UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

KURTIS D. JONES,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-CV-1153-JPS

HEATHER KRUEGER, ALEXANDER HOLLFELDER, and DR. JASMINE ORDER FELIX,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Kurtis D. Jones, an inmate confined at Waupun Correctional Institution (“WCI”), filed a pro se complaint under

alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by ignoring his risk of self-harm. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See

(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee.

§ 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee.

(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account.

On September 11, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $12.77. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on October 12, 2023. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 5, and will deny his earlier motion, ECF No. 2, requesting the same relief as moot. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats,

(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison,

(7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

(citing Twombly,

). To state a claim for relief under

, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp.,

(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee,

(7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal,

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio,

(7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff names Defendants Heather Krueger (“Krueger”), Alexander Hollfelder (“Hollfelder”), and Dr. Jasmine Felix (“Felix”) as defendants who violated his Eighth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to his serious risk of self-harm. ECF No. 1. On February 19, 2023, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Krueger neared Plaintiff’s cell and he asked her to hand him a phone cord from a few cells down. Id. at 2. Krueger refused. Id. Plaintiff then told Krueger that he needed to see psychiatric services because he felt like “slicing up” and showed her a razor. Id. Krueger told him that no one would be pulled out so “you’re just going to have to do what you have to do.” Id. Plaintiff continued to scream and say that Krueger knew he was not bluffing and needed to call a nurse. Id. Hollfelder was trailing behind Krueger and asked what was going on. Id. Plaintiff told him and that Plaintiff was going to take a hospital trip now. Id. Hollfelder looked at Krueger, looked back at Plaintiff, shook his head, and continued to move on. Id. Krueger and Hollfelder both ignored policy when they failed to get him help. Id. at 3. Plaintiff immediately started slicing at his antecubital artery until blood started spraying out. Id. Plaintiff stayed at his cell front, allowing blood to spray out all over the tier, until the bell for count rang. Id. At approximately 5:10 p.m., Plaintiff heard Krueger yell for standing count. Id. When she got about three to four cells away from Plaintiff’s door, she radioed for a supervisor and left the range. Id. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Captain Greil appeared at Plaintiff’s cell front to gain compliance for Nurse Jenna to look at his wound, clean it, and take him to observation. Id. On the way to observation, Captain Greil asked if Plaintiff had anything that he could use to harm himself. Id. at 4. Plaintiff replied that he always did. Id. She asked if Plaintiff was willing to give it up, but he replied, “Never.” Id. She asked if Plaintiff was going to be safe that night and he replied, “Probably not.” Id. Plaintiff was placed in the strip cell to be searched for contraband. Id. Captain Greil called Felix, the on-call clinician on observation. Id. Plaintiff’s razors could not be found at that time, so he was placed on observation. Id. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff started cutting his left antecubital artery with a spare razor and bled out profusely. Id. Plaintiff was taken to HSU for treatment and Lt. Fisher asked if he had any more razors. Id. Plaintiff said he did. Id. Lt. Fisher asked if he could have the razors and Plaintiff said, “No. I gave you one already.” Id. He asked if Plaintiff was going to “chill out” yet and Plaintiff replied that he probably would not. Id. Plaintiff was again placed in the strip cell to be searched while Fisher called Felix to tell her about what happened. Id. Felix cleared Plaintiff to go back to observation. Id. Plaintiff maintains that Felix was deliberately indifferent to his safety by only placing him in observation when she knew he had access to a razor and planned to hurt himself again. Plaintiff needed to be strapped down in restraints for his safety. Id. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Krueger, Hollfelder, and Felix for their indifference to the risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety and to ensure that inmates receive adequate care.” Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56,

, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,

(1994)). While a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment, not every claim by a prisoner that he did not receive adequate care will succeed.

(citing Estelle v. Gamble,

, 104–05 (1976)). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff will have to provide evidence showing that “(1) his medical need was objectively serious, and (2) the defendant[] consciously disregarded this need.” Berry v. Lutsey,

, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer,

). Prison staff have a duty to prevent inmates from causing serious harm to themselves. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison,

, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014). Before an official will be liable for ignoring a risk of self-harm, however, the “risk of future harm must be sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Davis-Clair v. Turck,

(7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of when that risk of future harm becomes “sure or very likely to give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers” depends on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Freeman v. Berge,

, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “at some point,” to ensure a prisoner is not “seriously endangering his health,” prison officials would have a duty and right to step in and force a prisoner on a hunger strike to take nourishment); see also Davis v. Gee, No. 14-cv-617,

, at *3–4 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2017) (holding that to show a constitutional injury, the harm must present an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of serious damage to future health; swallowing a handful of Tylenol fails to do that). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Krueger, Hollfelder, and Felix were aware that he planned to hurt himself and failed to appropriately act. Plaintiff further alleges that after they were aware of Plaintiff’s threats, they did not appropriately respond, and that Plaintiff engaged in self-harm and was seriously injured. At this early stage, without more detailed information, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed on a deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Krueger, Hollfelder, and Felix 3. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b): Claim One: Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Krueger, Hollfelder, and Felix for their indifference to the serious risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. The Court has enclosed with this Order guides prepared by court staff to address common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. These guides are entitled, “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions.” They contain information that Plaintiff may find useful in prosecuting his case. Defendants should take note that, within forty-five (45) days of service of this Order, they are to file a summary judgment motion that raises all exhaustion-related challenges. The Court will issue a scheduling order at a later date that embodies other relevant deadlines. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s initial motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2, be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 5, be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, a copy of the complaint and this Order have been electronically transmitted to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Defendants Krueger, Hollfelder, and Felix; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the informal service agreement, those Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty (60) days; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants raise any exhaustion- related challenges by filing a motion for summary judgment within forty- five (45) days of service; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED if Defendants contemplate a motion to dismiss, the parties must meet and confer before the motion is filed. Defendants should take care to explain the reasons why they intend to move to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff should strongly consider filing an amended complaint. The Court expects this exercise in efficiency will obviate the need to file most motions to dismiss. Indeed, when the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it typically grants leave to amend unless it is “certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Harris v. Meisner, No. 20-2650,

, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021) (quoting Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind.,

(7th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, it is in both parties’ interest to discuss the matter prior to motion submissions. Briefs in support of, or opposition to, motions to dismiss should cite no more than ten (10) cases per claim. No string citations will be accepted. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is hereby warned that he must file a response, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.), or he may be deemed to have waived any argument against dismissal and face dismissal of this matter with prejudice; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $337.23 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with

(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this case. If Plaintiff is transferred to another county, state, or federal institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with his remaining balance to the receiving institution; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office mail Plaintiff a copy of the guides entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions,” along with this Order. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 22nd day of November, 2023. BY THE COURT:

WD te) Fa rather J. tak ueller U.S. District Judge

Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. If mail is received directly to the Court’s chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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