The State appeals an order that reinstated Casanova Liquor Store, Inc., as a Wisconsin corporation even though Casanova failed to file for reinstatement by the secretary of state within the statutorily allotted time period.1 The circuit court granted the order on the grounds that § 180.1423, Stats.,2 unambiguously gives the power to reinstate dissolved corporations in its discretion even if the application for *951reinstatement was untimely.3 Because we conclude that § 180.1423(3) does not allow a circuit court to reinstate a corporation that failed to timely file an application for reinstatement, we reverse the circuit court.

The secretary of state administratively dissolved Casanova on June 22, 1991, by sending it a Certificate of Administrative Dissolution. Casanova was dissolved because it (1) had not paid the annual report fee within one year after it was due, and (2) had not delivered its annual report within one year after it was due.

Pursuant to § 180.1422(1), Stats.,4 the secretary of state is only authorized to grant reinstatement within two years after the effective date of dissolution. There*952fore, the last day on which Casanova could apply for reinstatement was approximately June 22, 1993. However, Casanova failed to apply until March 30, 1994. Consequently, the secretary of state informed Casanova it could not act upon the application because Casanova filed the application beyond the time allowed in § 180.1422(1).

Casanova initiated an action in circuit court seeking an order reinstating it as a Wisconsin corporation. The circuit court granted the order on the grounds that § 180.1423(3), Stats., gives it unlimited authority to reinstate corporations and that factual circumstances excused Casanova from applying for reinstatement within the time allowed by § 180.1422(1), Stats. The secretary of state appeals the circuit court's conclusion that § 180.1423(3) grants the court authority to reinstate a corporation when the corporation did not file a timely application with the secretary of state.

Our decision regarding the power conferred to circuit courts by § 180.1423(3), Stats., raises an issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. State ex rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry, 173 Wis. 2d 222, 225, 496 N.W.2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1992). Only if a statute is ambiguous are we permitted to look beyond the statutory language. In re T.P.S., 168 Wis. 2d 259, 263, 483 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Ct. App. 1992). The interaction between two statutes can create an ambiguity. *953State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 49, 270 N.W.2d 160, 166 (1978).

Section 180.1423, Stats., is ambiguous because it fails to specify whether a circuit court can reinstate a corporation if the corporation failed to file a timely application for reinstatement. Section 180.1423(3), Stats., seemingly grants the circuit court broad discretion to reinstate any corporation. However, § 180.1423(2), Stats., only allows a corporation to appeal the secretary of state's "denial of reinstatement" to the circuit court.5 The interaction between these two subsections renders § 180.1423 ambiguous.

When construing a statute, we should consider its context. Sweet v. Medical Exam. Bd., 147 Wis. 2d 539, 544, 433 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Ct. App. 1988). Casanova's broad interpretation of § 180.1423(3), Stats., isolates it from the rest of § 180.1423, as well as from § 180.1422, Stats. Read in its entirety, § 180.1423 provides several indications that it applies only to situations in which the secretary of state has made a discretionary decision to deny the application under § 180.1422. First, § 180.1423 is entitled "Appeal from denial of reinstatement." Next, subsec. (1) begins, "[i]f the secretary of state denies a corporation's application for reinstatement under s. 180.1422 . . . ." Finally, subsec. (2) begins, "[t]he corporation may appeal the denial of reinstatement to the circuit court . . . ." (Emphasis *954added.) We conclude that § 180.1423 provides an appeal to the circuit court only if the application to be reinstated to the secretary of state was timely and the secretary of state denied the application under § 180.1422.

Casanova's literal interpretation of § 180.1423(3), Stats., defeats the purpose of the time limit for reinstatement under § 180.1422(1), STATS., because under that interpretation a corporation could obtain a trial de novo in court at any time after a corporate dissolution. An interpretation making a closely related statute meaningless is an unreasonable interpretation. Courts should try to avoid an interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it superfluous. State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 437 N.W.2d 878, 880 (1989). We may reject the literal reading of a statute if it leads to an unreasonable result. See Bob Ryan Leasing v. Sampair, 125 Wis. 2d 266, 268, 371 N.W.2d 405, 405-06 (Ct. App. 1985). We reject Casanova's interpretation as unreasonable.

Casanova's interpretation of § 180.1423(3), Stats., which gives a court unbridled discretion to reinstate a corporation, allows courts to encroach upon the power of an administrative agency.6 The judicial branch may review an administrative agency's resolution of questions of fact and legal conclusions; however, the judicial branch is foreclosed from making legislative decisions itself. See Pleasant Prairie v. Department of Loc. Aff., 113 Wis. 2d 327, 345, 334 N.W.2d 893, 902-03 (1983). *955Under Casanova's interpretation, a corporation would never have reason to apply to the secretary of state for reinstatement; the corporation could simply skip that step and go directly to court. Hence, the circuit court would become the branch in charge of reinstating corporations. Our interpretation avoids this result.

In conclusion, we hold that § 180.1423(3), Stats., is rendered ambiguous by its failure to specify whether it allows the circuit court to reinstate a corporation that fails to make a timely application for reinstatement to the secretary of state. We construe the ambiguous statute as not allowing a circuit court to reinstate a corporation under such circumstances because of its interplay with § 180.1422, Stats., its context and the undesirable consequences of a contrary construction.

By the Court. — Order reversed.