W.2d at 386. Second, § 808.03(1), Stats., provides that a "final judgment or a final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise provided by law." See id., 165 Wis. 2d at 708, 478 N.W.2d at 386. Third, § 808.03(1) does not authorize appeals to the court of appeals from an order of a court commissioner because "an order of a court commissioner is not the equivalent of a final order or judgment of a circuit court." Ibid. Fourth, § 51.20(15), Stats., does not modify the necessity that the order appealed from be that of a circuit court because the word "appeal" "is expressly defined under sec. 809.01(1) to mean 'a review in an appellate court by appeal or writ of error authorized by law of a judgment or order of a circuit court.'" Id., 165 Wis. 2d at 708-709, 478 N.W.2d at 386-387. (Emphasis by C.M.B.)

Thus, an appeal by definition can only be from a judgment or order of a circuit court. Since a court commissioner's order is not the equivalent of an order or judgment of the circuit court, and since the order appealed from must come from the circuit court, we conclude that the court commissioner's order cannot be appealed directly to the court of appeals but must first go to the circuit court.

Id., 165 Wis. 2d at 709, 478 N.W.2d at 387. C.M.B. thus held that the circuit court was empowered to review determinations made under § 51.20(7) by the court commissioner and that such review was to be de novo. Id., 165 Wis. 2d at 709-713, 478 N.W.2d at 387-389.

The trial court here declined to review the probable-cause determinations by the court commissioner because, in the trial court's view, C.M.B. was limited to those instances where the court commissioner found *207that there was no probable cause. We disagree and see no principled distinction between the two situations.

Section 51.20(15), Stats., authorizes appeals to the court of appeals. There is nothing in the provision limiting this right of appeal to those situations where the court commissioner has found no probable cause; indeed, given the liberty interest of those who are potential subjects of civil-commitment, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990) ("there is a substantial liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital"), we are constrained not to construe the applicable statutes to foreclose appellate review of orders continuing confinement. Under C.M.B., the court of appeals may not review directly an order of a court commissioner. Thus, intermediate review by the circuit court is required. Section 808.03(2), STATS., specifically permits appeals from non-final orders when that is appropriate.3 Thus, it is a distinction without a difference that C.M.B. concerned an appeal from a final order and this case concerns an appeal from a non-final order. Accordingly, the orders of the trial court declining to exercise de novo review of the probable-cause determinations by the court commissioner are reversed.

*208Under our supervisory authority over the circuit courts, see Wis. Const. art. VII, § 5(3); § 752.02, Stats.; United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 258, 263-264, 338 N.W.2d 298, 300-301 (Ct. App. 1983), we adopt for de novo review by the circuit court the time limits established in § 51.20(7)(a), Stats.: absent extraordinary circumstances, the de novo-review hearing must, if requested by either party, be held within seventy-two hours after the order of the court commissioner from which such review is sought.4

By the Court. — Orders reversed.

(dissenting). Is a court commissioner’s probable cause finding for an emergency detention hearing,1 based upon the criteria set forth in § 51.15(1), Stats., reviewable by the circuit court when the underlying petitions for involuntary commitment were dismissed with prejudice?

The majority concludes that such review exists. It is axiomatic, however, that a right of review is the creature of statute. I conclude that Article VII, Section 8, of the Wisconsin Constitution does not authorize, nor do the Wisconsin statutes provide for, such a review. *209Further, such review may not be reasonably implied from § 51.20, Stats.

The majority relies in part upon Dane County v. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992), in reaching its conclusion. See majority op. at 205-07. C.M.B. is distinguishable, and inapplicable, because in C.M.B., the court commissioner entered a final order dismissing the action for want of probable cause. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d at 706, 478 N.W.2d at 385-86.

With judicial resources in this state stretched nearly to the breaking point, I am dismayed by the majority's creation of such a review out of the miasma of "our supervisory authority over the circuit courts." See majority op. at 208. Equally perplexing to me are Louise M. and Theodore S.'s suggestions in their reply brief that the circuit court should conduct another probable cause hearing, and that we should direct the circuit court to adopt a new rule to that effect in all cases of this type. We should affirm the order of the trial court granting the County's motion to dismiss the requests of Louise M. and Theodore S. for a de novo hearing on the commissioner's probable cause finding and order.

For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.