State v. Roundtree
State v. Roundtree
Opinion of the Court
¶1 Leevan Roundtree, by counsel, appeals a judgment convicting him of possession of a firearm by a felon. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Roundtree was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to his 2003 felony conviction of two counts of failure to pay child support. Roundtree was charged under the felon-in-possession statute, WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2) (2013-14),
¶3 Roundtree filed a postconviction motion, arguing that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, since his felony conviction was for a nonviolent crime, failure to pay child support. The circuit court denied the motion on the basis that Roundtree waived the right to pursue a constitutional challenge when he entered his guilty plea. Roundtree now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. State v. Wood ,
DISCUSSION
¶5 Roundtree makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that Wisconsin's lifetime firearm ban for all felons, as codified in WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2), is unconstitutional as applied to him, a person convicted of failure to pay child support. Second, Roundtree argues that the guilty plea waiver rule does not bar him from pursuing his as-applied constitutional challenge. We need not decide the second issue because, regardless of whether Roundtree forfeited the constitutional argument by entering a guilty plea, we conclude that the argument fails on its merits.
¶6 When a statute is unconstitutional on its face, it is "void 'from its beginning to the end.' " Wood ,
¶7 Roundtree argues that Wisconsin's lifetime firearm ban for felons is unconstitutional as applied to him because he was convicted of failure to pay child support, a nonviolent felony. As we explain, Roundtree's notion that his particular nonviolent felony matters is incorrect. Rather, it is settled law that the firearm ban applies regardless of the defendant's particular felony.
¶8 In State v. Pocian ,
¶9 This court rejected a similar as-applied constitutional challenge to the felon-in-possession statute in State v. Culver ,
We plainly concluded that the ban on both violent and nonviolent felons is constitutional, Pocian ,341 Wis. 2d 380 , ¶12, and we plainly must follow that holding: "[T]he court of appeals may not overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals." Cook v. Cook ,208 Wis. 2d 166 , 190,560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).
¶10 Like the defendant in Culver , Roundtree attempts to distinguish the factual circumstances of his underlying felony and his felon-in-possession conviction from those in Pocian . Roundtree also argues that this court should not consider Pocian controlling because to do so would disregard "the very nature of as-applied challenges." He asserts that, because this case involves an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as to a particular person under particular circumstances, Pocian's holding neither precludes his argument nor resolves the issue raised. We disagree.
¶11 Roundtree's argument fails for the same reason the Culver defendant's argument failed. Like Roundtree, the defendant in Culver argued that it matters what particular nonviolent felony is the subject of the underlying conviction. We rejected that proposition, stating that "we plainly must follow" Pocian . See Culver ,
¶12 In sum, it is undisputed that Roundtree is a felon. The ban on felons possessing firearms is therefore constitutional as to him.
By the Court. -Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).
The Honorable William S. Pocan presided over the plea hearing and entered the judgment of conviction. The Honorable David A. Hansher entered the order denying Roundtree's postconviction motion.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise noted. Pursuant to 2015 Wis. Act 109, § 8,
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.